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Summary 
 
What role do political institutions play in determining whether countries coming out of 
conflict manage to remain peaceful or revert to war? The current literature has 
addressed this question either from a highly aggregated perspective, by analyzing a 
country’s regime type, or has focused on one specific institution only, namely post-
conflict elections. Results of the first approach show no clear connection between 
democracy and conflict recurrence, while results of the second have led several authors 
to warn of the destabilizing effects of elections in post-conflict contexts. In this 
dissertation I instead show that specific types of political participation can significantly 
increase a country’s chances to remain peaceful.  
Three main chapters unpack the relationship between political institutions and conflict 
recurrence. The first chapter looks at how local elections can reduce the risk of conflict 
recurrence by providing the population with access to the political system and giving 
the post-conflict elite an opportunity to influence policy-making. The second chapter 
takes a closer look at the role institutional change, in the form of constitution-writing, 
can play in stabilizing post-conflict countries. The third chapter then turns the focus to 
international efforts to promote peace after civil war and uses Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA), rather than quantitative analyses as in the first two chapters, to 
identify successful strategies of international peacebuilding. 
Overall, this thesis expands the current literature by disaggregating the political-set up 
of post-conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) specific political institutions have 
a pacifying effect 2) institutional change can be good for peace and 3) international 
support to political processes and governance is an important strategy in building 
sustainable peace. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Most post-conflict countries struggle immensely to sustain peace. Almost 50% of all 
countries that suffered a civil war between 1946 and 2011 experienced renewed 
conflict, resulting in new suffering, human loss and destruction.1 In 2013, only 5% of 
all active civil wars – if not protracted for two decades or more – had never experienced 
conflict before (Fiedler et al., 2016). How to sustain peace in post-conflict countries 
has therefore become the focus of much international efforts as well as a large scholarly 
debate (Collier et al., 2008, Mason et al., 2011, Walter, 1999, Walter, 2004, World 
Bank, 2011). This thesis contributes to the existing literature by unpacking the 
relationship between specific political institutions and conflict recurrence. 
 
As the numbers above demonstrate, the risk of conflict recurrence is constantly looming 
large in post-conflict countries. Although violent conflict came to an end, a post-
conflict situation must be seen as a continuous (bargaining) process in which either side 
can quickly decide to reject the current arrangement and go back to war. This regards 
the belligerents of the previous conflict – the former rebel group(s) and government. 
At the same time new conflict can also erupt from new rebel groups emerging, either 
                                                 
1
  Based on own data presented in Chapter 2. Walter (2014) and Collier et al. (2008) present similar 
figures.  
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because the post-conflict set-up fuels new grievances or provides them with the 
opportunity to act upon existing ones. Furthermore, the population is also a central 
actor in post-conflict settings, as it is here that old or new rebel groups can try to 
mobilize supporters if the benefits of peace are not felt.  
 
Challenges in post-conflict countries hence abound: after years of intense military 
confrontation, the infrastructure and the economy need to be rebuilt and internally 
displaced peoples and refugees taken care of. Former rebels need to reintegrate back 
into civilian life and find new employment opportunities. At the same time, reforms of 
the military and police are essential to increase citizen security. Polarized segments of 
society need to be reconciled and channels of peaceful conflict management 
established. New groups will often have to be accommodated into the political system 
and state institutions need to be reformed or rebuilt. 
 
Empirical research on conflict recurrence has analyzed a wide variety of factors to 
understand what makes renewed violence in post-conflict countries more likely, 
focusing in particular on characteristics of the previous conflict, the extent and type of 
international engagement in the post-conflict country as well as socio-economic and 
political factors characterizing the post-conflict state (Mason, et al., 2011, Quinn et al., 
2007, Walter, 2010, Walter, 2004). The thesis connects and contributes to this debate 
by shedding new light on how political participation and institutional change can 
contribute to peace.  
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Contribution to the previous literature on democracy, political institutions and 
conflict recurrence 
 
The approach used in this dissertation address two main shortcomings of the existing 
literature on conflict recurrence. Firstly, most research has approached the relationship 
between conflict recurrence and political institutions from a too highly aggregated 
perspective, by looking at the role of regime type for post-conflict peace. Despite a 
large body of literature on the determinants of conflict recurrence, the empirical 
evidence regarding this relationship remains inconsistent (Collier, et al., 2008, Hegre 
and Nygård, 2015, Mukherjee, 2006, Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). 
This thesis therefore approaches the relationship between political participation and 
conflict recurrence by disaggregating political features across regime types. This 
includes both the first chapter, which looks at different types of elections and the 
second, which looks at constitutional change.  
 
Secondly, the thesis expands the current literature by moving away from post-conflict 
elections at the national level as the only very specific institution that so far has gained 
widespread attention (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and 
Nooruddin, 2012). It has almost become common knowledge that democratization, 
while possibly leading to more stable regimes in the long-run, can cause instability in 
the short-run (Cederman et al., 2010, Mansfield and Snyder, 2002, Mansfield and 
Snyder, 2008, Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). The main argument behind this 
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relationship is that democratizing states are troubled by weak state institutions that 
exacerbate the potential for conflict. Although the argument applies to democratization 
more generally, national elections are normally seen as most critical by these authors 
as they can reinforce political and societal divisions and introduce stark competition 
into an already volatile and fragile context (Cederman et al., 2012, Hegre, 2014). And 
indeed, several studies show that very early post-conflict elections at the national level 
can be harmful for peace (Brancati and Synder, 2011, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and 
Nooruddin, 2012). In line with this argument, the international community has been 
criticized for pushing post-conflict countries to hold elections and then leaving these 
countries to their own faith (Paris, 2004). Several authors therefore warn of the 
destabilizing effects of democratization and national elections, as well as international 
support to such processes (Burnell, 2006, Jarstad and Sisk, 2008, Paris, 2004).  
 
To summarize, the current literature has studied the relationship between political 
institutions and conflict recurrence either from a highly aggregated perspective, by 
analyzing a country’s regime type, or has focused on one specific institution only, 
namely national level post-conflict elections. Results of the first approach show no 
clear connection between democracy and conflict recurrence, while results of the 
second have led several authors to warn of the destabilizing effects of elections in post-
conflict contexts. In this dissertation I instead argue and show that specific types of 
political participation in the post-conflict context can significantly increase a country’s 
chances to remain peaceful.  
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By taking a closer look at the relationship between political participation and conflict 
recurrence, the thesis adds to the peace and conflict literature more generally, since 
conflict recurrence has still to be explained more fully. But the thesis also has 
implications that go beyond the literature focusing on armed conflict. Conflict is 
inherent to any society, although it only turns violent in some. How institutions can 
help to manage conflict within societies is hence interesting from different academic 
perspectives. Finally, the thesis should also be of interest to the political science 
literature more generally as well as comparative law, because it provides more detailed 
insights into the working of local elections and constitution-making, two key political 
institutions that have become the focus of individual research agendas.  
 
Overall, this thesis therefore contributes to the conflict recurrence literature as well as 
the wider political science literature by disaggregating the political-set up of post-
conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) specific political institutions have a 
pacifying effect 2) institutional change can be good for peace and 3) international 
support to political processes and governance is an important strategy in building 
sustainable peace.  
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
Main concepts 
 
Before presenting the three chapters in more detail, some core concepts need to be 
clarified. First, this dissertation specifically focuses on explaining systemic rather than 
dyadic peace. This means that it is not only interested in explaining why peace between 
two specific parties sticks or not, but whether entire countries manage to overcome 
their violent past and remain peaceful, which allows analyzing peace in a more holistic 
manner (following Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Hartzell and 
Hoddie, 2003, Mason, et al., 2011). This approach is more encompassing but at the 
same time also more stringent, because there are likely to be different mechanisms at 
play explaining why either formerly warring parties or post-conflict countries as a 
whole remain peaceful. Second, when this thesis talks about conflict, it does so based 
on the widely used UCDP/PRIO definition. According to this definition, armed conflict 
is characterized by all of the following features: the use of armed forces, a minimum 
of 25 battle deaths, the government of a state as one primary party to the conflict and 
an incompatibility over the government or territory (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). 
Civil war, in turn, is a particularly intense armed conflict, leading to 1000 battle deaths 
or more. Third, in line with the negative conception of peace often employed in the 
peace and conflict literature, a post-conflict situation can rather simply be described as 
a “situation in which open warfare has come to an end” (Junne and Verkoren, 2005:1).  
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For some cases the application of this definition is straightforward. In the Nepalese 
civil war, for example, two clear cut sides opposed each other – the king and the Maoist 
rebels. The war came to an end through the signing of a “Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement” in 2006, after which Nepal can clearly be considered a post-conflict 
country. However, conflicts can end in many ways, with the blurry category of “fading 
out” actually constituting the most common form of conflict end (Kreutz 2010). Also 
many, if not most, conflicts are more complicated, with several rebel groups 
challenging the government at the same time, such as the current war in Syria. Peace 
agreements are at times agreed upon with some but not all rebel groups, as in Burundi 
where the Arusha agreement of 2000 included 14 rebel groups but excluded the two 
largest ones. Furthermore, different conflicts can overlap, as was the case in Indonesia 
with two main secessionist conflicts – Timor-Leste and Aceh – both beginning in the 
70s, but Timor-Leste’s coming to an end in 1999, but Aceh not until 2005. The systemic 
perspective taken in this dissertation implies that in order to be considered a post-
conflict country all major conflicts have to have ended. As already laid out above, this 
does not mean that these are stable situations. Quite to the contrary, as Junne and 
Verkoren (2005:1) note: “Such situations remain tense for years or decades and can 
easily relapse into large-scale violence”. Nevertheless, in line with the negative 
definition of peace proposed by Galtung (1964), post-conflict situations marked by the 
absence of war are considered to be at peace, whereas any renewed armed conflict 
occurring in a post-conflict country is considered a recurrence of conflict.  
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Regarding the explanatory variables, I follow the definition by North (1990), according 
to which institutions are the formal and informal rules and norms that organise social, 
political and economic relations, although the focus in this dissertation lies on the 
formal institutions underlying political relations, such as elections or the constitution. 
Political regimes in turn describe different forms of government that consist of a set of 
formal and informal institutions. One main distinction of political regimes is between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes, but more fine-grained differences exist and each 
regime type can be disaggregated into further sub-types (Bartusevicius and Skaaning, 
2018, Mason and Greig, 2017). Finally, I follow the definition by Kaase and Marsh 
(1979:42) in that political participation can be defined as ‘all voluntary activities 
intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of 
the political system’.  
 
Main argument and underlying theoretical assumptions 
 
In this thesis, it is assumed that at its core armed conflict is about furthering policy 
change (Cunningham, 2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 2004). For violent 
conflict to occur, two conditions have to be met – a group has to have both the 
incentives to rebel as well as the capacity for rebellion (Mason and Greig, 2017).  
 
Incentives for rebellion exist when an organized group is dissatisfied with the status 
quo and strongly wants to implement policy change – stark grievances exist (Gurr, 
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1968). The systematic exclusion of groups from political power, strong state repression 
or highly uneven resource distribution that only benefit certain economic elites, all 
represent potential political incentives to go to war.  
 
The second central condition in order for armed conflict to occur is that a group has the 
capacity to mount a rebellion, which in turn depends on their military capacity and 
civilian support base (Mason and Greig, 2017). A rebel group’s military capacity is 
influenced by several factors, such as whether they were defeated in the previous war, 
agreed to a demobilization process, whether a strong leadership exists and more 
generally the availability of arms or lootable resources to fund rebellion. Furthermore, 
rebel groups depend on a civilian support base within the population to engage in armed 
conflict. This is because every rebel group needs to mobilize recruits and they do not 
have conventional armies they can rely on to do so (Walter, 2004).  
 
For grievances to turn violent – and hence war to occur – a group has to be convinced 
that policy change is necessary and can be best pursued through war, not peaceful 
means. One often made assumption in this regard is that a group’s choice to resort to 
war is based on a cost-benefit calculation (Mason and Greig, 2017). Both incentives 
and capacity affect the cost-benefit calculation of rebel groups. War is per se a risky 
and costly strategy when pursuing policy change. However, if the expected payoffs 
from war are high while the expected costs of war are relatively low, renewed violence 
becomes more likely (Cunningham, 2011, Walter, 2004). While political and economic 
16 
 
factors determine what payoffs a group can expect from winning a war or reaching a 
peace deal, their military capacity, the existence of a civilian support base and 
information on the previous war in turn affect how costly the war is judged to be.  
 
What determines whether conflict recurs in post-conflict situations? The rational, 
bargaining theory of war usually sees one of three problems as the cause of war 1) issue 
indivisibility, 2) lack of information 3) credible commitment problems (Fearon, 1995). 
Post-conflict situations are particularly characterized by credible commitment 
problems (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 1997, Walter, 1999). This means that 
both sides may claim they want to adhere to peace, but since a post-conflict situation 
is essentially a situation of anarchy they cannot trust each other to do so. Instead both 
sides have to fear that any concessions they make will be exploited by their opponent 
to defeat them militarily or politically. This is exacerbated by the fact that no external 
enforcement mechanism exists that could enforce the peace between the two sides. 
 
More specifically, two types of commitment problems characterize post-conflict 
societies (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly, both sides have to commit to laying 
down arms, which means reducing each side’s military capacity for rebellion, for 
example through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. The 
second credible commitment problem regards the political set-up of the post-conflict 
regime and the willingness to peacefully contest for power. Most importantly, the side 
that achieves political control has to be able to credibly commit that they will not use 
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their new position to politically exclude their former enemy and hold on to power 
indefinitely (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). The second stage of the commitment 
problem hence addresses the political incentives for rebellion.  
 
Peace can then be explained by political institutions or international support reducing 
the incentives and capacity for rebellion as well as alleviating the commitment 
problems marking post-conflict situations. All three chapters of this dissertation 
explicitly or implicitly rely on this rational approach to explain conflict recurrence.  
 
Overview over the dissertation 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation takes a closer look at the specific political 
institutions a post-conflict country exhibits, focusing on different types of electoral 
participation. Going beyond arguments put forward by democratic civil peace theory, 
I argue that it is not democracy per se, but rather very specific political institutions that 
should be able to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict. More specifically, the 
theory put forward holds that in order to contribute to peace, institutions need to firstly 
enable access to broad segments of the population. This can limit mobilization 
possibilities of rebel groups, thereby reducing the capacity for renewed conflict. 
Secondly, institutions can reduce the incentives for conflict recurrence if they provide 
former and potentially future rebel groups with the possibility to influence policy 
change through institutional means. This is because this raises the cost of war vis-à-vis 
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a peaceful pursuit of their political interests. Based on this theory, only local elections 
should be able to reduce the risk for conflict recurrence because they are the only type 
of electoral participation that can provide both broad based access to the population 
and influence to the post-conflict elite. Using newly available data from the Varieties 
of democracy (V-dem) project for the time period between 1946 and 2011, I 
systematically analyze and compare the effect of electoral participation at all three 
levels of government – the national, the regional and the local level. The analysis 
demonstrates that indeed only local elections are significantly and robustly associated 
with less conflict recurrence.  
 
The second chapter looks at how writing a new constitution influences post-conflict 
countries’ prospects for sustainable peace. The scholarly debate on post-conflict 
constitution building has focused heavily on the content of the constitution and 
institutional design questions (Bastian and Luckham, 2003, Lijphart, 2004, Reilly, 
2001, Simonsen, 2005). In this chapter, I instead posit that a constitution writing 
process in itself can deter future violence. I argue that two mechanisms explain why 
this is the case: First, a constitution-making process can make former adversaries work 
together, build trust between them and thereby help overcome the commitment 
problems characterizing post-conflict societies. Second, a constitutional momentum 
can also increase trust between the state and its citizens, rebuild state-society relations 
and thereby reduce mobilization possibilities of rebel groups. Based on data by the 
Comparative Constitutions Project, the analysis reveals that managing to write a new 
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constitution indeed significantly reduces a country’s risk of experiencing conflict 
recurrence. Using hand-coded data on the exact beginning and end-dates of the post-
conflict constitution-making process furthermore demonstrates that it is important to 
allow sufficient time for the constitution-making process, underlining the hypothesized 
relevance of bargaining and trust building. 
 
The third chapter asks how external actors can help post-conflict countries to sustain 
peace and whether support to political institutions plays an important role here. The 
question of how effective different types of peace support are and which combinations 
of support are most conducive to sustain peace in countries emerging from violent 
conflict has so far remained open. This chapter therefore unpacks the broad category 
of peacebuilding to look beyond peacekeeping or general aid flows in order to identify 
which components or combinations of international support can contribute to sustained 
peace. Five areas of engagement are distinguished, based mainly on OECD/DAC data: 
peacekeeping, non-military security support, support for politics and governance, to 
socio-economic development and to societal conflict transformation and their effects 
on alleviating the commitment problem and reducing capabilities for rebellion 
discussed. Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming out of major civil wars after 
1990 with configurational analysis (fuzzy-set QCA), the results show that 1) 
peacekeeping is but one important component of effective post-conflict support, 2) 
supporting governance can be an effective international strategy of peace support and 
3) only combined international efforts across all types of support can address difficult 
20 
 
contexts. In addition, the findings show that countries neglected by the international 
community are at a high risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. 
 
The three chapters complement each other, as they analyse the role of political 
institutions for conflict recurrence from different angles. The first chapter zooms into 
the political set-up of post-conflict countries, by taking a careful look at the concrete 
political institutions they exhibit. The second chapter then looks at institutional change 
in the form of constitution-writing processes. In many countries such processes decide 
which political institutions the post-conflict country will adopt. The final chapter then 
brings external actors into the picture, by disaggregating peacebuilding and 
demonstrating that external support to politics and governance can play an important 
role in stabilizing post-conflict societies. This category of peacebuilding support 
includes support to constitution-making processes and the institutions identified in the 
first chapter, thereby underlining the insights of the first two chapters. 
 
Policy implications 
 
The thesis also has very clear policy implications. The largest debates in the 
quantitative literature on conflict recurrence have centered around time-invariant 
factors or features that cannot easily be changed, such as how the type of ending of the 
previous conflict affects a country’s risk of experiencing renewed war. Others only 
warn of democratization, more specifically post-conflict elections, but do not provide 
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strategies how to deal with them or real alternatives. The literature warning of post-
conflict elections, for example recommends international actors to focus on institution-
building before supporting elections (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Mansfield and 
Snyder, 2007, Paris, 2004). However, it remains entirely opaque what this is supposed 
to mean as “it is not clear (…) precisely what the exact institutional developments or 
preconditions are—only that they take time to develop” (Joshi et al., 2017:8). The 
results provided by this dissertation instead provide policy makers with much more 
concrete information on what might work. The first chapter points towards a specific 
type of political participation, which can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence: local 
elections. The second chapter takes a closer look at whether and under which conditions 
institutional change in the form of constitution-building can contribute to peace – again 
a very concrete entry point where international actors can become active. Finally, by 
disaggregating peacebuilding in the third chapter, international engagement and 
conditions for its effectiveness become the explicit focus of study. So far, the literature 
has not been able to show what types of international support beyond peacekeeping can 
contribute to peace. The results here show that support to politics and governance 
constitutes an effective alternative for international actors seeking to support peace in 
post-conflict situations.  
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Chapter 2: Different types of electoral participation 
and conflict recurrence 
 
Introduction 
 
One factor that remains highly disputed in the discussion on conflict recurrence is the 
role of a post-conflict country’s political set-up. Many studies include regime type into 
their analyses but fail to find a consistent effect (Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and 
Nooruddin, 2009, Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004). Regarding specific political 
institutions, particularly post-conflict elections at the national level have gained 
widespread attention with several authors showing that post-conflict elections, more 
specifically early elections in new democracies, can lead to renewed conflict (Brancati 
and Snyder, 2012, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). While these 
studies have produced highly relevant and interesting insights, they focus exclusively 
on national level politics. In this chapter, I instead widen the focus and analyze the 
effect of different types of electoral participation – at the national, regional and local 
level – on peace. More specifically, I argue and show that electoral participation at the 
local level is important to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence in countries coming out 
of civil war.  
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Most scholars writing on the positive effects of democracy on intrastate peace cite 
political participation as one important mechanism2 (Hegre and Fjelde, 2010, Mason, 
et al., 2011, Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). The argument holds that 
democratic states should be well equipped to resolve conflict through non-violent 
means because they exhibit institutions that encourage participation, thereby providing 
aggrieved groups with several channels to voice dissent. This should make it less costly 
for a group to pursue policy change through peaceful channels rather than through war, 
reducing the risk of conflict recurrence. While this argument rightfully points toward 
the importance of participation in reducing the risk of conflict recurrence, it remains 
underdeveloped: although democracies provide more channels to participate, they are 
not significantly associated with less conflict recurrence. To address this gap I first 
develop a more differentiated theoretical argument as to when participatory institutions 
should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. I argue that only those types of electoral 
participation that can ensure access to large parts of the post-conflict elites to influence 
policy making while at the same time enabling broad participation within the 
population reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Applying this framework to different 
types of electoral participation – at the national, regional and local level – then shows 
that only local elections fully satisfy the influence and access hypotheses and should 
be expected to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Using newly available data from 
                                                 
2
  The other being „institutional constraints“. In order to allow for a parsimonious, yet detailed 
discussion, this chapter focuses on the aspect of participation and leaves it to future research to take 
a closer look at those institutions that constrain the executive and how they might influence conflict 
recurrence.  
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the Varieties of democracy (V-dem) project, makes it possible to then measure several 
types of electoral participation individually and assess their effect on a country’s risk 
of experiencing conflict recurrence. In line with the theoretical expectations, not all 
types of electoral participation are consistently related to less conflict recurrence, only 
local elections are. 
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by being the first to systematically 
analyse the effect of local elections on conflict recurrence. Its contribution lies in not 
only pointing out the relevance of one specific political institution that significantly 
reduces the risk of conflict recurrence, but systematically comparing different types of 
elections. This chapter thereby provides both scholars and policy makers with much 
more specific insights on which types of institutions can be crucial for peacebuilding. 
Sustainable Development Goal 16.7 of the Agenda 2030 calls upon countries to “ensure 
responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”. 
The results of this chapter suggest a stronger focus should be laid upon systematically 
strengthening the different levels of government. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section reviews the relevant literature on 
political participation and conflict recurrence. The second section provides the 
theoretical background on why specific participatory political institutions should 
reduce a country’s risk of conflict recurrence and applies it to national, regional and 
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local elections. The third section presents the data used while the fourth section presents 
and discusses the results. The fifth section concludes.  
 
Existing research on political participation and 
conflict recurrence 
 
At the most aggregate level, research has addressed the question of political 
participation’s effect on peace by including a measure of regime type when analyzing 
conflict recurrence. The democratic civil peace approach has long argued that channels 
for participation should be important to reduce the risk of conflict as they provide 
dissatisfied groups with non-violent channels to voice their dissent and pursue policy 
change and that for this reason democracies should experience less conflict. However, 
the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between regime type and conflict 
recurrence remains mixed.3 Some authors find that being democratic significantly 
increases a country’s likelihood to remain at peace (Hegre and Nygård, 2015, 
Mukherjee, 2006). In contrast, Collier, et al. (2008) find that strict autocracies have a 
significantly lower risk of experiencing repeat civil war. However, most authors simply 
do not find any statistical effect of democracy or autocracy on the likelihood of conflict 
                                                 
3
  Several excellent literature reviews on the relationship between democracy and peace more 
generally (both interstate and intrastate) exist (Cederman et al., 2008, Hegre, 2014, Hegre and Fjelde, 
2010). 
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recurrence (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). Others have therefore 
approached the question by disaggregating across regime types. Mukherjee (2006), for 
example, does not find a significant difference between the two main types of 
democracy – parliamentary vs. presidential, whereas Mason and Greig (2017) show 
that certain types of autocracies are more susceptible to renewed war than others and 
that this effect depends on the outcome of the previous war. Bartusevicius and Skaaning 
(2018) in turn differentiate between five regime types, based on the electoral 
competition they exhibit, and find that unconstrained “polyarchies” are the least likely 
to experience conflict recurrence. While differentiating between different types of 
democracy and autocracy is a first step at taking a closer look at how political 
participation affects conflict recurrence, this approach does not offer insights on the 
relationship between individual political institutions and conflict recurrence. 
 
A second strand of research focuses on the role of elite participation for conflict 
recurrence. The literature on power-sharing agreements is relevant here, which focuses 
on the concrete clauses included in negotiated settlements and how these influence 
whether peace endures or not. Interestingly, most authors find that although military 
and territorial power-sharing4 prolong peace after civil war, no such effect of political 
power sharing - including proportional representation as the electoral system or the 
                                                 
4
  How exactly these concepts are defined and operationalised differ. Military power-sharing usually 
includes the merging of the two armies or assignment of military posts to former rebels. Territorial 
power-sharing is by most authors conceived as either federalism, regional autonomy or the 
establishment of self-governed zones.  
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assignment of posts in the cabinet or civil service to former belligerents - can be found 
(Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008, Martin, 2013).5 In contrast, both 
Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) & Matanock (2017) find that allowing former rebels to 
participate in the political arena is an important predictor of post-conflict peace. While 
they do provide important insights, these approaches all focus on the post-conflict elite 
and fail to take into account how participation through the population affects a 
country’s prospects for peace 
 
A third strand of the literature analyzing political participation has focused on one 
specific type of electoral participation: national-level elections. It is a relatively well 
established finding that while established democracies are rather stable, the process of 
democratization can lead to conflict (Cederman, et al., 2010, Hegre et al., 2001, Hegre 
and Fjelde, 2010, Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, Paris, 
2004). Especially elections are said to hold the potential to spark violent conflict, 
because they introduce a strongly competitive element into a highly fragile (Brancati 
and Snyder, 2012, Burnell, 2006, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Paris, 2004). Several 
studies confirm that under specific circumstances, post-conflict elections can spark 
civil war recurrence (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Cederman, et al., 2012, Collier, et al., 
2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Joshi, et al., 2017). Flores and Nooruddin (2012) 
argue that the timing of elections is critical. They find that early elections in new 
                                                 
5
  Only the study by Mattes and Savun (2009) finds the exact opposite, namely that political power-
sharing significantly increases the duration of peace after negotiated settlement, while military and 
territorial power-sharing does not.  
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democracies are particularly at risk to lead to renewed violence. Brancati and Snyder 
(2012) confirm that timing is important. At the same time, several variables beyond 
timing can influence whether elections result in renewed violence including for 
example, the strength of the state and security institutions, the choice of the electoral 
system, the capacity of the electoral administration as well as presence of international 
actors and election observers (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Höglund et al., 2009, Joshi, 
et al., 2017, Matanock, 2017, Reilly, 2008). What the literature so far shows is therefore 
that certain factors, such as the timing and context can lead to elections sparking new 
conflict, whilst others can reduce this risk. Focusing specifically on the extent of 
participation at the national-level by looking at voter turn-out in national elections a 
similarly divergent picture emerges. Walter (2015) finds higher turn-out marginally 
decreases the risk of conflict recurrence. However, Letsa (2017), to the contrary, finds 
a significant, positive relationship between voter turnout in the first post-conflict 
elections and the risk of renewed war. According to the literature, national elections 
can hence contribute to conflict resolution in some cases but have also spurred conflict 
in others. While this research has produced highly relevant and valuable insights, 
voting in national elections clearly only constitutes one dominant mode of electoral 
participation. The question which role subnational elections play for peace after civil 
war remains unanswered. Brancati (2006) is a notable exception in this regard, because 
she shows that decentralization, more specifically regional elections, can both decrease 
and increase the risk of conflict. However, her analysis is restricted to ethnic conflict 
in democracies and also does not take local elections into account.  
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To summarize, the current literature has mostly studied the relationship between 
political participation and conflict recurrence either from an aggregated perspective 
looking at regime type, an elite perspective or by focusing on national elections. It 
remains to be studied more systematically, however, what effect different types of 
elections, especially at the subnational level can have on conflict recurrence. To address 
this gap, I theoretically develop an argument as to why specific channels of political 
participation should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, and apply this to elections 
at the different levels of government. To this end, the next section first puts forward a 
general model explaining conflict recurrence and then shows how different types of 
elections affect this model.   
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
I assume that at its core, armed conflict is about furthering policy change (Cunningham, 
2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 2004). For violent conflict to occur, two 
conditions have to be met – a group has to have both the incentives to rebel as well as 
the capacity for rebellion (Mason & Greig 2017).  
 
Incentives for rebellion exist when an organized group is dissatisfied with the status 
quo and strongly wants to implement policy change – stark grievances exist (Gurr, 
1968). The systematic exclusion of groups from political power, strong state repression 
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or highly uneven resource distribution that only benefit certain economic elites, all 
represent potential political incentives to go to war. The second central condition in 
order for armed conflict to occur is that a group has the capacity to mount a rebellion, 
which in turn depends on their military capacity and civilian support base (Mason and 
Greig, 2017). A rebel group’s military capacity is influenced by several factors, such 
as whether they were defeated in the previous war, agreed to a demobilization process, 
whether a strong leadership exists and more generally the availability of arms or 
lootable resources to fund rebellion. Furthermore, rebel groups depend on a civilian 
support base within the population to engage in armed conflict. This is because every 
rebel group needs to mobilize recruits in order to go to war since they do not have 
conventional armies they can rely on to do so (Walter 2004).  
 
For grievances to turn violent – and hence war to occur – a group has to be convinced 
that policy change is necessary and can be best pursued through war, not peaceful 
means. One often made assumption in this regard is that a group’s choice to resort to 
war is based on a cost-benefit calculation (Mason and Greig, 2017). Both incentives 
and capacity affect the cost-benefit calculation of rebel groups. War is per se a risky 
and costly strategy when pursuing policy change. However, if the expected payoffs 
from war are high while the expected costs of war are relatively low, renewed violence 
becomes more likely (Cunningham, 2011, Walter, 2004). While political and economic 
factors determine what payoffs a group can expect from winning a war or reaching a 
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peace deal, their military capacity, the existence of a civilian support base and 
information on the previous war in turn affect how costly the war is judged to be.  
 
Explaining conflict recurrence in post-conflict situations 
 
What determines whether conflict recurs in post-conflict situations? The rational, 
bargaining theory of war usually sees one of three problems as the cause of war 1) issue 
indivisibility, 2) lack of information/uncertainty 3) credible commitment problems 
(Fearon, 1995). Post-conflict situations are particularly characterized by credible 
commitment problems (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 1997, Walter, 1999). This 
means that both sides may say they want to adhere to peace, but since a post-conflict 
situation is essentially a situation of anarchy they cannot trust each other to do so. 
Additionally, no external enforcement mechanism exists that could enforce the peace. 
Instead both sides have to expect that as soon as they become weaker the other side 
will renege on their promises and will try to defeat them militarily or politically.  
 
Two types of commitment problems characterize post-conflict societies (Flores and 
Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly, both sides have to commit to laying down their arms, which 
means reducing each side’s military capacity, for example through disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. The second credible commitment 
problem regards the political set-up of the post-conflict regime and the willingness to 
peacefully contest for power. Most importantly, the side that achieves political control 
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has to be able to credibly commit that they will not use their new position to politically 
exclude their former enemy or other parts of the population and thereby hold on to 
power indefinitely (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). The second stage of the commitment 
problem hence addresses the political incentives for rebellion.6 
 
Political participation and conflict recurrence 
 
Most scholars writing on the positive effects of democracy on civil peace cite political 
participation as an important mechanism (Hegre and Fjelde, 2010, Mason, et al., 2011, 
Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). This argument holds that democratic 
states should be well equipped to resolve conflict through non-violent means because 
they exhibit institutions that encourage and enable participation, thereby providing 
aggrieved groups with several channels to voice dissent. The main rationale here is that 
political systems providing channels of participation make it less costly for a group to 
pursue policy change through peaceful means rather than through war and thereby 
reduce the incentives for renewed conflict. Channels of participation hence present 
diverse ways to influence policy making. And because I assume that armed conflict is 
                                                 
6
  For conflicts that end in a peace agreement the above described problems are evident. For those that 
end in an outright military victory it is maybe less so. Nevertheless, as Flores and Nooruddin (2011) 
argue, commitment problems persist: “(…) outright military victories do not eliminate the credible 
commitment problem, as leaders must still convince citizens that they will forego political 
retribution, allowing minority groups that formerly supported the defeated parties to participate in 
politics and live without fear of state-sponsored discrimination. The nature of the credible 
commitment problem therefore shifts away from forging credibility among former combatant groups 
(as in peace agreements) and towards making credible promises to citizens. Though the credible 
commitment problem may reduce in complexity, it does not disappear.”  
 
33 
 
about furthering policy change they should be able to play a role in whether post-
conflict countries experience conflict recurrence. However, as the literature review 
demonstrated, it is not the case that countries that have diverse channels to participate, 
namely democracies, are necessarily better able to avoid conflict recurrence. I argue 
that this is because only specific types of political participation can influence countries’ 
chances to remain peaceful after having experienced civil war.   
 
I assume that political participation can decrease the risk of conflict recurrence, if it 
reduce both the incentives and the capacity for renewed war. Firstly, inclusive channels 
of participation that allow the population at large to participate in political life should 
reduce the capacity for rebellion. This is because, as laid out above, rebel leaders need 
dissatisfied parts of the population in order to mobilize recruits. The more the political 
system is able to provide all citizens with chances to participate in politics, the less 
likely will they be susceptible to mobilization attempts from rebel leaders. Secondly, 
in order to reduce the incentives for renewed war, it is important that the post-conflict 
elite – the previous government and rebel group(s), but also leaders of potentially new 
rebel groups – have a realistic chance to influence policy making. If instead the post-
conflict political set-up offers them no chances to express and address their political 
concerns, renewed war becomes more attractive to achieve ones aims. Participation 
that provides both access to all parts of the population and influence to the different 
elements of the post-conflict elite should therefore be able to address the commitment 
problem prevalent in post-conflict societies. This is because providing both the 
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population and the post-conflict elite with possibilities to influence policy- and 
decision-making can be taken as an indication of the government’s commitment to 
refrain from excluding its opponents in the now peaceful contest for power. Because it 
is unlikely that one political institution can entirely eliminate the incentives or capacity 
for renewed war, I theorize that only those channels of political participation that are 
able to reduce both the incentives and the capacity for renewed war can increase the 
chances of post-conflict peace. In the next section I apply this theory to the three main 
types of electoral participation – elections at the national, regional and local level.  
 
Types of electoral participation and conflict recurrence 
 
Voting in national elections is the most classic form of participation and the one current 
research has mostly focused on. On the one hand, some have argued that post-conflict 
elections provide a channel to peacefully contest for power and are vital for stability 
because only they can create a legitimate post-conflict government (Reilly, 2002). In 
Nepal, for example, relatively free and fair elections were held in 2008, two years after 
the signing of a peace agreement. They allowed a reconfiguration of the political 
system to now include the party of the former Maoist rebels as one central political 
actor and constituted an important step in keeping peace (Grävingholt et al., 2013). On 
the other hand and as pointed out above, several authors have drawn attention to the 
fact that post-conflict elections can also be highly problematic for peace, as they can 
introduce stark political competition into an already fragile context (Paris, 2004, Reilly, 
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2002). Cleavages from the war can be reinforced through electoral competition and at 
the same time strong state institutions that can prevent the rise of extremist parties are 
often lacking. Especially if the monopoly of violence has not been successfully 
reestablished, election losers may decide to rather revert to war to further their policy 
aims. Angola is a much cited example in this regard (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Paris, 
2004, Reilly, 2002). Based on a peace agreement negotiated in 1991, national elections 
were held in 1992 in order to promote peace. In the run-off of the presidential race the 
two main candidates represented two former liberation movements. When it became 
clear that one party (Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Indpendence of 
Angola) had only slim chances to win the race, they rejected the election altogether and 
instead returned to war (Reilly, 2002). Statistical analyses confirm that particularly 
premature, national elections can increase the risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict 
contexts (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012).  
 
According to the theory presented here, voting in national elections can be seen as 
granting political participation to the population, but it does not clearly offer the post-
conflict elite possibilities to influence policy making. This is because they seldom 
represent a level playing field and are very difficult to access, especially for minority 
groups (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Additionally, the stakes tend to be very high, particularly 
in majoritarian systems where a “the-winner-takes-it-all” logic prevails. Because 
national elections can provide broad based access to the population, but not equally 
guarantee influence to the post-conflict elite, I expect that:  
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H1: National elections do not reduce the risk of conflict-recurrence 
 
In contrast, according to the framework presented here, subnational elections should be 
able to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. This is firstly because they are easier to 
access as participating in them requires less resources than national level politics. 
Furthermore, former rebels or minorities have higher chances of winning in subnational 
elections, as they often represent a very clear-cut, local constituency (Brinkerhoff, 
2011). Political positions at the local or regional level can be attractive political posts, 
with some discretion over financial resources and the opportunity to climb the political 
ladder into national level politics (Myerson, 2006). At the same time, stakes in 
subnational elections are often not as high as in national elections and they can focus 
more on service delivery (Brinkerhoff, 2011).   
 
Although the role specifically of subnational elections in post-conflict societies has not 
received much scholarly attention, there are authors that argue that subnational 
elections should precede national elections in post-conflict contexts, due to their 
stabilizing effects (Diamond, 2006, Reilly, 2016). Reilly (2002) argues that subnational 
elections are important to develop a functioning party system and familiarize voters 
with the functioning of politics. In Kosovo, for example “national elections were 
postponed in favour of municipal polls, where the stakes are much lower and the 
responsibilities of elected officials were focused on service delivery rather than 
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national issues. (...) Evidence suggests, that by involving local actors in the process of 
governing while lengthening out the transition to full-blown national elections, a more 
mature and responsible form of party politics has begun to develop” (Reilly, 2002:124). 
Aceh is another example where local elections contributed to strengthening peace. 
Country-wide direct elections of local governors were introduced in Indonesia in 2004, 
but out of fear of furthering secessionist claims only national parties were allowed to 
nominate candidates. In the Helsinki agreement that ended the decade long Acehnese 
war for independence in 2005 the former rebels successfully negotiated that 
independent candidates were allowed to run. This resulted in a former GAM member, 
Irwandi Yusuf, being victorious in the 2006 elections. The access to political power 
and resources this enabled can be seen as one of the main reasons why Aceh has 
remained stable since7. Electoral competition at the local level also seems to have had 
an important, positive effect on the relationship between the local population and the 
Indonesian state: “By allowing its critics to assume executive responsibilities (…), the 
Indonesian center finally delivered a signal that it was serious about granting 
substantial autonomy rights to its politically most sensitive provinces – something it 
had been reluctant to do in the past, with disastrous consequences for its image (…) 
(Mietzner, 2007:38). Survey data shows that 64% of respondents felt more positively 
toward the central government after these local elections (Mietzner, 2007). Although 
the effect of local elections has not received extensive scholarly attention through 
statistical analyses, the study by Brancati and Snyder (2012) also suggests that 
                                                 
7
 Based on 35 interviews the author held in Banda Aceh in November 2017. 
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subnational electoral participation should be studied more systematically. The authors 
find that premature elections can increase the risk of renewed war, but only find robust, 
significant effects when restricting their analysis to national elections.  
 
It is not clear though, whether both local and regional elections should have the same 
effect. Regional elections in post-conflict settings have received more scholarly 
attention than local elections and the evidence of their effect on peace is mixed. 
Brancati (2006), (2009) for example, shows that decentralization in the form of regional 
elections can reduce the risk of ethnic conflict in democracies, but only if it does not 
encourage the emergence of regional parties. This is because regional parties can 
strengthen ethnic identities, favor specific constituencies and mobilize violent groups.  
 
To summarize, both local and regional elections represent an opportunity for the 
population at large to become politically active. At the same time, they offer more 
concrete possibilities for the post-conflict elite and minorities more generally to 
influence policy making. However, since regional elections can also spur secessionist 
conflict by strengthening regional parties, I expect and test whether: 
 
H2: Local elections reduce the risk of conflict recurrence 
H3: Regional elections do not reduce the risk of conflict recurrence 
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Data & Measurement 
 
The dependent variable of the analysis is conflict recurrence, which I construct from 
the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict database (ACD). In order to code conflict recurrence 
it is first necessary to identify post-conflict countries. Three coding decisions are 
important in this regard. First, as I am interested in the effect of specific political 
institutions in countries that have experienced major civil conflict8, I use UCDP’s 
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset and PRIO’s Battle Deaths Data to identify only those 
countries that have experienced conflicts, which led to at least 1000 battle deaths in 2 
years.9 Second, as many countries experience multiple, overlapping conflicts, I follow 
Mason, et al. (2011) and Flores and Nooruddin (2009) in that all conflicts in a country 
had to have ended in order for a peace spell to begin. Third, a country had to experience 
a minimum of one calendar-year of peace in order to enter a peace spell so that 
intermissions in fighting are not coded as long term peace (for a similar approach, see 
Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012, Walter, 2015). This produces 88 peace spells in 56 
countries between 1946 and 2011.10  
 
                                                 
8
  This focus on the effect of elections in severe conflict cases follows the approach taken by Brancati 
& Snyder (2012). 
9
  This per definition includes all countries that experienced 1000 battle deaths in one year. At the 
same time it is not as lenient as a 500 battle death criterion that for example Sambanis (2008) applies. 
10
  See appendix for a list of post-conflict episodes. 
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Recurrence is the outbreak of any conflict once a country has entered a peace spell. In 
the year a country experiences renewed conflict with 25 battle deaths or more the peace 
spell ends.11 This holds regardless of the time period since the ending of the last conflict 
and whether the conflict involves the old and/or new conflict parties. I include conflicts 
between the same and new parties because I am interested in systemic, not only dyadic 
peace (following Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Hartzell and 
Hoddie, 2003, Mason, et al., 2011). Conflict recurrences are a clear subset of the 408 
conflict onsets ACD codes – 63 instances of armed conflict are recurrences according 
to the definition presented here. Given that there are 88 peace spells, this means that a 
vast majority - 70% - of the post-conflict cases experience renewed violence. The 
analysis covers all country years of the 88 peace spells, coded 0 if no recurrence 
occurred in a given year and 1 otherwise. 
 
I rely on data by V-dem12 to measure the different types of electoral participation.  
Firstly, I want to capture more traditional participation through national elections. To 
this end, I use V-dem’s elected official index to measure whether national elections for 
the legislature or executive take place. At the subnational level, indicators were chosen 
that measure whether local and regional elections exist. Local elections fill government 
posts at the level of town, cities and counties, whereas regional elections address the 
second-highest level of government, referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, 
                                                 
11
  If a peace spell does not experience a recurrence it ends in 2014 or the year the country ceased to 
exist. 
12
  All analyses are based on the data version 8.0 (Coppedge et al., 2016) 
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regions or states, depending on the country context.  Local elections and regional 
elections both take a value of 1 if all posts (executive and legislative) for the respective 
level are filled through elections and are otherwise coded as 0. 
 
Control variables 
 
In line with existing research I control for several factors known to have significant 
effects on the likelihood of a country experiencing conflict recurrence, thereby 
accounting for alternative explanations for conflict recurrence. At the same time the 
control variables capture several factors that could influence what type of post-conflict 
institutions countries exhibit. Many authors find that conflicts, which have caused more 
deaths, are more likely to repeat themselves, whereas longer wars lead to less conflict 
recurrence (Fortna, 2004, Hartzell et al., 2001, Mason, et al., 2011, Walter, 2004). 
Duration is a measure of the length of the previous conflict in days, based on the ACD. 
In case of overlapping conflicts, their duration was aggregated. Similarly, severity 
counts the aggregate number of battle deaths over the conflict period, based on UCDP’s 
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset and PRIO’s Battle Deaths Data. I use the natural 
logarithm of both variables. Regarding the ending of the previous conflict, recent 
research finds that decisive victories by rebels are particularly likely to make peace 
stick (Quinn, et al., 2007, Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012, Toft, 2010). To determine how 
the previous war ended, I use UCDP’s conflict termination dataset and code whether 
the conflict ended in a rebel victory compared to negotiated settlements, government 
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victories or simply fading out (Kreutz, 2010). Cunningham (2011) shows that civil wars 
involving several parties can be more difficult to settle durably. Based on the ACD 
Number of factions is coded as 2 both if a country experienced several conflicts with 
different rebel groups at the same time or if there was only one conflict, but several 
rebel groups active within it. Empirical evidence shows that countries with higher 
income are less prone to conflict recurrence, and there is also a clear correlation 
between income and the level of democracy (Collier, et al., 2008, Fortna, 2004, Walter, 
2004). Income is based on GDP per capita data by Gleditsch (2002) and transformed 
using the natural logarithm. Furthermore, third-party peacekeeping is a well-
established factor that has been shown to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence (Collier, 
et al., 2008, Fortna, 2004, Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mason, et al., 2011, Sambanis, 
2008, Walter, 2004). At the same time, international actors might push post-conflict 
countries to establish participatory institutions. I use the International Military 
Intervention Data by Kisangani and Pickering (2008) until 2005 and then SIPRI data 
from 2005 onwards to identify whether UN-peacekeeping forces Unpko were present 
at any point during the conflict or post-conflict period. Furthermore, it has been shown 
that civil war onset diffuses – countries with neighbors experiencing conflict are more 
susceptible to conflict themselves (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). I use Gleditsch and 
Ward’s (2001) Minimum Distance database and define countries that have 25km or 
less between them as neighbors. Neighboring conflict is based on the ACD and codes 
whether any of these neighbors is experiencing conflict of 25 battle deaths or more. To 
control for the wider political context, I introduce democracy as an additional control 
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variable, based on V-dem’s polyarchy measure, as democratic regimes can be expected 
to be more likely to have elections at all levels of government. Table 1 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of all variables presented in this section.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for variables of Chapter 2 
 
Variable Variable Type Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Conflict recurrence Dependent 1,113 .0566038 .2311878 0 1 
Local elections Core 1,103 .6364461 .4812405 0 1 
Regional elections Core 998 .3046092 .4604725 0 1 
National Elections Core 1,113 .7001285 .4501637 0 1 
Duration (ln) Control  1,070 6.437704 2.183114 0 10.04377 
Severity (ln) Control  1,113 9.252177 1.546099 6.907755 14.00199 
Rebel victory Control  1,094 .1361974 .343155 0 1 
GDP (ln) Control  1,045 7.994221 1.046482 5.093505 10.31 
Nr. Of factions Control  1,113 1.393531 .4887525 1 2 
Peackeeping operation Control  1,113 .230009 .4210275 0 1 
Neighboring conflict Control  1,113 .5004492 .5002246 0 1 
Level of democracy Control  1,113 .4205554 .2734596 .0253011 .922789 
Peace years Control  1,113 15.19227 14.15005 1 66 
Peace years2 Control  1,113 430.8491 732.0289 1 4356 
Peace years3 Control  1,113 16303.8 39407.59 1 287496 
       
 
 
Analysis 
The hypotheses are tested on 56 countries in the time period between 1946 and 2011, 
with the country years of 88 peace spells as units of analysis. Using a time-series cross-
sectional logit regression model, I test whether elections at different levels of 
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government significantly impact a country’s risk of experiencing repeated conflict. In 
order to account for time dependencies in my data, I use cubic polynomials, controlling 
for different forms of time: t1, t2 and t3. Furthermore, I cluster the standard errors 
according to countries to account for geographic dependencies. The independent 
variables and the control variables were all lagged by one year to reduce the risk of 
endogeneity – mistakenly taking effects of conflict recurrence for its cause. Another 
possibility would be to use survival analysis. However, since I am interested in whether 
peace failed or not and not how much time elapsed until peace failed, I prefer to use 
logistic regression. Survival analysis is included in the robustness checks and does not 
alter the results. 
 
Before turning to the main results, I briefly discuss the control variables. I confirm 
several findings of other authors: higher income in the post-conflict phase reduces the 
risk of renewed war, whereas more factions involved in the last conflict increases the 
risk of conflict recurring. The signs of UN-peacekeeping, democracy and neighboring 
conflict correspond to theoretical expectation, but the coefficients are not, or not 
consistently, statistically significant. The measure of the severity and duration of the 
previous conflict are both statistically significant, but in the opposite direction of what 
some other authors find – longer civil wars are more likely to result in renewed violence 
whereas more severe civil wars reduce these risks. This suggests that drawn out, but 
relatively low-intensity conflicts are more difficult to settle durably. While these results 
at first might seem surprising, they do however, correspond to certain theoretical 
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expectations – many have argued that high casualty rates should reduce the risk of 
conflict recurrence, because they reveal information on the high costs of future armed 
conflict (Mason, et al., 2011, Walter, 2004). Furthermore, not all authors find consistent 
effects regarding theses variables. Kreutz (2010) for example does not find length or 
intensity to be significantly related to conflict recurrence, whereas Gates et al. (2016) 
also find that longer wars are significantly more likely to recur. Also contrary to other 
research, I find rebel victories to significantly increase a country’s risk of experiencing 
renewed violence. This could stem from the fact that rebel victories can lead to highly 
authoritarian regimes (Lyons, 2016). It is likely that these divergent findings stem from 
whether one is analyzing systemic or dyadic peace, how battle deaths and duration are 
aggregated and which conflict exactly is considered as the last conflict. While they 
cannot be further explored here, they do warrant further analysis.  
 
In line with the theoretical expectations, the main results show interesting variation 
amongst the different types of electoral participation. The coefficient for national 
elections is positive – hence suggesting they might increase the risk for conflict 
recurrence – but not statistically significant. The coefficient for regional elections, in 
turn is negative, pointing towards reducing the risk of conflict recurrence, but also not 
statistically significant. In line with my theoretical expectations, the holding of local 
elections, in contrast, is statistically significantly associated with less conflict 
recurrence (p=0.029). On average, countries that have local elections are half as likely 
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to experience conflict recurrence compared to those that do not. Table 2 summarizes 
the regression results. 
Table 2: The effect of types of electoral participation on conflict recurrence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
National elections 0.0287   
 (0.494)   
Regional elections  -0.160  
  (0.363)  
Local elections   -0.815* 
   (0.372) 
    
Rebel victory 1.533** 1.575* 1.639** 
 (0.555) (0.688) (0.578) 
    
GDP -0.464* -0.558** -0.479* 
 (0.193) (0.191) (0.207) 
    
Multiple factions 0.768* 0.849** 0.777** 
 (0.303) (0.326) (0.296) 
    
UN Peacekeeping -0.714 -0.851+ -0.769 
 (0.495) (0.515) (0.531) 
    
Neighboring conflict 0.475 0.399 0.317 
 (0.396) (0.402) (0.395) 
    
Duration 0.243* 0.284** 0.265** 
 (0.0948) (0.0897) (0.0914) 
    
Prior ethnic war -0.0733 0.246 0.0839 
 (0.392) (0.404) (0.427) 
    
Severity -0.361* -0.466** -0.326* 
 (0.156) (0.127) (0.144) 
    
Democracy -2.286+ -1.970 -1.201 
 (1.333) (1.423) (1.272) 
    
t -0.0543 -0.0330 -0.0364 
 (0.0680) (0.0794) (0.0665) 
    
t2 0.00119 -0.000517 0.000849 
 (0.00325) (0.00381) (0.00314) 
    
t3 -0.000000339 0.0000332 0.000000584 
 (0.0000378) (0.0000462) (0.0000358) 
    
Constant 2.010 3.055 1.562 
 (2.068) (1.930) (2.119) 
Observations 1002 902 992 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Robustness checks  
 
To test the robustness of the results several steps were taken. First, when available, 
additional V-dem indicators were employed to measure the effect of different types of 
elections. For national elections, I analyze whether the extent of participation through 
higher voter turnout positively influences peace, based on data from Vanhanen (2000). 
I also test whether the quality of national elections matters, based on V-dem’s clean 
elections index. Neither indicator yields significant results, although both now display 
a negative coefficient. The analyses conducted here hence does not suggest that the 
holding of national elections significantly impacts on a country’s risk to experience 
conflict recurrence. Additional data on subnational elections is more scarce. Next to 
the indicators on subnational elections, V-dem codes whether governments at the 
subnational national level exist. In line with the main results presented above, the 
indicator for the local level is significant, while the regional indicator is not. However, 
that countries do not have any type of local government is extremely rare and only 
applies to a few country years in Azerbaijan and Greece. This result should therefore 
not be interpreted too strongly. V-dem also codes the de facto power of regionally or 
locally elected officials vis-à-vis unelected officials. Neither indicator is significant. 
This suggests that enabling participation through elections might be more important 
than the actual power subnational offices hold. This is underlined by the fact that V-
dem’s subnational elections index, which measures whether elections at the local or 
regional level take place is again statistically significant. As the main analysis 
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demonstrates, this result can be explained by local, rather than regional elections. Table 
3 provides the regression results of all additional indicators used.  
Table 3: Regression results: Additional V-dem indicators for subnational elections  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Voter turnout -0.0106       
 (0.00974)       
National elections free  -1.285      
  (0.851)      
Local gov. exists   -1.282*     
   (0.579)     
Regional gov. exists    -0.0483    
    (0.353)    
Power of local gov.     0.0862   
     (0.168)   
Power of regional gov.      0.0714  
      (0.132)  
Subnational elections       -0.367** 
       (0.126) 
        
Rebel victory 1.685** 1.494** 1.583** 1.520** 1.614** 1.509* 1.604** 
 (0.506) (0.528) (0.565) (0.588) (0.534) (0.644) (0.570) 
        
GDP -0.486* -0.434* -0.484* -0.468* -0.430* -0.520** -0.420* 
 (0.220) (0.202) (0.198) (0.193) (0.204) (0.175) (0.213) 
        
Multiple factions 0.681+ 0.733* 0.755* 0.767* 0.780* 0.802* 0.731* 
 (0.362) (0.309) (0.302) (0.304) (0.318) (0.329) (0.309) 
        
UN Peacekeeping -0.889 -0.713 -0.728 -0.712 -0.703 -0.752 -0.913 
 (0.573) (0.508) (0.498) (0.510) (0.545) (0.458) (0.558) 
        
Neighboring conflict 0.203 0.439 0.463 0.474 0.466 0.439 0.518 
 (0.375) (0.385) (0.397) (0.393) (0.422) (0.405) (0.399) 
        
Duration 0.327** 0.250** 0.247** 0.243** 0.142 0.283** 0.262** 
 (0.0986) (0.0886) (0.0926) (0.0913) (0.100) (0.0874) (0.0863) 
        
Prior ethnic war 0.190 -0.111 -0.0187 -0.0758 -0.0210 0.257 0.220 
 (0.366) (0.389) (0.404) (0.416) (0.442) (0.394) (0.380) 
        
Severity -0.453** -0.356* -0.365* -0.361* -0.326* -0.451** -0.294* 
 (0.119) (0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.140) (0.132) (0.142) 
        
Democracy -1.962 -0.861 -2.179+ -2.253+ -2.480+ -2.338+ -1.319 
 (1.316) (1.368) (1.244) (1.250) (1.356) (1.266) (1.339) 
        
Constant 2.780 1.717 3.408 2.096 2.167 2.769 0.302 
 (2.005) (2.107) (2.314) (2.025) (2.113) (1.896) (2.113) 
Observations 944 1002 1002 1002 953 885 1002 
 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.0. Specifications of time included, but not 
reported here 
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Second, I test whether the results are sensitive to the definition of post-conflict 
situations. To test this, the criterion for what constitutes a post-conflict situation is first 
reduced to whether the previous conflict led to 1000 battle deaths in one year or more 
and then expanded to include all countries that have experienced conflicts of up to 500 
battle deaths in one year. The results remain unchanged.  Furthermore, it was analysed 
whether local elections can also explain severe recurrence – here measured as violence 
leading to at least 500 battle related deaths. The coefficient for local elections is now 
marginally significant (p= 0.054). Furthermore, the periods of analysis were cut to 30, 
20 and 15 years in order to make sure that the results are not driven by outliers where 
recurrence occurred long after the last conflict. In both cases the results hold. Lastly, 
all models were re-estimated using different types of regression analyses. First, rare 
events logistic regression based on Firthlogit was used to account for the fact that 
conflict recurrence is highly unlikely – the distribution between 1s and 0s for the 
dependent variable is highly uneven with only 6% (63) of country-years experiencing 
recurrence and 94% (1,050) non-recurrence. All results remain unchanged. Second, 
survival analysis was used to measure the core variables’ effect on the duration of peace 
– a common equivalent to using logistic regression analysis to analyze conflict 
recurrence – and again the results are confirmed. Overall the results of the different 
robustness tests suggest that local elections are robustly and significantly associated 
with a lower risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. 
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter moved away from the prevailing focus on electoral dynamics at the 
national-level, instead arguing and showing that local elections can contribute to peace. 
Proponents of the democratic civil peace theory have long argued that one mechanism 
via which democracy contributes to peace is by providing non-violent channels to 
participate. This chapter contributes to this debate by scrutinizes this claim and 
developing the main argument further. More specifically, it suggests that there should 
be less conflict recurrence in post-conflict countries that exhibit institutions which a) 
encourage the participation of large segments of society and that b) allow the post-
conflict elite to influence policy-making. I argue that not all types of electoral 
participation satisfy both the influence and access assumption, but local elections do. 
In line with the theoretical argument put forward, the analysis of all countries that 
experienced civil war between 1946 and 2011 shows that local elections are 
significantly associated with less conflict recurrence, while divers indicators for 
participation through national or regional elections are not.  
 
Overall, this chapter underlines the benefits of tackling the question on the relationship 
between political institutions and conflict recurrence from a more disaggregated 
approach. At the same time, the insights provided here also suggests several avenues 
for further research. One central question this chapter leaves unanswered is how these 
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local elections, that are important to prevent conflict recurrence, came about and how 
this affects countries’ prospects for peace. Studying institutional change at the local 
level in post-conflict societies could provide interesting insights in this regard. 
Furthermore, the purely quantitative analyses could be complemented by qualitative 
analyses of how exactly the post-conflict elite or population at large make use of local 
elections to further their political aims. Furthermore, this chapter focused on one 
specific type of participation only. Participation through political parties or civil society 
could also be important, alternative channels for participation in post-conflict contexts, 
and their effects remain to be better studied and understood. Finally, data restrictions 
remain a challenge. V-dem is the first to provide comprehensive data on local elections 
worldwide, thereby making it possible to systematically study their effect. However, 
the fact that no alternative data sources are available make it difficult to assess the 
sensitivity of the results, especially because V-dem codes expert opinions. Also more 
detailed information on local elections is difficult to obtain, but could be highly useful 
in understanding their effect better. This could include the exact dates on when local 
elections were held, the parties that competed in them or the level of voter turnout. This 
would make it possible to study the relationship between local level electoral 
participation and peace in much greater detail.   
 
What do these results mean for external actors aiming to support sustainable peace in 
post-conflict societies? SDG 16.7 of the Agenda 2030 calls upon countries to “ensure 
responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”. 
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The results of this chapter suggest that particularly participation beyond the national 
level can contribute to peace in post-conflict societies. However, international actors 
often lay their focus on developments at the national level. Strengthening participation 
and accountability at the local level should therefore be an important starting point for 
external engagement geared at strengthening peace. It is more likely that democracies 
will have local elections, but the argument and analysis do include, and can be applied, 
to non-democratic regimes. Especially in context where participation at the national 
level is difficult to achieve, strengthening the local level might be a promising 
alternative. At the same time the analysis only offers a static view on the relationship 
between local electoral participation and peace. Whether the process of widening 
participation by introducing local elections might have similarly destabilizing effects 
as democratization more generally remains for further research. While international 
actors should hence very carefully consider whether to push for the introduction of 
local elections, the strengthening of electoral politics at the local level could benefit 
from more international attention.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 4: Population of cases of Chapter 2 
Country Previous civil war Recurrence (from 25 battle 
related deaths) 
Angola 1975-2002 2004 
Argentina 1974-1977  
Azerbaijan 1991-1995 1997-1998 
Bolivia 1946 1952, 1967 
Bosnia- Herzegovina 1992-1995  
Burundi 1994-2006 2008 
Cambodia 1967-1975 1978-1998 
Cambodia II 1978-1998  
Cameroon 1960-1961 1984 
Chad 1966-1972 1976-1984 
Chad II 1976-1984 1986-1987 
Chad III 1986-1987 1989-1994 
Chad IV 1989-1994 1997-2003 
Chad V 2005-2010  
Chile 1973  
China 1946-1950 1956 
China II 1956 1959 
China III 1959 2008 
Congo 1997-1999 2002 
Costa Rica 1948  
Dominican republic 1965  
DR Congo 1964-1965 1967 
DR Congo II 2006-2008 2012 (ongoing) 
El Salvador 1979-1991  
Ethiopia 1964-1996 1998 (ongoing) 
France 1961-1962  
Georgia 1991-1993 2004 
Greece 1946-1949  
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Guatemala 1965-1995  
India 1948-1951 1956-1959 
India II 1956-1959 1961-1971 
India III 1961-1971 1979 (ongoing) 
Indonesia 1950 1953,  
Indonesia  1958-1961 1965,  
Indonesia 1975-1988 1990-1992 
Indonesia 1997-2005  
Iran 1979-1988 1990-1991 
Iraq 1958-1959 1961-1970 
Iraq 1961-1970 1973-1996 
Iraq 1973-1996 2004 (ongoing) 
Israel 1949-2012 2014 (ongoing) 
Ivory Coast 2002-2004 2011 
Laos 1960-1961 1963-1973 
Laos 1963-1973 1989-1990 
Lebanon 1958 1975-1976 
Lebanon 1975-1976 1982-1986 
Lebanon 1982-1986 1989-1990 
Lebanon 1989-1990 2014 (ongoing) 
Liberia 2000-2003  
Morocco 1975-1989  
Mozambique 1977-1992 2013 
Nepal 1996-2006  
Nicaragua 1977-1979 1982-1990 
Nicaragua 1990  
Nigeria 1966-1970 2004, 2009 
Pakistan 1971 1974-1977 
Pakistan 1974-1977 1990 
Paraguay 1947 1954 
Peru 1982-1999 2007-2010 
Philippines 1946-1954 1969 (ongoing) 
Russia 1946-1950 1990-1991 
Russia 1993-1996 1999-2014 (ongoing) 
Rwanda 1990-1994 1996-2002 
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Rwanda 1996-2002 2009-2012 
Rwanda 2009-2012  
Serbia 1991 1998-1999 
Serbia 1999  
Sierra Leone 1991-2001  
Somalia 1986-1996 2001-2002 
South Africa 1966-1988  
South Vietnam 1955-1964  
South Yemen 1986  
Sri Lanka 1971 1984-2001 
Sri Lanka 1984-2001 2003 
Sri Lanka 2005-2009  
Sudan 1963-1972 1976, 1983 (ongoing) 
Syria 1979-1982 2011 (ongoing) 
Tajikistan 1992-1998 2000 
Thailand 1982 2003 (ongoing) 
Turkey 1984-2013  
Uganda 1979-1992 1994-2011 
Uganda 1994-2011 2013 (ongoing) 
Yemen (North) 1948 1962-1970 
Yemen (North) 1962-1970 1979-1982 
Yemen (North) 1994 2009-2014 (ongoing) 
Zimbabwe 1973-1979  
Overall  number of recurrences  63 (vs. 1050 0s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Chapter 3: The power of deliberation: How post-
conflict constitution-making processes can 
contribute to peace 
Introduction 
 
This chapter13 contributes to the debate on conflict recurrence by focusing on one factor 
I argue has not received enough attention – constitution-making processes. Every 
fourth country coming out of conflict writes a new constitution.14 Because a successful 
constitution-making process establishes a new and potentially permanent governance 
framework that regulates access to power, it is often seen as a main part of a political 
transition necessary in post-conflict states. Constitution-making has therefore become 
a central component of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies (Samuels, 2006). 
A prominent discussion has been whether the design of the new political institutions – 
embedded in a new constitutions or a peace agreement – can help reduce the risk of 
renewed conflict. While content certainly seems to matter, these discussions have 
focused on very technical details including the institutional design of power-sharing 
institutions and electoral systems (Bastian and Luckham, 2003, Lijphart, 2004, Reilly, 
2001, Simonsen, 2005). What this debate does not address is whether there is an effect 
of the constitution-making process itself. Writing a new constitution can be a 
                                                 
13
 A version of this chapter has received an R+R from the Journal of Peace Research. 
14
 Calcuation based on data presented in the data section.  
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complicated and difficult process that detracts considerable funds and energy from 
political actors. However, if the process itself contributes to making peace stick, then 
it should be no question that these efforts are worth it. However, it is not clear whether 
writing a new constitution indeed enables a more secure transition from war to peace.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that a constitution-making process can deter future violence. 
Two mechanisms can be brought forward to explain why this might be the case – first, 
a constitution-making process can make the main political actors of a post-conflict 
country, including former adversaries, work together, build trust between them and 
thereby help overcome the commitment problems characterizing post-conflict 
societies. Second, a constitutional momentum can increase trust between the state and 
its citizens, rebuild state-society relations and thereby reduce mobilization possibilities 
of rebel groups. Based on these arguments, this chapter develops two hypotheses on 
the effect of constitution-making processes on peace in post-conflict countries and tests 
them empirically on all post-conflict cases between 1946 and 2011. It is thereby the 
first to systematically theorize and analyze the effect of constitution-making processes 
on post-conflict peace.  
 
The results show that writing a constitution indeed significantly reduces a country’s 
risk of experiencing renewed conflict. Based on newly coded data, the analysis also 
demonstrates that it is important to allow sufficient time for a constitution-making 
process, suggesting that processes, which allow for extensive bargaining are more 
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beneficial for peace. Overall, this chapter thereby contributes to the discussion on how 
to make post-conflict processes more stable and points toward institutional 
development in form of constitution-making as an important factor to do so. It thereby 
firstly contributes to the literature on peacebuilding and conflict recurrence. Secondly, 
the chapter also contributes to the literature on constitution-making, which has begun 
to analyze the effect of constitution-making but so far has failed to systematically 
investigate the effect on peace. Thirdly, this chapter also has strong policy implications: 
post-conflict contexts are extremely difficult to stabilize and strongly influenced by 
factors that cannot be impacted – e.g. characteristics of the previous war. Writing a 
constitution, however, can be encouraged and supported. This chapter hence generates 
findings which can be directly relevant to efforts to stabilize post-conflict countries.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows – the next chapter discusses the available literature 
on the effect of constitutions in post-conflict contexts, demonstrating that the attention 
has so far laid on the content of the constitution rather than the constitution-making 
process itself. The third section then develops an argument as to why and under which 
circumstances constitution-making should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. The 
fourth section presents the data used and the fifth section the results of the analyses. 
The sixth section addresses the issue of endogeneity. The seventh and final section 
concludes.  
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Previous literature on post-conflict constitution-
making 
 
Understanding conflict recurrence has become an independent strand of research within 
peace and conflict studies. While other literature focuses on explaining why conflict 
breaks out in the first place, what explains how long conflicts endure and how they are 
ended, this strand of research aims to understand what prevents post-conflict countries 
from sliding back into war. One large debate within this literature has focused on 
characteristics of the previous conflict to explain renewed violence. How the previous 
war ended plays a particularly prominent role in this discussion (Mason, et al., 2011, 
Toft, 2010). A second large debate focuses on the role of external actors in supporting 
peace, particularly through peacekeeping (Beardsley, 2011, Fortna, 2008, Sambanis, 
2008). The third group of identified relevant factors are the economic and political set-
up and development of the post-conflict country (Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mason, et 
al., 2011, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). This chapter connects to this third strand by 
focusing explicitly on institutional development in post-conflict societies. More 
specifically, it takes a closer look at the role constitution-making processes can play for 
post-conflict peace and argues that the process of writing a constitution can help build 
post-conflict peace.   
 
Regarding the role of constitution making in post-conflict settings, the most prominent 
strand of political science research has focused on the question of the appropriate 
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design of a constitution. The large debate on whether the consociational15 or the 
centripetal approach is to be preferred in highly divided and post-conflict societies 
marks this field (Horowitz, 2001, Lijphart, 1977, Lijphart, 1999). The main difference 
between the two is that while the consociational approach aims to overcome conflict 
by requiring “the inclusion of all groups in government” (Horowitz, 2008:1215-16) the 
centripetal approach strives to build institutions that can help “transcend group 
differences by encouraging groups to cooperate around common political goals” 
(Samuels, 2006:672-73). This large debate has very much centered upon whether 
power-sharing – ensuring representation of groups territorially, in the military or in the 
government – should be implemented and which electoral model should be preferred 
after conflict.  
 
Empirically, some indications exist that power-sharing can help secure peace (Hartzell 
and Hoddie, 2007, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Martin, 2013). However, there is still a 
large debate on which type of power-sharing - military, territorial or political – 
contributes to peace. Most authors find that military and territorial power-sharing leads 
to less conflict recurrence, while political power-sharing does not (Derouen et al., 2009, 
Ginsburg et al., 2009, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008, Martin, 
2013, Mattes and Savun, 2009). At the same time, several authors also caution that 
power-sharing might be good for peace in the short-term, but less beneficial in the long-
term, as it can also perpetuate divisions, rather than help to overcome them (Jung, 2012, 
                                                 
15
 Also referred to by some authors as consensus democracy or power-sharing more generally. 
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Samuels, 2006). An empirical problem with this literature is that it only addresses a 
very narrow set of cases, by only analyzing dyadic peace after peace agreements. 
Regarding the electoral system many concur that proportional representation is to be 
preferred but highly technical discussions regarding the ideal institutional design of 
electoral systems are still ongoing (Horowitz, 2008, Reilly, 2001).   
 
Beyond the discussions on the content of constitutions in the form of power-sharing 
institutions, practically no systematic, empirical research on the effect of constitutions 
on peace in post-conflict settings exists. Several case studies provide interesting 
insights on constitution-making in specific cases, but are not able to draw more general 
conclusions because they do not employ comparative designs (Bannon, 2007, 
Benomar, 2004, Ihonvbere, 2000, Miller, 2010, Selassie, 1998, Wheatley and Mendez, 
2013). Using statistical analyses Walter (2015) finds that having a written constitution 
significantly reduces a country’s risk of experiencing civil war recurrence. However, 
as almost all post-conflict countries have a written constitution this factor only holds 
limited explanatory power. Additionally, this leaves the question about the impact of 
the process of undergoing constitutional change – which only 1/3 of post-conflict 
countries do - unanswered.  
 
A second strand of literature relevant for this chapter comes from comparative 
constitutionalism. This literature is rooted in comparative law and has analyzed post-
conflict situations as very specific circumstances for constitution-making (Samuels, 
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2006, Widner, 2008). 16 Overall, this literature is mostly highly descriptive, which is 
why both Wallis (2014) and Ginsburg, et al. (2009) note a lack of systematic research 
on the impact of constitution-making processes on several outcomes, including peace. 
Only Widner (2008) tries to compare and explain violence five years prior to 
ratification and five years after ratification. However, the author herself admits that the 
measures used are too crude to allow for drawing strong conclusions from them. Within 
this literature, attention has also gone to understanding the effect of constitution-
making on other outcomes, such as democratization or the longevity of the constitution 
(Saati, 2015, Wheatley and Mendez, 2013). Eisenstadt et al. (2015) for example show 
that countries that write a new constitution, and particularly those that do so in 
participatory manner, experience statistically significant increases in their level of 
democracy afterwards. There is also a research on the issue of constitutional endurance 
(Elkins et al., 2009, Widner, 2008) and whether how the constitution is written effects 
the types of provisions included (Ginsburg, et al., 2009, Negretto, 2016, Samuels, 
2006). While these studies represent first attempts from comparative law and political 
science to systematically address the effects that constitution-making process can have, 
how constitution-making effects peace has also not been addressed by this literature. 
 
To summarize, the political science literature has focused on the content of the 
constitution to explain post-conflict peace. The comparative constitutionalism 
literature in turn mostly provides detailed accounts of individual cases or provides 
                                                 
16
 Some of the arguments developed by this literature will be presented in the next section. 
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systematic analyses of other outcomes, such as democratization or constitutional 
endurance rather than peace. Case studies seem to indicate that constitution-making 
processes can make a difference, but this has not been systematically analyzed on a 
larger number of cases. There is hence a clear gap with regard to understanding how 
constitution-making processes impact on post-conflict peace.  
 
Theory & Hypotheses 
 
New constitutions are usually written in reaction to a political crises or major political 
events (Brown, 2008, Elster, 1995, Negretto, 2016).17 Most typically, these include a) 
independence b) a change of authoritarian leadership, c) a regime transition; or c) the 
ending of a conflict (Negretto, 2016).18 Two or more of the four factors can co-occur – 
such as in Eritrea, which wrote a new constitution after having come out of a conflict 
that led to its independence from Ethiopia. Or the prominent example of South Africa, 
which embarked on a regime transition after conflict, accompanied by a major 
constitution writing process, which established democracy in the country. Constitutions 
are hence usually written to signal a clear break with the previous regime and in order 
to redefine the ground rules for how the country will be governed.  
 
                                                 
17
  Examples of constitution-writing in stable times also exist, but are rare. They include Sweden 1974, 
Switzerland 1999 or Finland 2000 (Negretto, 2016).  
18
  Less prominent reasons according to Negretto (2016) include either stronger shifts in party 
competition, the need to modernize the political system or to adapt the constitution to new practices 
that have evolved and have been unofficially practiced already. 
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New constitutions are written both in democratic and autocratic regimes. Ginsburg and 
Simpser (2013) differentiate four major functions of constitutions. Firstly, both in 
autocracies and democracies constitutions can serve as coordination tools that organize 
the state’s institutions and clarify responsibilities. Precommitment can be a second, 
important function of a constitution – it allows rulers to set limits to their own power. 
Although more pronounced in democratic constitution-making, examples of 
authoritarian rulers limiting their own power through constitutions also exist (Ginsburg 
and Simpser, 2013). Third, constitutions can be instruments to signal policy intent, both 
in democracies and autocracies. Finally, in authoritarian settings, constitutions can be 
used for window dressing - giving the country pseudo democratic institutions or using 
a democratically worded constitution and knowingly violating it to demonstrate an 
authoritarian leader’s power to the opposition. Regarding the writing of a new 
constitutions - democratic constitution-making most often occurs during regime 
transitions, when the new political regime needs to be designed and focuses on how to 
balance power and constrain leaders (Brown 2008). In an autocratic setting a new 
constitution is often used by leaders to coordinate intra-elite competition and to try to 
consolidate their power (Ginsburg and Simpser, 2013, Landau, 2013).  
 
Not all post-conflict countries aim to write new constitutions after conflict. One, simple 
explanation which post-conflict countries embark on constitution-writing processes is 
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necessity.19 If a civil war has resulted in independence, a new constitution is often 
necessary to provide the basis for the new state and help it gain international 
recognition (Negretto, 2016). Beyond independence, a more general explanation for 
constitutional change is that the relative bargaining strength of groups within a polity 
has changed (Voigt, 1999). This is clearly the case after many conflicts. Negotiated 
settlements usually lead to the inclusion of new political actors into the regime and can 
become part of countries’ transition to democracy, as was the case in Nepal or South 
Africa. Rebel victories change the power-structure fundamentally, installing a new 
main political actor in the country. The victorious rebel group in Ruanda, for example, 
used the constitution-writing process to restructure the state according to its liking. 
Finally, also a government victory can alter the power relations in a country and lead 
to post-conflict constitution-making. If a government was able to crush its opponent it 
can use a new constitution to consolidate this superior position, constitutional 
amendments in Sri Lanka being a case in point. As pointed out before, constitution-
making usually occurs after profound political change. Whether or not post-conflict 
countries will aim to engage in constitution-writing therefore should depend on 
whether the previous conflict is seen as such a major political crises or whether it has 
significantly altered the power relations within the country.  
 
                                                 
19 
 The question of why countries adopt new constitutions in general and in post-conflict settings in 
particular has surprisingly not been studied systematically. While it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to fully discuss this issue here, I briefly sketch some ideas on when we should see post-
conflict constitution-making to take place and leave it to others to further develop and test these 
arguments. 
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Table 5 displays the number of post-conflict episodes that have gone through 
constitution-making processes, differentiated according to the ending of the civil war 
preceding the constitution-writing process. It shows that post-conflict constitution-
making occurs after all types of ending, but also demonstrates that it is least likely when 
a conflict has simply faded out – a post-conflict situation in which the power structure 
in the country can be expected to have remained relatively untouched by the conflict. I 
therefore assume that most post-conflict constitution-making is initiated either because 
constitution-making is seen as a conflict management tool or as a reaction to shifts in 
power relations caused by the conflict20. Table 5 also makes clear that most post-
conflict episodes do not experience constitution-making, which is not surprising, given 
that it is a rare event more generally. However, the data also shows that a considerable 
number of countries do engage in constitution-making after having experienced 
internal violence and the effect of undergoing such a constitution-writing process on 
peace needs to be studied more systematically. 
 
 
                                                 
20
  At the same time, in some cases post-conflict constitution-making might occur without having a 
strong connection to the previous conflict. Constitutional review might have been a pending issue 
in the country predating the conflict, or new problems arise in the post-conflict phase that are 
relatively unrelated to the conflict but result in constitution-making. That post-conflict constitution-
making does not have to have a clear connection to the previous conflict does not call the theory 
developed in the next section into question. Whether a constitution-making process contributes to 
peace should not depend on whether it was initiated because of the conflict, but whether it enables 
trust building between the elite and the state and its citizens in the post-conflict phase. 
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Table 5: Post-conflict constitution-making after different types of conflict end 
 
 
 
 
 
This short introduction into the question why post-conflict countries choose to write 
new constitutions suggests that it is the countries in more severe crises that do so. As 
Elster (1995:394) notes “the task of constitution-making generally emerges in 
conditions that are likely to work against good constitution-making. Being written for 
the indefinite future, constitutions ought to be adopted in maximally calm and 
undisturbed conditions. (…) (Instead) the call for a new constitution usually arises in 
turbulent circumstances (…).” This suggests that the following analysis on how post-
conflict constitution-making – the writing of a constitution in the aftermath of violent 
conflict – contributes to peace does not suffer from a selection bias of easier cases. 
Instead countries that write new constitutions after conflict represent more difficult 
case at a higher risk of reverting back to war. The next section elaborates how 
constitution-making in such post-conflict contexts can contribute to peace.  
 
 
 
 
 Agreement Gov. Victory Rebel victory Low activity 
No new constitution 55 (81%) 49 (73%) 9 (36%) 59 (83%) 
Post-conflict constitution 13 (19%) 18 (29%) 16 (64%) 12 (17%) 
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How post-conflict constitution making can contribute to peace 
 
Post-conflict societies are marked by stark mistrust – after years of military 
confrontation, neither of the formerly warring parties can credibly commit to the peace 
process and both parties live in the fear that the other will reignite conflict (Walter, 
1997). In order for peace to sustain, former enemies hence have to overcome the 
mistrust and suspicions they hold against each other. Walter (Walter, 1997, Walter, 
2004) has extensively and convincingly argued that external actors can help internal 
enemies overcome these commitment problems, but external actors are not always 
equally active in post-conflict situations. I instead argue that a constitution-making 
process can also help overcome commitment problems and thereby contribute to 
reducing the risk of civil war recurrence.  
 
Two arguments explain how constitution-making processes can contribute to peace 
after conflict – one offers an elite-centric explanation, while the other focuses on state-
society relations. The elite-centric mechanism holds that because constitution-making 
encourages the major political actors of the post-conflict state to jointly define how 
access to power will be regulated it can build compromise and trust between them. The 
state-society mechanism in turn stresses the legitimacy and public support for the new 
state that a constitution-making process can create.21 Although the logic is slightly 
                                                 
21
  Two other, less important arguments why constitution-making could impact on post-conflict peace 
can be made. First, agreeing to engage in a constitution-making process signals the parties’ 
commitment to the peace process (Benomar, 2004). Second, I would argue that if former adversaries 
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different depending on the regime context, both mechanisms work in the same direction 
both in democracies and autocracies.  
 
The elite-centric mechanism 
 
Writing a constitution can be seen as an important negotiation process in the post-
conflict period (Horowitz, 2008). In this line of thinking, Ginsburg, et al. (2009:211) 
claim that “It is common to think of constitutions as products of various competing 
interest groups organized along economic goals, ethnic claims, or political ideology” 
and Hart (2010:20) writes: „Constitution making is a contest over the distribution, 
redistribution, and limitation of power“. Conceiving of constitution-making as a 
bargaining process in the post-conflict phase makes clear that it essentially allows 
rebels and governments to continue their negotiation about the future of the country, 
but within an institutionalized process rather than on the battlefield. If the process is 
very inclusive, other excluded groups and thereby potentially new rebels can equally 
be included in this negotiation process. This does not imply such processes to 
necessarily be smooth, to the contrary they are often highly complicated and 
conflictual. Because a constitution is “a system which establishes the fundamental rules 
and principles by which a state is governed” (Samuels, 2006:664) and thereby regulates 
access to power, there is bound to be conflict over how such a post-conflict constitution 
                                                 
jointly agree on these rule and principles the likelihood that they will abide by them instead of going 
back to war should be higher. 
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should look. At the same time a constitution-making process not only consists of 
intensive, complicated bargaining, but it is also highly focused on finding compromise. 
Constitution-making is hence best described as a mixture of “battles fought and 
compromises struck” (Landau, 2013:633). Because compromises need to be found at 
various stages throughout the constitution-making process, post-conflict constitution-
making should be seen as iterative rounds of bargaining and finding compromises. I 
argue that it is through this that trust can incrementally be built between the post-
conflict elite.  
 
Firstly, it needs to be decided who will write the new constitution – with the decision 
usually having to be made between a constitutional commission or a constituent 
assembly as well as the degree the public will be able to participate.22 Fiji and South 
Africa are both examples where the question on process stirred highly intense 
discussions and it took months to find an agreement on these issues. Second, if a 
constitutional commission is to write the new constitution, bargaining and compromise 
will have to be struck on who is appointed as commissioners. If the constitution is 
written through an assembly, political actors will have to work together even more 
closely in committees debating and adopting drafts of specific parts of the constitution. 
Deadlock can occur during the drafting process and often special bodies are created in 
order to deal with particularly decisive issues. This joint work on a constitution can 
                                                 
22
  See Widner (2008) or Ginsburg et al. (2009) for detailed descriptions of the different processes and 
procedures applied in constitution-making processes. 
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have “educative features”, which Brown (2008:11) describes as follows: “Messy, 
protracted drafting serves the underappreciated purpose of preparing various parties for 
the operation of normal democratic politics. (…) Forming alliances, crafting consensus 
(or at least majority) positions, compromising, and trading are critical elements for 
leaders in any democratic system.” Thirdly and finally, a final draft of the constitution 
has to be adopted by parliament. A highly important and unique feature of constitution-
writing processes is that they require broad consensus – final drafts usually require 
either unanimity or a 2/3 majority to be adopted. In order to produce a constitution, a 
broad compromise between the main political actors is necessary. This means that any 
post-conflict country that has successfully ended a constitution-writing process by 
writing and adopting a new constitution, has gone through an intense inter-elite 
dialogue. A constitution-making process hence consists of a number of stages and 
requires the actors involved to work together, debate and find compromise at every one 
of them. I argue that this can incrementally build trust between former adversaries. 
 
While more pronounced in democratic constitution-making, the importance of 
bargaining through constitution-making can also be applied to autocratic contexts. As 
Ginsburg and Simpser (2013: 3) note: “(…) even authoritarian constitutions often 
reflect processes of collective choice among elites with divergent interests. Therefore, 
despite the fact that authoritarian rulers enjoy more discretion than their democratic 
counterparts in deciding when and how to draft a constitution, it may be incorrect to 
assume that authoritarian constitutions reflect optimizing behavior on the part of a 
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unitary ruler.” Even in authoritarian settings, a certain degree of bargaining will hence 
often be involved in adopting a new constitution. Additionally, autocratic rulers can 
consolidate their power through a revision of the constitution. The elite-centric 
mechanism in authoritarian setting hence is more about autocratic rulers increasing 
their repressive capacities, which can be used to avoid further conflict.  
 
The state-society mechanism 
 
The second mechanism works through state-society relations and applies equally to 
democracies and autocracies. A constitution-making process has the potential to 
reconcile the people and rally them around a common goal: “constitution-making after 
conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road 
map on how to get there.” (Samuels, 2006:664). In countries torn from war, a 
constitution-making process can hence be an opportunity to not only stipulate public 
support for a peace process but also confer legitimacy to the (possibly new) state 
institutions. Tushnet (2012:1984) notes, “(I)n nations with heterogeneous 
populations—an increasingly large proportion of the world’s nations—a constitution 
can serve as an expression, perhaps the only one available, of national unity”. Positively 
influencing the relationship between the new state and its citizens, i.e increasing trust 
in state institutions, should in turn reduce recruitment possibilities for future conflict. 
This is important as groups depend on a civilian support base to mount the capacity for 
civil war. In a democratic setting, positively influencing trust in state institutions 
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through constitution-making is ideally achieved by creating a document, which 
represents all interests in a society, thereby rebuilding national unity. In an autocratic 
setting “the process of writing the constitution serves a political purpose. It allows the 
regime to be seen as engaged in an important project” (Ginsburg and Simpser, 
2013:13), thereby garnering trust and support from the population. In this vain, Klein 
and Sajó (2012) note that “even an imposed constitution may gain acceptance and even 
legitimacy”. Based on the two mechanisms laid out above, the first hypothesis holds:  
 
H1: Writing a new constitution reduces the risk of conflict recurrence 
 
The importance of the length of the constitution-writing process 
 
An implication of the first hypothesis is that in order to contribute to peace after conflict 
it should be important that sufficient time is given to the constitution-making process. 
This is because substantial deliberation that produces a compromise cannot be achieved 
in a few months. While early research on constitution-making processes depicted 
negotiations in them as enlightened bargaining (Elster, 1995), this view has also been 
called into question (Brown, 2008). Post-conflict constitution-making processes should 
be particularly conflictual as finding compromise on the future political structure of the 
country is bound to be controversial and complicated. The Constituent Assembly in 
Nepal was dissolved twice, Tunisia’s constitution-making process was disrupted by 
political assassinations and also in South Africa – the most prominent, positive example 
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of post-conflict constitution-making – there was considerable deadlock and at several 
instances it seemed that the process could derail. However, this bargaining and 
deliberation – although not particularly enlightened, can potentially have a 
transformative effect, as Brown (2008:683) notes: “Inclusiveness, consensus, and 
design of long-term institutions might lead the actors to an outcome that is more durable 
and just, even if it takes place wholly through a combination of haggling, threats, and 
partisanship that leaves little room for public-spirited deliberation.” 
 
A longer process hence stands for one that includes true bargaining because comprise 
needs to be found on issues that are disputed and not easily resolved. In this vain, Wallis 
(2014:304), for example, concludes: “an unhurried timetable is preferable, as it (…) 
allows the draft constitution to reflect lessons learned, and leaves time to build 
consensus (…)”. Similarly, practitioner guidelines are urging international actors to not 
hurry constitution-writing processes because “Bringing people together, building trust, 
and developing shared ownership takes time” (Brandt et al., 2011:9) and “If 
constitution-making allows sufficient time for consultations, a genuine agreement 
among stakeholders may be reached.”(Benomar, 2003:16). 
 
An example of the opposite, namely a very tight time-table, was post-conflict 
constitution-writing in Timor-Leste. Writing to the United Nations complaining about 
the tight deadline set to write a new constitution, civil society actors lamented “A 
Constitution is a complex document embodying fundamental choices about the type of 
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country an independent East Timor will be. (…)”. The Timorese “need time to consider 
and debate so that they are able to form opinions, time to hold discussions in order to 
seek consensus where opinions are divided, and finally time to officially record their 
views. None of this can happen in three months.”23 Nevertheless, the process was only 
allowed to occupy a few months and a new constitution was passed in 2002. Timor-
Leste experienced another major violent crisis in 2008. In contrast, the South African 
process took five years and South Africa has not returned to civil war since.  
 
Because time is needed to allow for substantial bargaining, deliberation and the 
building of compromise, which in turn should be beneficial for peace, I also test the 
following, second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Longer constitution-making processes reduce the risk of conflict recurrence 
 
Data  
 
To measure my dependent variable, conflict recurrence, I first use the UCDP/PRIO 
database to identify all relevant cases: countries that have experienced conflict – 
leading to at least 25 battle related deaths – where all conflicts have come to an end and 
peace has prevailed for at least 12 consecutive months. I consider any outbreak of new 
                                                 
23
 The full text can be found at: http://www.etan.org/news/2001a/03ngoconst.htm 
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violence in these post-conflict phases, by the same or new rebel groups, causing at least 
25 battle related deaths, as conflict recurrence. Peace periods end either with renewed 
conflict or in 2011. This means that I am analyzing systemic, not dyadic peace, as peace 
can only begin once all conflicts in a country have ended and any renewed conflict is 
considered as conflict recurrence. 
 
In order to identify successful constitution-making processes in post-conflict periods I 
rely on data by the comparative constitutions project (CCP data). The CCP data 
provides, amongst other issues, country-year data on whether a new constitution was 
adopted. To test the first hypothesis that post-conflict constitution-making can 
positively influences a country’s chances of peace, the binary indicator new 
constitution measures whether a post-conflict country was able to write a new 
constitution at any time in its post-conflict phase. The post-conflict phase is defined as 
a maximum of 15 years after having experienced conflict (it is shorter if renewed 
conflict broke out).24 Because the CCP does not provide exact dates for the adoption of 
the new constitutions, those cases in which the new constitution was written in the same 
year the conflict ended pose a problem. In these cases, qualitative sources were used to 
determine whether the constitution was written before or after the conflict came to an 
end and only the latter coded as 1. CCP also provides data on constitutional 
amendments. Although amendments can sometimes be of very far-reaching nature, 
                                                 
24
  This means constitution-writing processes in Russia (27 years), Zimbabwe (34 years), Morocco (22 
years), Kenya (28 years) and Bolivia (42 years) were not considered.  
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they can also be simply “cosmetic” (Wheatley and Mendez, 2013). Since the different 
types cannot be easily distinguished, amendments are not included here. Several 
countries, including South Africa and Nepal, wrote an interim constitution before 
embarking on the bigger project of writing an entirely new constitution. Since a lot of 
bargaining occurs also in the later stages, the date of the adoption of the final 
constitution, not the interim constitution, was coded. New constitutions can also be 
written during conflict and become integral parts of peace agreements that end a war, 
as was the case in Bosnia in 1995. I do not consider them to be cases of post-conflict 
constitution-making. The main difference between constitutions as peace agreements 
(and peace agreements more generally) and post-conflict constitution-making is that 
the former only focus on warring parties, but the latter are likely to include more 
political actors, ideally even the entire post-conflict elite. Since the mechanism linking 
post-conflict constitution-making to peace works through the process of bringing the 
elite together with the aim of finding a compromise of how power will be allocate in 
the post-conflict country, I only focus on cases of constitution-making after conflict. 
Of the 236 peace episode 59 are coded as having experienced post-conflict constitution-
making. 
 
Secondly, in order to test the second hypothesis that longer post-conflict constitution-
making processes reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, it is necessary to construct a 
proxy for the length of the constitution writing process. This is because while it is 
possible to code the exact date when a constitution was adopted in a post-conflict 
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period, data for the beginning of a constitution-making process is unreliable. Online 
sources used to identify adoption dates were: the constitute project, the constitution 
writing and conflict resolution project (Princeton University) and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) site. Because this variable aims to approximate the 
length of the constitution-making process, the date of the adoption of the constitution 
(through a referendum or the parliament for example) was coded rather than the later 
occurring promulgation.25 Based on these data, I construct an indicator time, which 
measures the number of days elapsed between conflict end and the adoption of the 
constitution. I assume that if this period is very long, so was the constitution-making 
process. In order to account for the fact that the length of the process might matter more 
in the early than the later stages, I use the natural logarithm. This makes it possible to 
assess the second hypothesis that longer constitution-making processes ensure 
bargaining takes place and thereby reduce a country’s risk of experiencing conflict 
recurrence.  
 
I control for a number of factors the conflict recurrence literature has consistently found 
to influence the outbreak of conflict recurrence and that could explain constitution-
making as well. First, this regards characteristics of the previous war. Several authors 
find short and intense previous wars to be more likely to break out again and it might 
be that specific types of previous wars condition constitution-making. I measure the 
                                                 
25
  Since the date of the promulgation is usually shortly after adoption, it is highly unlikely that 
employing the latter would change the results. 
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aggregated Intensity and Length of the previous conflict(s), based on the UCDP armed 
conflict data and the battle death data provided by UCDP & PRIO. I also consider 
whether the previous conflict had a primarily ethnic component - Ethnic Conflict and 
whether it involved more than one rebel group challenging the government Nr. of 
factions – both are factors, which could make post-conflict constitution building more 
difficult. If a country experienced several, consecutive conflicts, the characteristic of 
the last one was taken. I also control for the outcome of the previous conflict, using 
data provided by Kreutz (2010). I focus on whether a conflict ended in a rebel victory, 
as this is where most post-conflict constitution-making occurs. To assess the economic 
situation in the post-conflict period, I include a country’s GDP per capita using data 
from Gleditsch (2002). GDP can also be seen as a proxy for state capacity – which 
might be necessary to create the complex procedures and institutional structure needed 
for constitutional review processes. I also control for the presence of UN Peacekeeping 
using data from IMI and SIPRI, as they are known to reduce the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence and might encourage post-conflict countries to write new constitutions. To 
measure more concretely how active external actors are, I also include a measure of the 
amount of external Aid the post-conflict country receives, as constitutional-review 
processes often depend on support by donors. To control for the content of the 
constitution, I include a measure of whether the country uses a proportional electoral 
system PR system as well as its level of Democracy, relying on data from V-dem. 
Employing a control for democracy is also necessary because constitution-making 
processes are often an important component of democratization more generally. All 
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control variables are lagged by one year. Descriptive statistics on the variables 
employed can be found in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Summary statistics for variables of Chapter 3 
 
Variable Variable type N Mean SD Min Max 
Recurrence Dependent 2,599 .056945 .2317821 0 1 
New constitution Core 2,599 .3936129 .4886447 0 1 
Time Core 1,023 7.39165 .946375 3.044523 8.609225 
Severity Control 2,597 6.553471 2.548332 2.302585 14.00199 
Duration Control 2,599 4.491671 2.963718 0 9.573802 
Ethnic conflict Control 2,541 .3754427 .4843323 0 1 
Rebel victory Control 2,561 .1370558 .3439735 0 1 
GDP Control 2,578 7.95102 1.071716 4.888995 10.79657 
Nr. Of factions Control 2,599 1.190843 .3930409 1 2 
Democracy Control 2,548 .4042365 .2650564 .0164474 .9559249 
Proportional representation Control 2,384 .3716443 .4833454 0 1 
UN eacekeeping Control 2,599 .1223548 .3277581 0 1 
Aid Control 2,555 4.70e+08 1.50e+09 0 5.18e+10 
Neighboring conflict Control 2,599 .5044248 .5000766 0 1 
Peace years Control 2,599 12.7045 11.62086 1 63 
Peace years2 Control 2,599 296.3967 518.7417 1 3969 
Peace years3 Control 2,599 9399.883 24849.51 1 250047 
 
I employ a logistic regression, with the binary conflict recurrence indicator as the 
dependent variable. Another possibility would be to use survival analysis. However, 
since I am interested in whether peace failed or not and not how much time elapsed 
until peace failed, I prefer to use logistic regression. Survival analysis is included in the 
robustness checks and does not alter the results. Because the unit of analysis is country-
year data, three cubic polynomials are included to account for the fact that observations 
are not independent from each other with regard to time and standard errors are 
clustered according to country due to heterogeneity and non-constant variances in the 
data.  
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Results 
 
Before describing the results of the main, independent variables, I briefly discuss the 
results with regard to the control variables employed. Throughout several model 
specifications, I find several factors to significantly impact a country’s risk to 
experience conflict recurrence. In line with the previous literature, conflicts that 
involve several factions are found to be more likely to recur, whereas higher levels of 
GDP and the presence of UN peacekeeping consistently reduce a country’s risk of 
conflict recurrence. Contrary to others, I find rebel victories to be significantly 
associated with a higher likelihood of conflict recurrence. The results also show that 
longer and less severe previous wars might increase the risk for conflict recurrence, but 
both variable fail to consistently reach statistical significance. It is likely that these 
divergent findings stem from whether one is analyzing systemic or dyadic peace, how 
battle deaths and duration are aggregated and which conflict exactly is considered as 
the last conflict. While space restrictions make it impossible to investigate these issues 
here, this calls for further analyses in the future.  
 
Model 1 tests the first hypothesis that writing a new constitution reduces a country’s 
risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. The analysis lends support to the first 
hypothesis: there is a negative, statistically highly significant effect (p=0.006). 
Countries that write a new constitution are statistically significantly less likely to 
experience conflict recurrence. Computing marginal effects shows, that if a post-
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conflict country manages to write a new constitution the risk of conflict recurrence is 
reduced by half from 5% to 2,6%. Despite arguments to the contrary, it seems that the 
mere process of writing a constitution can already suffice to increase the chances for 
sustainable peace.  
Table 7: The effect of writing a new constitution on conflict recurrence 
 Model 1 
  
New constitution -0.721** 
 (0.260) 
  
Severity -0.0923+ 
 (0.0496) 
  
Duration 0.0760 
 (0.0511) 
  
Ethnic conflict 0.635** 
 (0.190) 
  
Rebel victory 0.790* 
 (0.337) 
  
GDP -0.288** 
 (0.0991) 
  
Nr. of factions 0.456* 
 (0.227) 
  
UN Peacekeeping -0.824** 
 (0.308) 
  
Aid 3.27e-11 
 (3.21e-11) 
  
Neighboring conflict 0.246 
 (0.231) 
  
PR System -0.137 
 (0.252) 
  
Democracy -0.263 
 (0.465) 
  
Constant -0.386 
 (0.912) 
Observations 2326 
R2 0.09 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, specifications of time included, but not 
reported here  
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Second, I test the hypothesis that the more time elapses between conflict end and the 
writing of a constitution, the more likely that peace will hold. This means reducing the 
population considerably, as only those cases in which a new constitution was written 
are compared. Table 8 presents the results of Model 2. The sign is negative, as the 
hypothesis would suggest and is highly statistically significant (p=0.000). This 
supports the hypothesis that it is important to allow sufficient time for the constitution-
making process. 
 
Table 8: The effect of the timing of the constitution-making process on conflict recurrence 
 
 Model 2 
  
Time -1.029** 
 (0.250) 
  
Severity -0.122 
 (0.111) 
  
Duration 0.224 
 (0.141) 
  
Ethnic conflict 0.293 
 (0.538) 
  
Rebel victory 1.740** 
 (0.501) 
  
GDP -0.579* 
 (0.254) 
  
Nr. of factions 1.516* 
 (0.743) 
  
UN Peacekeeping -1.480* 
 (0.640) 
  
Aid -3.63e-10 
 (4.35e-10) 
  
Neighboring conflict -0.0178 
 (0.610) 
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PR System -1.110+ 
 (0.612) 
  
Democracy -0.0548 
 (1.159) 
  
Constant 5.304+ 
 (2.854) 
Observations 935 
R2 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, specifications of time included but not 
reported 
 
Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of timing of the constitution-making process on the 
probability of conflict recurrence, clearly showing, how the risk of conflict recurrence 
is reduced, the more time has elapsed between conflict end and the new constitution.  
Figure 1: Marginal effects of timing on the probability of conflict recurrence 
Note: Only very few countries write the constitution in less than a year after conflict end, which makes 
the marginal effects unreliable and confidence intervals very large for these observations. This is why in 
light of the distribution, the figure starts at 5, which is approximately log (365), hence capturing countries 
that needed one year or longer.  
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To further test the second hypothesis, I also gathered information on the start dates of 
all post-conflict constitution-making process. Combined with the dates of adoption, 
this makes it possible to make a more accurate measure of the length of the constitution-
making process. However, since reliable sources are lacking for several cases, the 
subsequent analysis should be interpreted more cautiously.  
 
Whenever available, and ideally confirmed by two different sources, the exact date of 
when the constitution-making process began was coded. Often this is the case when a 
constitutional assembly or committee met for the first time to begin their discussions 
on the new constitution. In order to not overestimate the length of the process, those 
processes on which some information was missing were treated conservatively. This 
concerns almost half of the cases. In many cases only information on the month was 
available, so that the process was coded to have begun at the end of that month.26 In 
the four cases where only a beginning year could reliably be established, the process is 
coded as having begun at the end of that year. The variable process length then 
measures the number of days passed between the beginning of the process and the 
adoption of the constitution. Finally, if there was no process, but simply a new 
constitution was suddenly put forward by the executive, the process was coded as 
extremely short – namely one day. The data reveals that on average, post-conflict 
                                                 
26
  Information on the day the constitution-writing process was not available for 35 out of the 74 post-
conflict constitution-making processes identified.  
86 
 
constitution-making takes almost two years, namely 23 months. More specifically, 
most post-conflict constitutions are written in up to one year (38%), a considerable 
share in up to 2 years (21%), 19% in 3 to 10 years and finally, some constitutions are 
adopted without any process (22%). Outliers with particularly long constitution writing 
processes are Cuba (10 years), Chile (7 years), Angola (7 years), and Laos (7 years). 
Table 9 presents the results of a logistic regression analyzing the relationship between 
the duration of the constitution-making process and conflict recurrence.  
 
 
Table 9: The effect of the length of the constitution-making process on conflict recurrence 
 Model 3 
  
Process length -0.000656+ 
 (0.000344) 
  
Severity -0.0937 
 (0.0912) 
  
Duration 0.196+ 
 (0.111) 
  
Ethnic conflict 1.034+ 
 (0.589) 
  
Rebel victory 1.674** 
 (0.602) 
  
GDP -0.256 
 (0.209) 
  
Nr. of factions 1.112+ 
 (0.591) 
  
UN Peacekeeping -0.671 
 (0.649) 
  
Aid -5.12e-10 
 (4.81e-10) 
  
Neighboring conflict 0.494 
 (0.448) 
  
PR System -0.783 
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 (0.554) 
  
Democracy 0.333 
 (1.030) 
  
Constant -3.547* 
 (1.632) 
Observations 935 
R2 0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, specifications of time included but not 
reported 
 
As can be seen from Table 9, the analysis provides some support for the proposition 
that longer post-conflict constitution-making processes are beneficial for peace. The 
coefficient measuring the duration of the constitution-making process is negative and 
marginally significant (with p=0.057).27 The poorer quality of the data on when exactly 
a constitution-making process began means these results need to be interpreted 
cautiously. Nevertheless, they do suggest that the mechanism brought forward in this 
chapter exists.  
 
Robustness checks 
 
To corroborate the statistically significant findings, several steps were taken. First, I 
use data from Eisenstadt, et al. (2015) to employ a different measure of whether a new 
constitution was passed in the post-conflict period. Also with this different coding of 
                                                 
27
  A few cases exist, where the constitution was adopted in the post-conflict period, but the deliberation 
began before the conflict ended. To account for the fact that then the bargaining mechanism could 
only partially come into play, another variable was created reducing the duration of the process in 
these case from conflict end to adoption. The results remain unchanged.  
88 
 
whether a new constitution was adopted the analysis shows that post-conflict countries 
that adopt a new constitution are statistically significantly less likely to experience 
conflict recurrence. Second, it was tested whether the results change when defining a 
maximum amount of years until when renewed violence still constituted conflict 
recurrence. Reducing the analysis to the first 30, 20 or 15 years did not change the 
results, both main variables remain negatively and statistically significantly associated 
with conflict recurrence. Third, I control for power sharing, based on data from Gates 
et al. (2016) and the results remain unchanged. Fourth, I calculate all models using 
firthlogit, because conflict recurrence is a highly rare event – the data include only 161 
instances of recurrence but 2,744 (94.4 %) country years which remained stable. All 
results remain robust to this model specification. Finally, some scholars prefer to use 
survival analysis when analyzing conflict recurrence, as these models calculate how 
long it takes until a certain event takes place. Using both the cox proportional hazard 
model or the Weibull model provides further support for the results: both writing a new 
constitution and leaving more time for the constitution-making process are statistically 
significantly associated with a lower risk of conflict recurrence. 
 
Addressing the issue of endogeneity 
 
When analyzing constitution making processes, their characteristics and the 
relationship to an outcome such as peace (or democratization) one concern has to be 
the issue of endogeneity (Eisenstadt, et al., 2015, Wheatley and Mendez, 2013, Widner, 
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2008). Firstly, it is possible that the correlations found here in fact indicate a 
relationship that runs in the other direction – maybe peace is causing constitutional-
review processes. More specifically, the analysis so far could only be picking up on 
cases where the constitution-making process ended late because it started late – hence 
peace had already been established and started to stick. In order to assess the claim of 
reversed causality, I ran another analysis with the data on when exactly the constitution-
making process started. If it were true that rather than the length of the process the fact 
that peace has already been established is important, one would expect there to be a 
significant, negative relationship between the amount of time that elapses between the 
end of the conflict and the beginning of the constitution-making process. However, the 
analysis of whether processes that start later are more conducive to peace does not yield 
significant results – more time between conflict end and beginning of the constitution-
making process does not significantly reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Table 10 
summarizes the respective results.  
Table 10: The effect of the time elapsed between conflict end and beginning of the process 
 Model 4 
  
Beginning of constitution-making process -0.00423 
 (0.00459) 
  
Severity -0.203 
 (0.135) 
  
Duration 0.390* 
 (0.157) 
  
Ethnic conflict 0.409 
 (0.633) 
  
Rebel victory 1.732** 
 (0.660) 
  
GDP -0.462* 
 (0.198) 
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Nr. of factions 1.052 
 (0.839) 
  
UN Peacekeeping -0.450 
 (0.648) 
  
Aid -4.72e-10 
 (5.55e-10) 
  
Neighboring conflict -0.0358 
 (0.504) 
  
PR System -0.946 
 (0.624) 
  
Democracy 0.975 
 (1.008) 
  
Constant -1.705 
 (1.871) 
Observations 
R2 
750 
0.18 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, specifications of time included but not reported 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the second hypothesis is confirmed in the statistical analysis 
rules out that only those countries adopt new constitutions where it is particularly easy 
to do so. If the result that adopting a new constitution were endogenous, one would 
expect that only those post-conflict countries adopt new constitutions where there is 
already a large consensus between the political actors. This in turn would mean that 
they are very quickly able to decide upon a new constitution. The fact that the analysis 
shows that on the contrary those countries, which take longer to write the constitution 
and adopt it later in their peace process are those that remain more stable calls 
endogeneity problems into question.  
 
But a different cause of endogeneity might still exist – possibly there is a third factor 
causing both the constitution-making process and peace, which is not captured by the 
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control variables. Although omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out entirely, the next 
section looks into several cases in order to address this concern. If the mechanisms 
stipulated in the chapter do indeed hold, this should be traceable in specific cases, 
making it less likely that a third, unobserved variable is causing peace. Anecdotal 
evidence from three cases reveals that the mechanisms stipulated in this chapter could 
indeed explain how constitution-making contributes to peace. The South African case 
demonstrates that constitution-making can constitute a trust-building bargaining 
process in the post-conflict period, speaking to the elite-centric mechanism. Data for 
Venezuela and Mozambique in turn suggests that constitution-making might have 
contributed to increased trust in state institutions, thereby alluding to the state-society 
mechanism.  
 
South Africa as an example of the trust-building effects of constitution-making  
 
The first mechanism pertains to cases where deliberation over the constitution helps to 
increase trust between the diverse political actors in a political system. Studying this 
mechanism should be approached from a qualitative perspective. However, 
systematically selecting a case to do so is difficult because a) the binary nature of the 
analysis means any case that has written a new constitution and has remained peaceful 
is an equally good fit and because b) the literature on post-conflict constitution making 
has mostly focused on very few, prominent examples only (South Africa as a positive 
case and Timor-Leste as a problematic case). Because it is the only positive case where 
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extensive, qualitative data is available, South Africa was chosen as a plausibility probe. 
Although it cannot be considered a typical case of civil war, it should be considered an 
ideal case of democratic constitution-making: it is the most studied and widely 
referenced positive example of post-conflict constitution making (Barnes and De 
Klerk, 2002, Miller, 2010). If the mechanism stipulated in the theory section cannot be 
found here, we should not expect to be able to find it in other cases either. Therefore, 
South Africa can serve as a helpful qualitative check of whether the mechanism 
stipulated can be traced.  
 
In the armed conflict that lasted from 1981-1988 the government of South Africa faced 
violent opposition from the armed wings of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
Pan Africa Congress (PAC), who aimed to end apartheid. The constitution-making 
process consisted of two steps – from March to November 1993 closed negotiations 
between all 19 parties (the ANC and the government being the main ones) took place, 
which resulted in a transitional government and an interim constitution. This interim 
constitution entailed agreed-upon, core principles for the new constitution. In the 
second step an elected constitutional assembly wrote a new constitution. Here country 
wide consultations between the public and those involved in the constitution-making 
process played a major role. Both the negotiations in the constitutional assembly and 
the outreach activities made political opponents work together as “politicians who were 
previously at war with one another, (were) talking jointly to the people” (Ebrahim and 
Miller, 2010:135). But also more generally, the constitution-making process clearly 
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helped build trust between the formerly warring parties, also because sufficient time 
was scheduled for the process: “The length of the overall process also enabled parties 
to hone their negotiating skills and fully develop their substantive positions. Moreover, 
direct contacts throughout the slow buildup to substantive negotiation gave 
interlocutors the opportunity, on the Afrikaner side, to shed their demonized 
perceptions of the ANC, and on the ANC side, to become sensitized to white fears” 
(Ebrahim and Miller, 2010:147). More generally, de Klerk (2002: 19) describes the 
effects of the constitutional process on the participants as follows: “During the 
transition, South Africans started to debunk misperceptions and myths about each 
other. As trust increased, they began to make the political compromises necessary for 
a mutually acceptable future”. In the end, a process that was not without difficulties, 
accompanied by violence in the country and despite the threat of deadlock looming for 
a longer period of time – the constitution writing process was successful and a new 
constitution adopted in 1996 (Barnes and De Klerk, 2002). Through the new 
constitution “a high degree of consensus was achieved among parties representing a 
wide range of ideological perspectives” (Ebrahim and Miller, 2010:144) while at the 
same time rallying the people of South Africa behind the nascent “new South Africa” 
(De Klerk, 2002:16). Overall this anecdotal evidence suggests that constitution-making 
processes can enable dialogue and build trust between the main political actors of a 
polity as well as strengthening state-society relations. 
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Increased state legitimacy in Mozambique and Venezuela 
 
The second mechanism put forward in the theoretical section holds that constitution-
making can contribute to peace by increasing trust between the citizens and the state. 
Unfortunately, cross-national data on citizens’ trust in state institutions is extremely 
scarce for post-conflict countries. Relevant data could only be obtained for two 
countries contained in the dataset: Mozambique, which came out of conflict in 1992 
and adopted a new constitution in 2004 and Venezuela, where the conflict ended in 
1992 and a new constitution was written seven years later. Again, it is therefore not 
possible to carefully select cases to test whether the mechanism holds, but seeing 
whether it does hold in the two cases where data is available can provide a useful, first 
test. To this end, levels of trust in national parliaments – a central state institution and 
one that was asked about in both in the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer survey the 
data was taken from – can be compared across the two countries.  
 
Comparing Mozambique before and after the new constitution of 2004 suggests a 
strong effect with the mean level of trust in the national parliament rising from 1.79 to 
2.39. When asked about how much they trust the national parliament in 2002 over 40% 
respondents stated “Not at all” or “A little bit”. In 2005, this had reduced to under 20%. 
In Venezuela, we also see a very clear increase – here those respondents that expressed 
that they have “A lot of confidence” in the national parliament grew from about 8% to 
13% and those that at least have some confidence from 12% to 20%. Venezuela is a 
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particularly interesting case, because this constitutes constitution making, which 
enabled authoritarian tendencies, but the mechanism nevertheless seems to hold. 
Overall, these figures suggest that the second mechanism stipulated in the chapter 
might indeed exist. Figure two summarizes the responses in the two countries. 
Figure 2: Levels of trust in the national parliaments in Mozambique and Venezuela in % 
 
 
Source: Afrobarometer & Latinobarometer 
 
Overall, these – admittedly preliminary – insights into three cases give some suggestive 
evidence that the mechanisms put forward, which explain why writing a constitution 
and the length of the process should matter for peace, indeed hold.  
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter investigated the effect of constitution-making processes on conflict 
recurrence. I put forward two main arguments why constitution making should be 
beneficial for post-conflict peace. First, constitution-making can engage former 
adversaries in a continued bargaining situation which - by demanding compromise and 
building trust between them – can help overcome commitment problems. Second, a 
constitution-making process can strengthen state-society relations by creating new, 
legitimate state institutions. Testing the effect of constitution-making on 237 peace 
periods between 1950 and 2011 confirms that writing a new constitution significantly 
reduces a country’s risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. The analysis of the 
duration of the constitution-making process suggests that this result cannot be simply 
explained by endogeneity problems and that longer processes, which allow for 
bargaining and building trust between the main political actors of the post-conflict 
system, are more beneficial for peace.  
 
The research presented here could be expanded in several regards. First, further data-
collection efforts would be necessary to concretely test the two causal mechanisms put 
forward on how constitution-making can contribute to peace. Cross-national data on 
trust in political institutions, which is currently unavailable, could be used to assess 
whether post-conflict constitution-making increases trust in state institutions, whereas 
in depth case studies of constitution-writing processes could shed further light on 
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whether and how bargaining in constitution-making processes can build trust between 
political opponents. The second question that remains unanswered is the importance of 
international influence on post-conflict constitution making processes. International 
donors often support constitution-building and it is possible that those processes that 
receive international support are more likely to produce results that stick. At the same 
time examples exist where international actors have pressured countries to quickly 
write a new constitution shortly after conflict has ended. As this analysis suggests, this 
could be to the detriment of post-conflict constitution-making process’ effect on peace. 
Taking a closer look at international engagement in post-conflict constitution building 
could shed light on the question how important external influences are. Third, the 
analysis does not look more deeply into the provisions the respective constitutions 
entail. While the results presented here strongly suggest that constitution-processes by 
themselves can reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, the interplay of process and 
content needs to be further analyzed.  
 
Overall, this chapter clearly shows that constitution making processes can positively 
impact on post-conflict peace. While much previous work on conflict recurrence has 
focused on other important, but static factors, constitution-making processes can be 
encouraged and supported. The chapter thereby adds to the literature on conflict 
recurrence by demonstrating the importance of institutional change in post-conflict 
societies and identifies one issue that post-conflict countries can actively pursue in 
order to increase their chances of sustained peace. The results thereby also have clear 
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policy implications. International actors have been supporting constitution-making 
processes in post-conflict countries under the assumption that this can strengthen peace. 
The analyses presented here indeed show that such international engagement can be 
worthwhile, as a successful constitution-making process can reduce the risk of conflict 
recurrence. However, the second important result is that constitution-making processes 
occurring in the post-conflict phase need time. International actors often pressure 
countries to complete this difficult process very quickly or only pay attention to the 
main fighting parties of the conflict. Instead supporting broad dialog and discussions – 
even if this means the process might become more complicated and drawn out than 
anticipated – and at the same time working toward a consensus should be the more 
promising avenue to strengthen peace through constitution-making processes.  
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Chapter 4: Identifying pathways to peace: How 
international support can help prevent conflict 
recurrence 
 
 
By Karina Mross, Charlotte Fiedler and Jörn Grävingholt28 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The current literature on peacebuilding is in many regards ambiguous about the role 
specific elements of peace support can play for post-conflict peace. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the same type of support can be favourable or detrimental depending on 
context factors. Arguments have been made that peacebuilding without sufficient 
attention to security is likely to fail (Holm and Eide, 2000), yet that extensive security 
support that is not embedded in domestic institutions may also be ill-guided (Ryan, 
2009). To some, economic support is the key variable of success (Collier et al., 2003), 
while others claim that too much economic support can impact on a country in a 
similarly detrimental way as natural resource rents unless it is embedded in a broader 
strategy of political reforms (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Political, and in particular 
democratic, reforms, in turn, have been criticized to sow the seeds of unrest rather than 
                                                 
28
  Both Karina Mross and Charlotte Fiedler are the lead authors of this chapter. A version of this 
chapter is currently under revision at International Security. 
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help stabilise a country (Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). In sum, the effect of most types 
of external peacebuilding support might to a large degree depend on the combination 
with other elements of support or with certain context factors.29 
 
Against this background, this chapter takes a comprehensive look at external support 
for post-conflict countries. It seeks to identify patterns of international engagement that 
are associated with sustained peace after civil war. To do so, we analyse combinations 
of international support across the five main areas of engagement in post-conflict 
peacebuilding: support for politics and governance; for socio-economic development; 
for societal conflict transformation; peacekeeping; and non-military support for 
security. We thus ask the question: How do external actors need to combine different 
types of support to contribute to sustained peace after civil war? 
 
We use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to examine which combinations of 
international support (i.e., of different types official development assistance (ODA) and 
peacekeeping) are regularly associated with sustained peace. The analysis covers 36 
post-conflict episodes after 1990. Our configurational analysis is combined with three 
case studies – Cambodia, Indonesia and Liberia. Based on 90 interviews with domestic 
and international experts they complement the main findings derived from the QCA.30  
                                                 
29
  Following a definition provided by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:para 
21), we refer to peacebuilding support as external activities aimed at preventing the recurrence of 
violence in post-conflict societies. 
30
  Most interviewees worked at multi- or bilateral aid agencies, INGOs or local NGOs, in academia or 
the media. See appendix.  
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This chapter is a novel contribution to the literature on peacebuilding in several regards. 
Compared to previous research, our analysis is firstly more comprehensive because we 
take the whole range of peacebuilding activities into account in an encompassing, yet 
disaggregated way. Second, by applying a configurational analysis we are able to 
identify whether different types and combinations of peacebuilding support are 
particularly beneficial and whether this varies between different country contexts. 
Additionally, for the countries covered in this chapter, and on the basis of project level 
information provided by AidData, we have created what to the best of our knowledge 
is the first dataset to comprehensively document aid flows to all areas of societal 
conflict transformation. 
 
Among the patterns we identify, four findings stand out: first, peacekeeping is only one 
important component of effective post-conflict support. Second, supporting 
governance can also be an effective international strategy of peace support. Third, only 
a combination of all types of support explains sustained peace also in cases with a high 
risk of conflict recurrence. More generally, we find that international support clearly 
matters: no case without any substantial external support avoided civil war recurrence.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 discusses the existing 
research on different areas of international support for peacebuilding and their impact. 
Section 3 presents details of the research design and the methodology applied. Section 
4 presents our findings before we conclude in section 5. 
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Peacebuilding after civil war 
What do we know about the possibilities of external actors to contribute to peace after 
civil war? Although international actors regularly become active in post-conflict 
countries in a multiplicity of ways – by sending peacekeeping troops, providing ODA 
or engaging in mediation, for example – systematic knowledge about international 
impact on post-conflict peace remains limited (Findley, 2018). Research on post-
conflict aid has mostly focused on aggregate effects of ODA flows, coming to mixed 
results (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Findley, 2018, Flores 
and Nooruddin, 2009, Walter, 2010) or conducted sector-specific analyses (Girod, 
2012, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). Systematic comparisons between and across 
sectors, however, are lacking.  
 
More conclusive evidence exists on the effect of peacekeeping on civil war recurrence. 
It is a well-established finding that the international community can play an important 
role in stabilizing post-conflict countries by providing peacekeeping troops (Collier, et 
al., 2008, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Fortna, 2004, Hegre 
et al., 2015, Mason, et al., 2011). Walter (1997) has convincingly argued that the 
international community’s impact results from the fact that external actors can help 
solve the commitment problem in post-conflict contexts – neither side can guarantee it 
will not resort to violence as it has to fear the other side will exploit such a situation of 
weakness of their opponent. Peacekeepers can separate the two sides, help with the 
demobilisation process and take over duties of the local military or police and thereby 
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help overcome the security dilemma. One of the most influential studies in this line of 
research shows that multidimensional peacekeeping31, which combines troop 
deployment with developmental elements of peacebuilding support, has so far proven 
to be the most effective approach in promoting peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). 
 
The effectiveness of multidimensional peacekeeping suggests that broader strategies 
than just troops are needed if the international community wants to impact on peace in 
post-conflict countries. However, it seems unclear exactly what such an effective 
strategy could look like. Hoeffler (2014:75) concludes in a recent literature review that 
“our knowledge about the optimal policy mix of economic, diplomatic and military 
interventions is still limited”. She basically confirms what Patrick and Brown 
(2007:132) found back in 2007: “There is little accumulated knowledge about how best 
to combine development, governance, rule of law, security and other interventions in 
fragile states”. This chapter aims to fill this gap by not only disaggregating ODA and 
studying different areas of engagement – security, politics and governance, socio-
economic development and societal conflict transformation – but also analysing their 
interplay with peacekeeping troops. 
 
                                                 
31
  Defined by Doyle and Sambanis (2000:791) as: “(…) missions with extensive civilian functions, 
including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight (…)”. 
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Analytical framework – how can peacebuilding 
support contribute to peace? 
 
One central assumption guides this chapter: building peace in a society that experienced 
civil war is an inherently domestic process, which can, however, be influenced by 
external actors. External actors can influence domestic dynamics by setting incentives 
and supporting actors and institutions that can contribute to peace. Similarly, Chetail 
(2009:10) writes about peacebuilding support: “Its raison d’être is to support the 
indigenous forces of a country coming out of conflict”. Although some authors argue 
that countries should rather be left to their own fate, even at the risk of state failure 
(Herbst, 2004, Weinstein, 2005), or that external interventions have been ineffective if 
not harmful (Paris, 2004), evidence also exists that external actors can contribute to 
promoting peace (Fiedler, 2018, Fortna, 2004, Zürcher et al., 2013). 
 
Based on the academic literature as well as practitioner guidelines we disaggregate 
international peacebuilding into five areas of engagement: peacekeeping, security 
ODA, politics and governance, socio-economic development and societal conflict 
transformation (Barnett et al., 2007, Smith, 2004, World Bank, 2011). As the following 
discussion of different strands of literature shows, it is widely assumed, but not 
undisputed, that engagement in each of these areas contributes positively to peace in 
post-conflict situations.  
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Peacekeeping 
 
Supporting the reestablishment of security is perhaps the most obvious pillar of 
international support aimed at preventing the recurrence of civil war. Its premise is that 
establishing basic security for the state and its citizens against internal and external 
threats is a precondition for all other activities related to peace and development. 
Interventions directly aimed at restoring basic security include the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces by the UN or other international organisations. Peacekeeping 
represents the military dimension of international peacebuilding support. The logic of 
peacekeeping is based on the idea of installing a third party that can arbitrate and 
enforce the peace or ceasefire (agreement). Such an external security guarantee 
addresses the credible commitment problem present in post-conflict societies, where 
former warring factions need to agree and adhere to measures that most likely reduce 
their power – such as demobilization or democratic elections (Walter, 2002). As 
mentioned above, ample quantitative evidence exists that peacekeeping significantly 
decreases the likelihood of renewed violence (Collier, et al., 2008, Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000, Fortna, 2004, Fortna, 2008, Hegre, et al., 2015). This is particularly 
noteworthy, since peacekeeping is often employed in especially challenging 
circumstances where the recurrence of conflict is highly likely (Fortna, 2004).  
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Non-military security support (security ODA) 
 
Besides direct provision of security by military means, security support (non-military) 
also plays a prominent role in development cooperation in post-conflict contexts. Re-
establishing public security helps to create a sense of safety in society that allows the 
resumption of basic social functions and normal routines. Moreover, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes also directly address the credible 
commitment problem by reducing the ability to renege on previous commitments to 
peace. Security ODA includes demining activities and small arms control, as well as 
more complex efforts aiming to re-establish and consolidate the state’s monopoly of 
violence. Among them are DDR programmes and security sector reforms (SSR), which 
focus on professionalising the state security forces (including the armed forces, police, 
security services and intelligence) and establishing democratic control over them. 
Especially, DDR and SSR are widely perceived by policy-makers as being crucial for 
sustainable peace, but the few available academic cross-country analyses provide 
mixed evidence (Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Krebs and Licklider, 2015, Toft, 
2009). However, it has been shown that under specific circumstances, e.g. before the 
first post-conflict elections, a DDR process can significantly reduce the risk of civil 
war recurrence (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Joshi, et al., 2017). Overall, we expect a 
pacifying effect of security ODA. 
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Politics and Governance 
 
Support for politics and governance, which includes democracy support, has become a 
central component of international efforts to establish peace in post-conflict societies. 
The underlying rationale is that functioning democracies prevent the recurrence of 
conflict by providing non-violent channels to express and deal with competing interests 
and grievances. Support for politics and governance typically includes assistance to 
elections, constitution-writing, building state capacity and strengthening the rule of 
law, human rights and civil society. 
 
Good governance has been idenified as a factor that is robustly correlated with less 
civil war recurrence. Two recent studies show that states which are governed better – 
measured through a strong bureaucracy, the extent of rule of law or the level of 
corruption, for example – are signficiantly less likely to experience civil war recurrence 
(Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Walter, 2015).  
 
Regarding democracy, the picture is more diverse. On the one hand, the international 
community has been strongly criticized for pursuing a “liberal peacebuilding” strategy, 
which pushes post-conflict countries to democratise and hold elections early on. This 
is said to endanger peace as democratisation more generally and elections in particular 
can be associated with renewed conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, Paris, 2004). On 
the other hand, many regard fostering democratic structures as a crucial step towards 
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long-term peace, and research demonstrates that full democracies are a regime type that 
rarely breaks down (Call and Cousens, 2007, Carothers, 2007, Hegre, et al., 2001). A 
study by Savun and Tirone (2011) shows that democracy support can reduce 
democratising countries’ risk of experiencing internal strife. Even in post-conflict 
situations, democracy support can effectively foster peace (Mross, 2018). Furthermore, 
both Matanock (2017) and Smidt (2016) show that international election monitoring, 
an important component of international support for politics and governance in post-
conflict countries, can stabilise elections. Overall, this suggests that although 
democratisation can be associated with conflict, support for politics and governance 
can compensate for this effect and contribute to peace in post-conflict societies.  
 
Socio-economic development 
 
Supporting socio-economic development is another important area of peacebuilding. 
Improving the living conditions of the population – so the reasoning goes – can 
alleviate grievances, restore confidence in state institutions, give the population a stake 
in peace and hence reduce the risk of arms being taken up again. Some activities in this 
area directly address the legacy of conflict, such as supporting physical reconstruction 
or the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people. Others are not unique to 
the post-conflict context and constitute the bulk of general ODA: infrastructure 
projects, the provision of basic services as well as more long-term policies for growth 
and employment. 
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The relationship between ODA – which largely consists of support for socio-economic 
development – and conflict recurrence is unclear. Walter (2010) and Flores and 
Nooruddin (2009) find no direct effect on recurrence. Even worse, warnings have been 
issued that aid in fragile states might produce adverse effects similar to the “resource 
curse” and thus erode domestic institutions (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Collier and 
Hoeffler and their co-authors, on the other hand, present various studies demonstrating 
a positive effect of aid on post-conflict growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, et 
al., 2008).  
 
Efforts to promote socio-economic development in post-conflict settings are supported 
by various findings in econometric research: for one thing, it is well-established that a 
high level of GDP per capita in a country is associated with a reduced likelihood of 
internal conflict (Collier, et al., 2003, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Holtermann, 2012, 
Sambanis and Hegre, 2006). Focussing more specifically on post-conflict situations, 
some quantitative research has shown that growth reduces the probability of a return to 
warfare (Collier, et al., 2008, Quinn, et al., 2007), although others have raised doubts 
about this finding (Dahl and Høyland, 2012). In sum, it seems fair to conclude that 
socio-economic development is not a guarantee against recurrence but increases the 
likelihood of a country remaining peaceful. We therefore expect international support 
in this area of engagement to contribute to peace. 
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Societal conflict transformation 
An area of support distinct from those mentioned so far is aid targeted at helping post-
conflict societies deal with their violent past and transform into peaceful societies. We 
refer to this area of support as societal conflict transformation (SCT). Former enemies 
– at the local as well as at a national, political level – have to learn to coexist peacefully. 
The main aim of SCT is hence to “mend the `social fabric´” by resolving grievances 
and overcoming societal divisons (Skaar et al., 2015). We adapt the concept by Skaar, 
et al. (2015) and conceptualize SCT to consist of four sub-areas: truth, justice, 
reconciliation and victim restitution. Truth aims to reveal atrocities committed during 
the conflict, Justice to hold perpetrators accountable for past abuses. Reconciliation 
aims to heal wounds of the past and overcome grievances within society whereas Victim 
Restitution offers compensation to individuals for harms and losses suffered. Our 
concept of societal conflict transformation is similar to, but not identical to the idea of 
Transitional Justice (see for example the definitions discussed in La Rosa and Philippe, 
2009)32.  
 
Support for truth and justice is often based on the assumption that establishing peace 
requires processing a society’s legacy of violence. This is supposed to build trust within 
society and legitimacy for the new order. Some critics have argued that initiating a 
debate on past abuses can divide a society even more (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). 
                                                 
32
  Our concept of SCT includes components of transitional justice and a wide array of dialogue 
supporting activities. Unlike some transitional justice concepts, however, SCT does not include 
institutional reforms or means that improve the security situation such as DDR or SSR. 
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However, more recent, quantitative studies mostly find either no effect or a positive 
effect of the different instruments of transitional justice on peace (Lie et al., 2007, Loyle 
and Appel, 2017). We therefore assume that support for SCT can contribute to 
sustained peace. 
 
We take an inductive approach to identify if certain patterns and combinations of 
international support can explain sustained peace. While peacekeeping has been shown 
to reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, the relative success of multidimensional 
peacekeeping supports the notion that security is crucial, but not enough (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000). For example, some suggest that extensive security support that is not 
accompanied by institutional reform may be ill-guided (Ryan, 2009). Likewise, while 
some consider economic support the key variable of success (Collier, et al., 2003), 
others claim that it needs to be embedded in a broader strategy of political reforms 
(Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Political, and in particular democratic, reforms, in turn, 
have been criticized to sow the seeds of unrest rather than help stabilise a country 
(Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). In sum, the effect of most types of external 
peacebuilding support might to a large degree depend on the combination with other 
elements of support or with certain context factors. For example, focusing international 
efforts on mainly one type of support might work in contexts with a lower risk for 
recurrence, but more difficult contexts might call for international engagement in 
several or all five areas of peacebuilding. To answer these questions this chapter 
analyses international peacebuilding support in a comprehensive, yet disaggregated 
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way, by taking all five areas of peacebuilding into account and systematically looking 
at the combinations between them to explain peace after civil war.  
 
Research design, method and empirical strategy 
To identify effective international strategies of peace support, we use Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis on 36 cases of post-civil war peacebuilding. To this end, we 
disaggregate international support by multilateral and bilateral OECD/DAC33 donors 
across five areas of engagement while controlling for a country’s predisposition for 
conflict recurrence. 
 
Introducing Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
QCA is a relatively recent addition to the repertoire of rigorous comparative methods 
in the social sciences.34 QCA is ideally suited for our purpose due to its unique 
strengths: First, it focuses on the effect of combinations of conditions; second, it allows 
identifying diverging paths to the same outcome, with each path characterised by a 
specific configuration of conditions. Third, the set-theoretic logic underlying QCA is 
in line with our research interest: we aim to better understand if substantial amounts of 
                                                 
33
  Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
34
  QCA owes much of its growing popularity in recent years to the path breaking work by Charles 
Ragin (e.g., (Ragin, 1987, Ragin, 2008, Rihoux and Ragin, 2009)) as well as Carsten Schneider and 
Claudius Wagemann (2012, 2010). For excellent examples of its application, see (Bara, 2014, 
Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018, Mello, 2012). 
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certain types and combinations of external support are sufficient to sustain peace. An 
additional advantage of QCA for our analysis is the fact that due to its underlying 
methodology it works well with relatively small numbers of cases, such as the 36 post-
conflict episodes in our population. 
 
The logic of QCA is based on set memberships. In its dichotomous (‘crisp-set’) version, 
QCA variables will adopt the values of 1 (member) or 0 (non-member). Our analysis 
uses fuzzy-set QCA, which classifies cases according to what degree their membership 
in a set is present. The calibration process transforms observational data into fuzzy-
sets on a scale from 0 and 1. Defining the cross-over point at 0.5, that separates 
members of a set from non-members, is central to calibrating a set. A central element 
of QCA is the truth table. Each row in the truth table represents one possible 
combination of the conditions, and cases are assigned to the row that represents them 
best. Based on the empirical data, the truth table also indicates if the configuration 
represented in a row can be considered sufficient for the selected outcome.35 Due to 
limited empirical diversity, usually some rows are “logical remainders” – theoretically 
possible but empirically not observed combinations. Algorithm-based logical 
minimisation reduces the combinations (rows) that are considered sufficient for the 
                                                 
35
  In this process, the raw consistency threshold set by the researcher specifies the level of 
inconsistency allowed in considering a combination of conditions (i.e. truth table row) sufficient for 
the outcome. The threshold should be tailored to the research at hand and can, for example, be guided 
by a gap between truth table rows with higher and lower consistency scores (see Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). 
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outcome to the simplest possible solution term without violating any of the statements 
made by them.  
 
Different types of solutions can be reached depending on the treatment of logical 
remainders.36 The parsimonious solution is based on assumptions about logical 
remainders that are most conducive to simplifying the solution term. However, some 
of these assumptions can contradict our knowledge about causal relations. Intermediate 
solutions address this problem by excluding “difficult counterfactuals” – those 
contradicting our knowledge about the world – from the logical minimisation 
procedure. We focus on the intermediate solution because we have strong directional 
expectations with regard to certain conditions. We report the parsimonious solution in 
the appendix. 
 
Two main parameters of fit inform the interpretation of QCA results: scores of 
consistency and of coverage.37 The consistency score indicates the degree to which the 
empirical data is fully in line with a result, or how much deviation occurs. If the findings 
pass a plausible consistency threshold, the coverage score provides information on the 
                                                 
36
  On the meaning and treatment of different types of solutions see (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
37
  A third, the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) score indicates how far a condition might 
be considered simultaneously sufficient for the outcome and its negation (simultaneous subset 
relations). 
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share of the outcome that is explained by the results38, that is, how comprehensive or 
trivial the findings are. Both scores run between 0 (worst) and 1 (perfect).  
 
The population: post-civil war cases 
 
To analyse international peacebuilding support in countries that emerged from civil 
war, we use the UCDP/PRIO dataset to identify post-conflict peace episodes. 
UCDP/PRIO provides data on armed conflicts that are characterised by all of the 
following features: the use of armed forces, a minimum of 25 battle deaths per year, 
the government of a state as one primary party to the conflict and an incompatibility 
over the government or territory.39 We consider a country involved in several armed 
conflicts as one system in conflict, which is why our analysis takes countries that 
emerged from conflict – rather than conflict dyads that ended – as units of analysis.  
Because we are interested in the effects of international support after civil war we 
reduce this group of countries to those where violence was particularly severe. In a 
slight deviation from a common practice in civil war research, we posit that all conflicts 
combined must have led to at least 1,000 battle deaths in any two consecutive years 
during the conflict period. This threshold broadens the number of cases eligible for 
inclusion and, inter alia, allows including cases that barely missed the 1,000 threshold 
in one calendar year. Finally, we consider a civil war “over” when a country has 
                                                 
38
  Or even more specifically, the share of the membership in the outcome. 
39
  We use the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset v. 4-2016. 
116 
 
experienced a minimum of one calendar year of peace, understood as the absence of 
any armed conflict on its territory. That year would then count as the first year of a 
peace period. The logic of this definition implies that the same country can enter our 
dataset more than once if a peace episode breaks down after more than one year and 
results in renewed civil war that ends again. 
 
Our period of observation includes all peace episodes that began in 1990 or later, 
because it was only in the 1990s that international peacebuilding emerged as a regular 
practice. At the same time, this choice of period allows us to discount effects that could 
be attributed to the fundamental shift in the international system that was brought about 
by the end of the Cold War. Based on the above criteria, we arrive at a list of 36 peace 
episodes in 28 different countries.40  
 
The outcome: sustained peace  
 
Consistent with our definition of post-conflict episodes, we define peace as the absence 
of major armed conflict after civil war. In order to explain ‘sustained peace’, we add 
the notion of longevity, or durability, and consider peace as sustained if peace lasted at 
least for five years. Clearly, the intensity of renewed violence also matters. Therefore, 
we create a fuzzy-set that ranges from entirely peaceful to full recurrence of civil war, 
                                                 
40
  See data matrices in the appendix for a full list of cases. 
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considering post-conflict countries that experienced renewed minor conflict (below 
100 battle deaths per year) still as relatively peaceful.41  
 
Measuring international support 
 
We conceptualize four of our conditions, namely substantial security ODA, substantial 
international support for politics and governance, for socio-economic development, as 
well as for societal conflict transformation as official development assistance given to 
these specific purposes. We approximate substantial support in these areas through 
financial contributions provided by OECD/DAC donors and multilateral organizations. 
To identify the volumes provided, we use the AidData database and their purpose 
codes, which indicate which topic an aid project focuses on.42 We use ODA 
commitments, because the quality of data on disbursements is very poor, especially in 
the earlier periods. This comes with the caveat that we thereby capture all activities that 
were planned rather than only those that were implemented. Nevertheless, 
commitments disclose what developmental activities donors and recipient countries 
jointly agreed upon and constitutes a good approximation of international engagement 
across the different issue areas.  
                                                 
41
  We use the direct method of calibration for the outcome and the areas of engagement. 
42
  The AidData purpose codes are often very close to the better known CRS (Creditor Reporting 
System) codes of the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) of the OECD. The advantage of 
is that it includes not only what donors themselves reported, but also incorporates information from 
project descriptions or annual reports.  
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Support for politics and governance is well captured by AidData’s purpose code 151 
“Government and Civil Society”, which includes topics such as elections, civil society, 
legal and judicial development or government administration. Developmental activities 
connected to security (security ODA), including DDR and SSR efforts, are measured 
using AidData’s purpose code 152 “Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and 
security”. The indicator for support for socio-economic development covers topics such 
as education, health, social services and infrastructure.43 Since the same volume of aid 
is likely to have a different effect depending on the size of a country, ODA 
commitments are measured per capita. Peacekeeping support is measured through the 
number of military personnel provided for activities relating to the internal conflict. 
Because concrete troop numbers were not easily available, we compiled this 
information ourselves, combining the data provided by SIPRI, the International 
Military Intervention Dataset and the homepages of the individual missions.  
 
In the case of societal conflict transformation (SCT) additional coding efforts were 
required. While SCT covers activities reported as ODA, no AidData or CRS code exists 
to capture this area of engagement. We therefore compiled the to our knowledge first 
dataset of projects in this area, using project information provided by AidData.44 To 
                                                 
43
  It is measured using the sum of all ODA commitments, minus those for Politics and Governance 
(151) and Security (152). We also decided to exclude debt relief and aid to refugees in donor 
countries. Their impact on the ground is less immediate, and including them could bias our results, 
suggesting that donors were highly active when in fact they were not. 
44
  The only other effort to quantify international engagement in the area of transitional justice comes 
from Muck & Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2012), which, however, focuses on trials and truth commissions 
only.  
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this end, we conducted a two-step coding process that combined mechanical pre-
selection with subsequent hand coding. For the mechanical coding, a list of search 
terms was developed that capture one or more of the central elements of SCT – Truth, 
Justice, Victim and Reconciliation. In a second step, hand coding based on project 
descriptions was used to identify SCT projects. The commitments per project were 
transformed into yearly aggregates in order to be comparable with the data used to 
identify support in the other areas of engagement.  
 
In order to capture international engagement provided after civil war we measure 
support in the first up to five post-conflict years. For cases that experienced recurrence 
in less than five years after peace was established, only the peaceful years were taken 
to calculate the average amount of support provided. Since no strong theoretical basis 
exists for whether support should be considered substantial, we used evident gaps 
between the amounts received (ODA or peacekeeping troops) by different countries to 
differentiate between substantial support and non-substantial support in the calibration 
process.45 Table 11 summarizes the conditions capturing international engagement, 
data sources as well as the calibration thresholds chosen.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
  The calibration patterns for all five areas of international engagement can be found in the appendix. 
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Table 11: Data sources and calibration thresholds chosen to measure international engagement 
 
Conditions: International 
peacebuilding support 
Data Indicator Fuzzy-set: Qualitative Anchors 
0 0.5 1.0 
Substantial support for 
socio-economic 
development 
AidData: Entire ODA  
minus 
- 151 (Government and Civil 
Society) 
- 152 (Conflict prevention and 
resolution, peace and 
security”) 
- 930 (Refugees in donor 
countries) 
- 600 (Action related to debt) 
O
D
A
 c
o
m
m
it
m
en
ts
, 
p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
 
 
20$ 58$ 150$ 
Substantial support for 
politics and governance 
AidData: CRS 151 
1$ 4.4$ 13$ 
Substantial support for 
societal conflict 
transformation 
AidData: Hand coded based on 
all projects 0$ 0.5$ 1$ 
Substantial security ODA 
AidData: CRS 152 
 0.1$ 1,6$ 10$ 
Substantial peacekeeping  
Sipri + IMI + handcoding No. 
peacekeeping 
troops 
0 500 11000 
 
Measuring a country’s predisposition for conflict 
 
Although it is possible for external actors to contribute to peace, many domestic factors 
influence the risk of civil war recurrence. Approximating a case’s ‘predisposition’ for 
conflict recurrence is important for two reasons: 1) to control for local and international 
factors besides peacebuilding support known to influence civil war recurrence and 2) 
to account for the fact that different contexts might require different types of 
international support.  
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We measure a country’s predisposition for conflict based on factors the quantitative 
literature has relatively consistently identified to increase a country’s risk of civil war 
onset or recurrence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, et al., 2008, Quinn, et al., 2007, 
Sambanis and Hegre, 2006, Walter, 2004). Six factors are included to approximate a 
particularly high risk of recurrence. The first three are characteristics of the previous 
conflict: its duration, intensity and number of factions. The next three have a more 
structural nature: the level of income, resource dependency and whether or not there is 
conflict in the neighbourhood.46 The six factors are then aggregated to control for those 
cases with a particularly high risk of conflict recurrence.  
 
The first characteristic of the previous conflict regards the presence of multiple factions 
during a conflict. This can increase the complexity of building a peaceful post-war 
order and the risk of spoilers disturbing the fragile peace (Cunningham, 2011, Doyle 
and Sambanis, 2000, Rudloff and Findley, 2016, Stedman, 1997). A short previous war 
may provoke new wars by demonstrating to potential rebels that a battle might be 
quickly fought and won (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004). Similarly, less intense 
previous wars could be more likely to be followed by new conflicts because they make 
renewed conflict appear less costly (Mason and Greig, 2017, Walter, 2004). 
Considering less intense wars to lead to civil war recurrence is not in line with some 
                                                 
46
  The cited studies have also included other factors into their analyses, but the results are less 
conclusive. This is why the type of ending of the previous conflict, (political) inequality, power-
sharing or regime type are not included (Collier, et al., 2008, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Mattes and 
Savun, 2009, Quinn, et al., 2007, Toft, 2010). 
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findings in quantitative research, which posit that more intense wars are more likely to 
recur (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004). However, running regression analyses on our 
data supports the opposite relationship, indicating that less intense wars are 
significantly related to less civil war recurrence.47 We therefore include less intense 
previous wars as a component in the predisposition variable.48 
 
More structural factors also impact the risk of recurrence. Low economic development 
can increase the risk of civil war recurrence out of two reasons. First, the post-conflict 
society is not able to benefit from a peace dividend that reduces incentives to return to 
war. Second, low GDP could stand for weak state capacity more generally, which 
indicates that state institutions are not strong enough to channel and prevent violent 
conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Holtermann, 2012). Natural resource dependency 
can undermine governance, weaken the state and at the same time increase the potential 
for rebels to finance a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Rustad and Binningsbo, 
2012). Finally, conflicts in neighbouring countries can exacerbate the risk of recurrence 
through negative spill-over effects (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Sambanis and Hegre, 
2006). More information on the concrete measurement and data sources used for each 
variable can be found in the appendix. 
                                                 
47
  See the appendix for results. We use a simple, binary logistic model and account for the time-series 
cross-sectional nature of the data by employing three cubic splines as well as robust standard errors 
according to countries. 
48
  Testing the aggregated variable in a regression analysis we find that this seems to capture the risk 
of conflict much more adequately – it is significantly related to civil war recurrence, while an 
aggregation including “intense previous war” is insignificant. The respective regression analyses 
can be found in the appendix. 
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To control for a particularly challenging context for international engagement, we 
consider cases that exhibit four or more of these factors to be at a high risk of civil war 
recurrence. The resulting indicator seems to capture the concept of a predisposition for 
conflict very well – 12 peaceful cases and 15 recurrence cases are correctly classified. 
However, ‘predisposition’ is not a perfect predictor of civil war recurrence: In five 
cases, the predisposition was low, but conflict occurred and in four the predisposition 
was high but conflict did not materialize.  
 
Findings 
We use fuzzy-set QCA to search for successful patterns of international support that 
explain peace.49 In the following, we present the intermediate solution, which is derived 
based on two directional expectations: Based on the literature review, we expect that a 
high predisposition is negative for peace, and peacekeeping troops are conducive to 
peace.  
 
It is good practice in QCA to start with an analysis of necessity, even if we are primarily 
interested in the relationship of sufficiency. Our analyses suggest, however, that none 
                                                 
49
  Using the packages QCA (Dusa, 2018, Dusa, 2007) and SetMethods (Medzihorsky et al., 2018) 
within the R project (R Core Team, 2018).  
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of our conditions or their combinations is necessary for peace.50 For the analysis of 
sufficiency, we identify the clearest gap in the data and consider those truth table rows 
as sufficient for the outcome (and hence include them in the analysis) that have a raw 
consistency score above 0.75.51 
 
Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming out of major civil wars after 1990 reveals 
four alternative paths to peace (see table 12). While providing peacekeeping troops is 
one of them, three further, robust paths to peace can be identified. First, we find that 
security ODA can contribute to peace, but second, that so can supporting politics and 
governance. Third, peace prevails in cases that received substantial international efforts 
across all types of support. 
 
All paths, except the encompassing approach, are also characterised by the absence of 
certain conditions (depicted by empty circles). Evidence from the case studies suggests, 
that absences of certain types of support do not represent necessary elements of a 
support strategy (which would imply that certain types of support should remain 
absent) but rather reflect constraints to what international actors were able or allowed 
to contribute. We elaborate on this issue in the “limitations” section below. The absence 
of “high conflict predisposition” in three out of four paths, by contrast, yields an 
                                                 
50
  Or for conflict recurrence. No condition or combination passes both the test of consistency and 
relevance of necessity, i.e. not being trivial. See the appendix for the results of an analysis of 
necessity. 
51
  Moreover, this consistency threshold ensures that PRI is above 0.7 to avoid that very small sets are 
included for the outcome and its negation. The truth tables can be found in the appendix. 
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interpretable pattern: paths 1–3, which focus on one element of support only, are 
limited to cases without a high predisposition for recurrence. Only the encompassing 
approach in path 4 addresses also cases with a high risk of recurrence. 
 
The solution is consistent (with an overall consistency score of 0.86) – as are the 
individual paths. The coverage of the overall solution of 0.63 indicates that we are able 
to explain two thirds of all cases that remained peaceful through these four alternative 
pathways to peace. There are no contradictory cases, that is, cases which are 
represented by a path but do not share the outcome. 52 Two cases – Tajikistan and Peru 
– deviate in degree: although representing the respective paths relatively well, they did 
not remain entirely peaceful.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
  Also called ‘deviant cases for consistency in kind’. 
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Our general finding that international support can make a difference is seconded by 
examining those cases that did not remain peaceful. Strikingly, all countries that did 
not receive any substantial support across the five areas of engagement experienced 
civil war recurrence.53 This comprises a total of 10 cases, including Iraq, Liberia after 
                                                 
53
  This can be deduced from examining the truth table and is confirmed by an XY-plot, which reveals 
that only one case contradicts this statement in degree. Table, graph and a full QCA of recurrence 
are included in the appendix . 
Table 12: Intermediate solution peace 
 
 Conditions 
 
Paths 
PRED PK SC SE PG SCT Cases 
Cons
isten
cy 
Raw 
cov 
Uni 
cov 
1 Protecting 
peace ○ ● ○   ○ Tajikistan, Mozambique  0.75 0.12 0.05 
2 Securing peace ○  ● ○  ○ 
Angola,  
Sri Lanka_10, 
Cambodia  
0.85 0.20 0.06 
3 
Institutionalizing 
peace 
○    ● ○ 
Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, 
Peru,  
El Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Serbia+Kosovo, 
Cambodia  
0.87 0.37 0.20 
4 Encompassing 
approach  ● ● ● ●  ● 
Sierra Leone, 
Liberia_04, 
Bosnia  
0.89 0.23 0.15 
Solution 
~PRED*PK*~SC*~SCT + ~PRED*SC*~SE*~SCT + ~PRED*PG*~SCT + 
PK*SC*SE*PG*SCT => PEACE 
0.86 0.63 
 
Note: The full circles depict the presence of a condition, the empty circles its absence. Empty cells indicate 
that a particular condition is not a necessary part of the path, as it includes both cases with and without this 
condition present. PRED: High conflict predisposition, PK: Peacekeeping, SC: Security ODA, SE: Socio-
economic development, PG: Politics and governance, SCT: Societal Conflict Transformation. ~ denotes the 
absence of a condition in the solution term. Cases are peace episodes, represented by country names. For 
countries with multiple peace episodes, a number attached to the name denotes the start year of the respective 
episode. Cases in bold are “uniquely covered cases”, i.e., they are explained by one path only. Raw cov: Raw 
coverage, Uni cov: unique coverage.  
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1996, Serbia after 1992, as well as Ethiopia and Yemen. One might assume that this 
can be explained by donors simply not engaging in particularly difficult contexts. 
However, four of these countries actually display a low predisposition for conflict and 
could therefore have rather been regarded as “easy” cases by the international 
community. At the same time, almost 1/3 of our cases with a high predisposition 
nonetheless received substantial engagement in at least one area – hence, a clear pattern 
of international actors “cherry picking” easy contexts does not emerge. The fact that all 
cases that did not receive any substantial support experienced recurrence therefore 
allows to conclude that a general lack of attention by the international community, or 
the provision of merely negligible support to a peace process clearly paves the way for 
recurrence.  
 
Robustness checks 
 
A vivid methodological discussion around QCA has evolved. On the one hand, some 
strongly criticize the method, either theoretically or based on empirical weaknesses 
they uncover (Krogslund et al., 2014, Lucas and Szatrowski, 2014, Munck, 2016, 
Paine, 2016). On the other hand, several QCA experts have also shown where these 
critical studies have weaknesses of their own (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2017, Ragin, 
2014, Rihoux and Ragin, 2004, Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). To address the main 
concerns these discussions have raised, we run an extensive number of robustness 
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checks.54 Krogslund, et al. (2014) show that minor changes in the parameters, 
particularly the inclusion scores and the raw data anchors, can impact on the results. 
We therefore varied all thresholds within plausible limits to corroborate the robustness 
of our results. This concerns the raw consistency threshold chosen for the logical 
minimization process, but also the anchors for the calibration of the conditions and the 
outcome. The results hold, as also when dropping all cases consecutively. Changing 
the period of analysis of international support from the first five post-conflict years to 
four or six again confirms the four paths, and so does calibrating crisp- instead of fuzzy-
sets. Furthermore, Baumgartner and Thiem (2017) show that both the conservative and 
intermediate solution can be problematic. While we believe that the existence of 
directional expectation are a good reasons to focus on the intermediate solution in this 
study, the parsimonious solution yields almost identical results55. Finally, another 
problematic aspect of QCA are model ambiguities (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2015, 
Rohlfing, 2015, Thiem, 2014). However, they do not occur in our analysis.  
 
In order to further assess the plausibility of the QCA results, we complement them with 
insights from three illustrative case studies. To this end, we selected typical cases for 
the most interesting paths (all except one which mainly confirms previous research).56 
The main insights drawn from the case studies are based on 90 semi-structured 
                                                 
54
  For literature on robustness checks in QCA see Schneider and Wagemann (2012), Skaaning (2011). 
55
  Both the parsimonious and the conservative solution can be found in the appendix. 
56
  For more details on the selection see appendix. For selecting cases based on QCA see Schneider and 
Rohlfing (2013). 
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interviews conducted in Cambodia (Phnom Penh), Indonesia (Jakarta & Banda Aceh) 
and Liberia (Monrovia) with national and international stakeholders and analysts in 
November 2017. Interlocutors were national stakeholders from the government, 
administration and civil society (including think tanks and the media) as well as 
national and international representatives from the diplomatic and donor community 
(including bi- and multilateral donors as well as INGOs). A full list of interviewees and 
their organizational affiliation can be found in the appendix. All interviews were 
systematically coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti. Nevertheless, the QCA provides the 
main results of the chapter and the case studies are only meant to complement the QCA 
results. They were used as plausibility probes to test whether the QCA results hold 
when assessed qualitatively, better understand the relevance of the absent conditions 
and contextualize the relevance of international support for sustaining peace.  
 
 
Discussion: Pathways to peace 
 
The QCA yielded three main findings: first, support for security (either peacekeeping 
or non-military support) can be key to sustain peace, yet (second) so can support for 
politics and governance. Third, of all the patterns identified, only an encompassing 
approach was successful in cases with a high risk of conflict recurrence. This section 
discusses the solution drawing on insights from three case studies: Cambodia, 
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Indonesia and Liberia. Moreover, it identifies contextual factors that might explain the 
cluster of cases in one path.57 
 
Protecting and securing peace 
 
The first of our four paths, “Protecting peace”, is characterised by substantial 
peacekeeping in cases without a high predisposition of civil war recurrence and in the 
absence of substantial security ODA or SCT support. As stated above, a path that 
highlights the importance of peacekeeping does not come as a great surprise given 
previous research. Somewhat unexpectedly though, this path covers only two cases – 
Mozambique and Tajikistan. In addition, both countries share an interesting 
commonality. In either case, one party to the conflict used its initial grip on power to 
consolidate its position at the expense of free political competition once international 
peacekeeping had contributed to stabilising the situation. Although major outbreaks of 
renewed violence were avoided in both countries, their long-term political dynamics 
give reason for concern. Tajikistan has seen an increasing exclusion of political 
opposition, including former warring factions, which has raised doubts about the 
longevity of the country’s post-civil war peace (ICG, 2016). Mozambique has moved 
in a similar direction despite a change in government after presidential elections in 
2014. International peacekeeping, it seems, was useful to reduce the immediate risk of 
                                                 
57
  As peacekeeping has already been shown by previous research to be an effective type of peace 
support, we abstained from country case research for this path and discuss it only briefly. 
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conflict recurrence. Issues with the exclusion of political opponents, however, have 
remained and contributed to periodic instability.  
 
Another security-related path to peace in our results is characterised by a substantial 
provision of non-military security support, which is why we refer to it as “Securing 
peace”. Cases covered by this path are not in the “high predisposition” category of 
countries. In addition, they received neither substantial amounts of support for societal 
conflict transformation nor in the field of socio-economic development. Security ODA 
comprises international security support that is non-military. It focuses on 
developmental activities connected to security. This includes disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reform (SSR) 
as well as demining activities and small arms control. 
 
Cambodia illustrates the pattern of “Securing peace”.58 Despite an internationally 
sponsored peace agreement in 1991, the civil war between the Government of 
Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge came to a final end only in 1998 when most remaining 
rebel fighters accepted an offer to demobilise and return into society. By then, Prime 
Minister Hun Sen had managed to secure his rule and forced his major rivals into exile. 
Hun Sen’s power consolidation defied earlier international efforts to oversee a 
negotiated peace settlement that included all parties to the conflict.  
                                                 
58
  This section is informed by more than 20 expert interviews conducted in Phnom Penh in November 
2017.  
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International support for Cambodia post-1998 reflected the political circumstances of 
a “victors’ peace”: Having won the civil war in 1998, the government was largely able 
to dictate the terms of peace and be selective in opening the doors for external support. 
International non-military support for security was welcomed because assistance in the 
field of humanitarian demining was much needed. Three decades of warfare had left 
the country with a legacy of hundreds of thousands of anti-personnel mines and 
unexploded ordnance. As much of this was the consequence of Western military 
involvement during the 1970s and 1980s, many Western donors engaged heavily in 
humanitarian demining after the end of the conflict.  
 
Interviewees agreed, however, that peace in Cambodia lasted due to a combination of 
factors in which international support did not play the most crucial role: a strong ruling 
party managed to provide basic security and portray dissent as a threat to the country’s 
stability. At the same time economic growth provided jobs for an impoverished 
population and the resources needed by the government to secure the buy-in from a 
new power elite. External assistance in the field of humanitarian demining contributed 
by helping foster a sense of increasing security in everyday life. 
 
Comparing Cambodia to the other cases covered by the “Securing peace” path (Angola 
after 2002 and Sri Lanka after 2009), it appears that this pattern might represent a 
typical scenario of authoritarian consolidation by a ruling party in the aftermath of 
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military victory. In Angola, the ruling MPLA established peace in 2002 after having 
defeated the UNITA rebels and killed their leader Jonas Savimbi. Since then, “the 
MPLA government has successfully recast itself as the party of stability and peace, and 
embarked on an ambitious reconstruction drive financed by growing oil revenues and 
oil-backed credit lines” (BTI, 2018:3) that have helped to establish a neo-patrimonial 
type of rule. In Sri Lanka, after a first peace period had broken down, violent conflict 
was ended at the hands of President Rajapaksa through a heavy military campaign 
against the rebel Tamil Tigers. Their defeat set the scene for an increasingly 
authoritarian and exclusionary rule that lasted until 2015. 
 
In sum, the cases indicate that the pattern of “Securing peace” might be dictated more 
by necessity than by design. Rather than being instrumental in bringing about peace, 
international support seems to have gone where it was allowed to do so, helping to 
secure a peace that was already won by the government. At the same time, questions 
need to be asked as to the longevity of a peace that is built upon the increasing exclusion 
of political opponents.  
 
Institutionalizing peace 
 
We find one path to peace, “Institutionalizing peace”, which does not include any type 
of security support. Instead, support for politics and governance provides an alternative 
pathway to sustain peace in cases with a low predisposition for conflict and in absence 
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of support for SCT. This path explains the largest share of cases, demonstrating the 
important role support for politics and governance can play in post-conflict situations.  
Indonesia is a case in point when looking at how developments with regard to politics 
and governance as well as donor support in this area can contribute to peace.59 
Indonesia has struggled with various internal conflicts – the two most prominent civil 
wars being Timor-Leste, a region which gained independence after violent struggle in 
2002, and Aceh, which fought for independence for almost 30 years but in the end 
remained a part of the country as part of a negotiated settlement reached in 2005. Since 
then Indonesia has managed to remain relatively stable.60 Interviewees concurred in the 
observation that this is mainly due to Indonesia’s decentralization process, which was 
part of the reform packages adopted after Indonesia’s transition toward democracy in 
1998. In Indonesia, decentralization has increased possibilities for participation at the 
sub-national level as well as resources being controlled more directly by the local 
governments. This has reduced grievances and improved relations toward the national 
government, although corruption remains a problem. Decentralization was not only 
specifically designed to alleviate existing conflicts, but also included institutional 
safeguards against further secessionist conflict. The safeguards for example include 
parties having to be national in scope. Moreover, powers were devolved directly to the 
lower-level district, in order to avoid empowering provinces, which could take up 
                                                 
59
  This section is informed by over 30 interviews conducted in Jakarta and Banda Aceh in November 
2017. 
60
  There has been an ongoing, low-intensity conflict in Papua. However, all interviewees agreed that 
the conflict did not and does not seriously threaten peace in Indonesia.  
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independence movements of their own. The only exception in this regard is Aceh, 
which gained the right to establish local parties through the peace agreement. It is 
exactly this possibility to participate locally, as well as gaining greater power over 
fiscal resources that interview partners mentioned as the most crucial factors explaining 
why Aceh has remained peaceful. The international community strongly supported 
decentralization, both at the national level and in Aceh, which could explain why the 
pattern of international support focusing on politics and governance is associated with 
peace in this pathway.  
 
Almost all cases in this path – namely Peru, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Serbia (including Kosovo), embarked on a democratization process either 
shortly before or after the conflict ended. The only exception is Cambodia, a multiply 
covered case61, which however, is well captured by the path “Securing peace”. As in 
Indonesia, all of these democratization processes were accompanied by a devolution of 
government through a decentralization process. More generally, this path represents 
cases where donor engagement in the area of politics and governance is combined with 
a domestic process of reforms geared towards sharing resources and political power 
between the national, regional and local level. The results therefore suggest that donor 
engagement can help to stabilize a democratization process. While not all countries 
successfully transformed into democracies, they did not slide back into more 
                                                 
61
  Multiply covered means that according to the underlying data, two paths explain the case equally 
well, so that both logics could be at play.  
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authoritarian systems either and remained peaceful. Our results are thereby in line with 
Savun & Tirone’s (2011) finding that democracy support helps avert the negative 
effects democratization can have on peace, but specifically confirms it for post-conflict 
cases. Overall, these findings speak to the debate whether supporting democracy in a 
post-conflict context can help to strengthen peace, or risks triggering renewed violence. 
Although democratization might sometimes have conflict inducing effects, 
international engagement aimed at building political institutions and democracy can in 
fact contribute to peace after civil war.  
 
The encompassing approach 
 
The fourth path identified by the QCA is the ‘Encompassing approach’. With combined 
support across all areas of engagement, this is the only path to peace that applies to 
post-conflict countries irrespective of their predisposition. An encompassing approach 
can be observed in Bosnia, Liberia (after 2003) and Sierra Leone. It suggests that 
external support that embeds security related efforts in support for politics, socio-
economic development as well as societal reconciliation can contribute to peace and is 
even able to overcome a negative predisposition. 
 
Liberia constitutes a prime example of such comprehensive support.62 Since the 2003 
peace agreement ended almost 15 years of two devastating civil wars, Liberia has not 
                                                 
62
 The following discussion is based on 40 interviews conducted in Monrovia in November 2017. 
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experienced renewed violent conflict. Interviews suggest that the large-scale, multi-
dimensional international support made an important contribution. The large UN 
peacekeeping mission stabilized the situation, facilitating the demobilization of 
combatants and subsequent conduct of democratic elections. At various instances, it 
prevented an escalation of violence. Accompanying these political developments, 
humanitarian assistance and quick impact projects helped to alleviate the most urgent 
socio-economic needs, until basic infrastructure – roads, schools, hospitals – could be 
rebuild and the provision of social services improved.63 Substantial efforts to train and 
equip government institutions helped to rebuild the largely defunct state and facilitated 
a normalization of the situation. Numerous hearings held throughout the country by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission allowed victims to express their grievances and 
addressed perceptions of impunity, even though the overall conduct and 
implementation of the TRC received much criticism. In sum, the path shows that it is 
important to embed international support for security in broader developmental 
activities whilst combining them with efforts to strengthen a country’s political 
institutions and reconcile the war-torn society.  
 
The three cases explained by the path “Encompassing approach” – Bosnia, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone – share a relatively complex conflict context, where a number of factors 
coincided. All civil wars involved several fighting factions, were characterized by 
regional conflict dynamics, ethnic polarization and large-scale atrocities against 
                                                 
63
 Even though the situation remains precarious until today. 
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civilians. They left the countries with a devastated economy, and a weak or even 
dysfunctional state. All three cases are small states, in which comprehensive peace 
agreements mediated by international actors ended the civil war, which facilitated such 
comprehensive international engagement. The results speak to the findings of previous 
research that multidimensional peacekeeping is particularly effective by going beyond 
a mere security focus and embedding support in broader developmental and political 
activities. 
 
Limitations 
 
Contrary to our expectations, three of our four paths are characterized by the absence 
of specific types of international support. It is not entirely straightforward how these 
absences should be interpreted. On the one hand, the absence of SCT support in three 
paths speaks to debates in the field of transitional justice. Some aspects of this type of 
support (such as truth commissions and investigations of war time crimes) might 
conflict with efforts to build a peaceful post-war order if they reignite animosities 
instead. On the other hand, the fact that SCT support was absent across many cases that 
remained peaceful could simply reflect the non-willingness of the government of the 
day to deal with such a politically sensitive issue. As indicated when presenting the 
results, our best interpretation is that the absences of certain types of support in any of 
the paths reflect constraints to what international actors were able or allowed to 
contribute, not their strategic choices. This is supported by the evidence from our case 
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studies. In Cambodia – a country that had experienced some of the gravest mass 
atrocities in modern history – societal conflict transformation was not deemed a priority 
by the government since an open dealing with the past would have threatened to reach 
into the highest levels of the new power elite. A special tribunal was not established 
until 2003, and it took another three years to come into operation. Similarly, Indonesia 
has had no process of dealing with the past – even the mass killings connected to 
anticommunist purge in the 1960s remain a sore topic for any national government. For 
Aceh, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was initiated by the local parliament in 
2016 – over 10 years after the conflict had ended and against the wishes of the national 
government. Absences of international support in the area of SCT could then primarily 
be explained by the unwillingness of national partners to deal with these sensitive 
issues. Finally, it is also important to note that some of the other absences would be 
much more difficult to explain, such as why the provision of troops should be 
particularly beneficial to peace in the absence of non-military security support. 
Therefore, we interpret the paths mainly based on the conditions present.  
 
The problem discussed above also raises the question more generally, whether the 
patterns of international support found to be associated with peace in the analysis 
represent a conscious, strategic decision by international actors or rather the country 
context and the type of support that was possible within this environment. Regardless 
of whether external support contributed to the countries remaining peaceful, another 
question is why donors provided a specific combination of support. Clearly the patterns 
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of support found can partially be explained by the specific context: all countries in the 
“Institutionalizing peace” path were experiencing a democratic opening, hence making 
substantial donor engagement in the area of politics and governance possible. The 
countries in the path “Securing peace” exhibit the exact opposite context, as they are 
characterized by authoritarian tendencies where donor engagement had to be limited to 
specific areas. The cases represented by the “Encompassing approach” in turn are 
marked by particularly devastating civil wars creating high needs for international 
engagement while at the same time these small, politically weak countries clearly 
enabled such substantial donor engagement in all five areas. The case studies indicate 
that the paths should be understood as a mixture of a country context that permits 
certain types of engagement and international actors being able and willing to use these 
areas to contribute to the country remaining peaceful.  
 
Conclusion 
How can international actors effectively support peace after civil war? This chapter is 
the first to unpack the broad category of peacebuilding to look beyond peacekeeping 
or general aid flows to identify which components or combinations of international 
support can contribute to sustained peace. Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming 
out of major civil wars after 1990 reveals four key insights. Firstly, our results confirm 
the findings of quantitative studies that peacekeeping can make a difference, yet also 
demonstrate that it is but one important component of effective post-conflict support. 
Secondly, a focus on support for politics and governance can also be effective. This 
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pathway covers a large share of the cases, which underlines that while support for 
security can be key, it is not the only way to effectively support sustainable peace in a 
post-conflict situation. Thirdly, only a combination of all types of support explains 
sustained peace also in cases with a high risk of conflict recurrence. Finally, and more 
generally, the analysis demonstrates that international support matters. All ten cases 
that did not receive substantial support in any of the areas of engagement experienced 
recurrence. This includes cases both with a high and a low predisposition for renewed 
conflict. Hence, a general neglect of a country emerging from civil war by the 
international community seems to be an almost certain pathway to renewed violence.  
The analysis consistently explains the majority of post-conflict countries that remained 
peaceful by taking a closer look at the type and combinations of international support 
these countries receive. To better understand the so far unexplained cases, it might be 
necessary to take new context factors into account – such as the regime type or whether 
the conflict ended through a military victory or a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, 
several results could be looked at more closely in an even more disaggregated manner. 
The support for politics and governance condition for example is still very broad, 
encompassing many different types of international engagement of which only some 
components might be associated with peace. Taking a closer look at differences 
between support provided by different types of international actors, such as bilateral or 
multilateral donors, might also yield interesting insights.  
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The findings have clear policy implications. International actors have been supporting 
post-conflict countries for almost two decades now. Our analysis shows that such 
international support can indeed make a difference. This analysis also demonstrates 
that different country contexts condition what types of support can be provided. In light 
of the controversial debate about detrimental effects of democratization on peace, it is 
particularly interesting to note that international support for politics and governance in 
democratizing post-conflict contexts can in fact contribute to peace after civil war.  
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Appendix 2 
Data matrices  
Table 13: Data matrix with calibrated conditions 
Cases  
(peace periods in brackets; 
“present” denotes peace until 
end of observation period in 
2015) 
Support for 
politics & 
governance 
Support for 
socio-economic 
development 
Support for 
societal conflict 
transformation 
Security 
support  
Peacekeeping 
troops 
Predispositio
n for conflict Peace 
Acron
ym 
Angola (2003 - present) 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.59 0.05 0 0.86 AGO 
Azerbaijan (1996 - present) 0.04 0.53 0.05 0.05 0.05 1 0.7 AZE 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1996 - present) 1 1 0.58 0.98 1 1 0.95 BIH 
Burundi (2007 - 2007) 0.69 0.36 0.71 0.52 0.05 1 0.42 BDI 
Cambodia (1999 - ) 0.55 0.38 0.21 0.59 0.05 0 0.95 KHM 
Chad I (1995 - 1996) 0.38 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 1 0.05 TCD 
Chad II (2004 - 2004) 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.05 1 0.02 TCD2 
Chad III (2011 - 2014) 0.16 0.1 0.08 0.13 0.05 1 0.36 TCD3 
Congo (2000 - 2001) 0.18 0.05 0.1 0.97 0.05 1 0.45 COG 
DRC I (2002 - 2005) 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.43 0.94 1 0.11 DRC1 
DRC II (2009 - 2010) 0.25 0.15 0.2 0.56 0.99 1 0.01 DRC2 
El Salvador (1992 - present) 0.99 0.92 0.07 0.95 0.31 0 0.95 SLV 
Ethiopia (1997 - 1997) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0 0.11 ETH 
Georgia (1994 - 2007) 0.15 0.66 0.05 0.05 0.58 1 0.15 GEO 
Guatemala (1996 - present) 0.9 0.59 0.24 0.6 0.1 0 0.95 GTM 
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Indonesia (2006 - present) 0.55 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0 0.95 IDN 
Iraq (1997 - 2003) 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.05 0 0 IRQ 
Lebanon (1991 - 2013) 0.62 0.91 0.05 0.05 0.05 1 0.48 LBN 
Liberia I (1997 - 1999) 0.43 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.05 1 0 LBR 
Liberia II (2004 - present) 0.97 0.93 1 0.95 0.97 1 0.95 LBR2 
Libya (2012 - 2013) 0.67 0.02 0.95 0.99 0.05 1 0.33 LBY 
Mozambique (1993 - present) 0.26 0.58 0.06 0.31 0.8 0 0.9 MOZ 
Nepal (2007 - present) 0.24 0.14 0.55 0.57 0.05 0 0.95 NPL 
Nicaragua (1991 - present) 1 0.96 0.08 0.05 0.05 0 0.95 NIC 
Peru (2000 - present) 0.92 0.67 0.07 0.06 0.05 0 0.81 PER 
Rwanda I (1995 - 1995) 0.67 0.47 0.7 0.06 0.8 1 0 RWA 
Rwanda II (2003 - 2008) 0.82 0.59 0.63 0.12 0.05 0 0 RWA2 
Serbia + Kosovo (2000 - 
present) 1 0.96 0.45 0.94 1 0 0.95 S+K 
Serbia (1993 - 1997) 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.05 1 0.01 SER 
Sierra Leone (2002 - present) 0.98 0.62 0.87 0.77 0.89 0 0.95 SLE 
Sri Lanka I (2002 - 2004) 0.33 0.68 0.68 0.56 0.05 0 0 LKA 
Sri Lanka II (2010 - present) 0.17 0.32 0.43 0.54 0.05 0 0.95 LKA2 
Tajikistan (1999 - present) 0.08 0.39 0.05 0.06 0.99 0 0.51 TJK 
Uganda I (1993 - 1993) 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.06 0.05 0 0.01 UGA 
Uganda II (2012 - 2012) 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.05 1 0.08 UGA2 
Yemen (1995 - 2008) 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0 0 YEM 
Qualitative anchors  
(Full non-membership, point of 
indifference, full membership) (1, 4.4, 13) (20, 58, 150) (0, 0.5, 1) (0.1, 1.6, 10) 
(0, 500, 
11000)    
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Table 14: Data matrix of raw values of data before calibration 
  ODA commitments (2010 constant USD) per capita Troops   
Cases 
(Peace periods in brackets; “present” 
denotes peace until end of observation 
period in 2015) Acronym 
Support for 
politics & 
governance 
raw 
Support for 
socio-
economic 
development 
raw 
Support for 
societal 
conflict 
transformation 
raw 
Security ODA 
raw 
Peacekeeping 
raw 
Predisposition 
raw 
Peace 
raw 
Angola (2003 - present) ANG 2.64 26.11 0,16 2.64 0 3 37 
Azerbaijan (1996 - present) AZE 0.77 61.15 0 0.09 0 5 72 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996 - present) BIH 24.03 260.65 0,56 12.77 35000 4 0 
Burundi (2007 - 2007) BDI 6.71 50.79 0,65 1.88 0 4 201 
Cambodia (1999 - present) KHM 5.04 51.55 0,28 2.65 0 3 0 
Chad I (1995 - 1996) TCD 3.82 28.13 0 0 0 4 989 
Chad II (2004 - 2004) TCD2 1.08 35.23 0,02 0.31 0 5 1250 
Chad III (2011 - 2014) TCD3 2.47 29.73 0,08 0.65 0 5 272 
Congo (2000 - 2001) COG 2.67 19.93 0,13 11.11 0 4 167 
DRC I (2002 - 2005) DRC1 2.61 33.97 0,17 1.46 10206 4 736 
DRC II (2009 - 2010) DRC2 3.16 35.96 0,27 2.3 17888 6 1473 
El Salvador (1992 - present) SLV 16.79 133.97 0,05 9.97 368 2 0 
Ethiopia (1997 - 1997) ETH 0.32 14.98 0 0 0 3 733 
Georgia (1994 - 2007) GEO 2.41 79.05 0 0.05 1648 4 621 
Guatemala (1996 - present) GTM 10.92 69.03 0,3 2.71 132 2 0 
Indonesia (2006 - present) IDN 5.01 23.7 0,04 0.15 0 2 0 
Iraq (1997 - 2003) IRQ 0.05 3.49 0,01 0.17 0 3 12929 
Lebanon (1991 - 2013) LBN 5.79 132.06 0 0.11 0 4 126 
Liberia I (1997 - 1999) LBR 4.07 33.87 0,03 0.7 0 4 1787 
Liberia II (2004 - present) LBR2 14.78 141.17 1,64 10.16 13371 5 0 
Libya (2012 - 2013) LBY 6.52 9.41 0,99 14.45 0 5 322 
Mozambique (1993 - present) MOZ 3.19 68.51 0,05 1.19 5360 1 27 
Nepal (2007 - present) NPL 3.09 34.74 0,54 2.45 0 3 0 
Nicaragua (1991 - present) NIC 43.8 158.16 0,08 0.05 0 1 0 
Peru (2000 - present) PER 11.54 80.19 0,07 0.22 0 3 50 
Rwanda I (1995 - 1995) RWA 6.48 56.41 0,64 0.19 5500 4 2044 
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Rwanda II (2003 - 2008) RWA2 8.85 69.78 0,59 0.57 0 3 1824 
Serbia + Kosovo (2000 - present) S+K 31.92 154.28 0,47 9.53 29600 3 0 
Serbia (1993 - 1997) SER 0.06 2.47 0 0.37 0 4 1404 
Sierra Leone (2002 - present) SLE 15.21 72.8 0,83 5.07 8006 3 0 
Sri Lanka I (2002 - 2004) LKA 3.58 81.81 0,62 2.32 0 1 10165 
Sri Lanka II (2010 - present) LKA2 2.57 48.53 0,46 2.03 0 1 0 
Tajikistan (1999 - present) TJK 1.52 51.96 0 0.15 15856 3 98 
Uganda I (1993 - 1993) UGA 1.15 46.31 0 0.17 0 3 1610 
Uganda II (2012 - 2012) UGA2 2.99 42.96 0,15 0.23 0 4 864 
Yemen (1995 - 2008) YEM 1.5 28.5 0 0.04 0 2 6778 
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Figure 3: Calibration patterns SE, PG and Security ODA 
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Figure 4: Calibration patterns SCT and PK 
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Details on condition ‘Predisposition’ 
 
     Table 15: Measurements of the components of predisposition 
Variable Indicator Time of 
measurement 
Assigning membership 
scores of 1, if 
Data source 
High resource 
dependency 
Share of resource 
rents in % of GDP 
Post-conflict year 
(of the first five) 
with highest gdp 
> 30 % (Iraq as an anchor 
case) 
WDI 
Conflict in the 
neighbourhood 
Neighbouring 
country 
experiencing 
conflict 
Up to 5 post-
conflict years 
1 neighbour experiences 
conflict 
UCDP (Conflict), Gleditsch & 
Ward (Neighborhood) 
Multiple factions No. of factions  Previous conflict > 2 factions UCDP 
Few battle deaths Number of battle 
deaths 
Previous conflict <0.7 battle deaths per 
thousand of population & 
<10.000 absolute battle 
deaths 
PRIO & Uppsala 
Short prior conflict Conflict years Previous conflict < 4.5 years UCDP 
Low income GDP per capita Last 2 conflict 
years 
< 1005 USD (WB 
definition of low-income 
country) 
WDI 
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Table 16: Regression analyses of components and specifications of the PRED variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GDP -0.000384+        
 (0.000201)        
Multiple factions  0.766       
  (0.724)       
Intensity   -0.239*      
   (0.113)      
Length    -0.0175     
    (0.0334)     
Neighboring Conflict     1.324**    
     (0.494)    
Resource Dependency      0.0276**   
      (0.00957)   
PRED (intensity negative)       1.226*  
       (0.496)  
PRED_intensity_positive        0.337 
        (0.575) 
         
t 0.0492 0.0208 0.0254 0.00688 0.103 0.0448 0.110 0.0207 
 (0.277) (0.270) (0.277) (0.268) (0.280) (0.278) (0.303) (0.272) 
t2 -0.00958 -0.0105 -0.00930 -0.00905 -0.0148 -0.0122 -0.0161 -0.0104 
 (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0292) (0.0275) 
t3 0.00000571 0.00000818 0.00000802 0.00000588 0.0000123 0.0000112 0.0000123 0.00000766 
 (0.0000331) (0.0000341) (0.0000336) (0.0000328) (0.0000335) (0.0000335) (0.0000353) (0.0000337) 
Constant -1.961** -3.014** -2.040** -2.223** -3.567** -2.964** -3.274** -2.496** 
 (0.511) (0.836) (0.493) (0.496) (0.669) (0.572) (0.767) (0.553) 
Observations 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Models 1-6 present the results of regression analyses to determine the directions of the different components of the predisposition variable (PRED). 
All signs, except for intensity are in the expected direction. The last two models compare the PRED variable with intensity included in a negative 
(Model 7) or positive (Model 8) specification, showing that including intensity as suggested by Model 3 leads to a PRED variable that is 
significantly associated with recurrence. 
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Truth tables 
Table 18: Truth table for outcome = peace 
PRED SE PG SCT SC PK OUT incl PRI Cases 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.9 0.84 S+K 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.84 SLE 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.88 0.72 MOZ 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.88 0.83 BIH,LBR2 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.82 0.77 SLV,GTM 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.81 0.53 TJK 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.81 0.76 AGO,LKA2 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.8 0.72 KHM 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.8 0.75 NIC,PER 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.77 0.69 IDN 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.75 0.66 NPL 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.68 0 BDI,LBY 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.66 0.19 AZE 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.66 0 LBN 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.65 0 COG 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.59 0.43 LKA 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.56 0.39 RWA2 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.42 0 RWA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 0.34 ETH,IRQ,UGA,YEM 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.41 0 GEO 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.37 0 DRC2 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.31 0 DRC 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0.04 
TCD,TCD2,TCD3, 
LBR,SER,UGA2 
 
Table 17: Truth table for outcome = recurrence 
PRED SE PG SCT SC PK OUT incl PRI Cases 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 DRC 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 DRC2 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 RWA 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 BDI,LBY 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 GEO 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.95 0.86 LBN 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.94 0.92 
TCD,TCD2,TCD3,LBR, 
SER,UGA2 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92 0.81 AZE 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.87 0.62 COG 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.72 0.33 TJK 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.72 0.61 RWA2 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.7 0.57 LKA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0.65 ETH,IRQ,UGA,YEM 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.68 0.28 MOZ 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.52 0.34 NPL 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.48 0.28 KHM 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.47 0.31 IDN 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.47 0.16 S+K 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.46 0.16 SLE 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.4 0.24 AGO,LKA2 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.25 NIC,PER 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.4 0.23 SLV,GTM 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.17 BIH,LBR1 
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Testing for necessary conditions 
 
Table 19: Necessary conditions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No condition or combination thereof reaches sufficiently high consistency, relevance and coverage scores to be interpreted as necessary conditions. 
Listed here are those combinations or individual conditions with the highest consistency and coverage scores. 
 
 
 
 PEACE RECURRENCE 
conditions incl RoN cov.r incl RoN cov.r 
~PRED 0.7 0.7 0.62    
PG 0.69 0.82 0.73    
~PG    0.78 0.75 0.74 
SE 0.63 0.85 0.74    
~SE    0.8 0.7 0.71 
~SC    0.83 0.65 0.69 
SC + PK 0.65 0.76 0.65    
~SCT*~SC    0.75 0.68 0.68 
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XY-plot and QCA for conflict recurrence  
 
This plot displays the membership of cases 
in the configuration ‘no substantial support 
across all areas’ and the outcome 
‘recurrence’. Only Tajikistan deviates in 
degree from a relationship of sufficiency (it 
is located below the diagonal in the upper-
right corner). No cases fully contradict the 
statement of sufficiency (deviant cases for 
consistency in kind would be located in the 
lower right corner). Hence, the lack of any 
substantial support across all areas can be 
considered quasi-sufficient for recurrence. 
Figure 5: Relation of sufficiency for conflict recurrence 
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We do not assume that international peace support actually triggers renewed violence, i.e. that our conditions explain recurrence, which is why we 
focus on the analysis of peace. Therefore, it is unclear how the paths that include presences of support should be interpreted. Did support for SCT and 
politics and governance or socio-economic development, respectively, contribute to recurrence, or was it not enough to prevent recurrence in the 
absence of the other types of support? To interpret these patterns, in-depth case studies would be required. In the case of Burundi it was clearly not 
the case that conflict recurrence can be traced to support provided in these areas.1 Therefore, the main conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis 
is that in a large share of cases the absence of support across most areas of engagement explains conflict recurrence. 
                                                 
1  Mross K. (2015) Fragile steps towards peace and democracy: Insights on the effectiveness of international support to post-conflict Burundi, Bonn: 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. 
 
Table 20: Intermediate solution for recurrence 
 Conditions 
Paths 
High conflict 
predisposition 
Peace-
keeping 
Security 
ODA 
Socio-
economic 
development 
Politics & 
governance 
Societal Conflict 
Transformation Cases Consistency Raw cov 
1 ●   ○ ○ ○ 
TCD, TCD2, TCD3, LBR, 
SER, UGA2, DRC1, COG; 
DRC2 
0.93 0.41 
2 ●  ○  ○ ○ 
TCD, TCD2, TCD3, LBR, 
SER, UGA2, DRC1, AZE, 
GEO 
0.9 0.4 
3 ● ○ ○  ● ● RWA 1 0.1 
4 ● ○  ○ ● ● BDI, LBY 0.98 0.11 
5 ● ○ ○ ●   AZE, LBN 0.81 0.13 
Solution 
PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT + PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC + PRED*~SE*PG*SCT*~SC + PRED*~SE*PG*SCT*~PK + 
PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*~PK => RECUR  
0.87 0.53 
 ~ Denotes the absence of a condition. Cases in bold are “uniquely covered cases, i.e., they are explained by one path only. For full country names and post-conflict 
periods see the data matrix (Table 13 & 14). 
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 XY-plots & case selection for illustrative case studies 
QCA results displayed as XY-plots are ideally suited to guide the selection of case studies. The qualitative case studies focus on typical cases, which 
can be found in the upper-right corner above the diagonal. We selected one case for the second, third and fourth path, which are the most interesting 
paths since they go beyond previous research and are highly consistent. To avoid that fading memory or the frequent staff-turnover in international 
organizations compromise the interviews, we selected cases whose peace period started not more than two decades ago. Liberia is selected for path 4. 
For path 3, we selected Indonesia, whose peace period started relatively recently in 2006. For path 2 we selected Cambodia, which is particularly 
interesting since it is also explained by path 2 and the case study thus also serves to better understand which of the two paths holds greater explanatory 
power in this case (all other cases are uniquely covered, that is explained by one path).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: XY Plot of the “Securing Peace” path Figure 6: XY Plot of the “Protecting Peace path 
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Figure 9: XY-plot of the ‘Institutionalizing peace’ path Figure 8: XY-plot of the ‘Encompassing approach’ path 
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Figure 10: XY-plot of solution term 
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Robustness tests 
 
Table 21: Overview of robustness tests 
Change incl, PRI, cov Solution (relationship of sufficiency for peace) 
Standard model (raw 
consistency 0.75) 
0.854, 0.833, 0.65 ~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
Higher raw consistency 
(0.8) 0.864, 0.829, 0.488 
~PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT*SC + 
~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
Lower raw consistency 
(0.7) 0.864, 0.837, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
Parsimonious solution 0.864, 0.835, 0.724 ~PRED*PK + ~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SCT*SC + SE*PG*SC 
Conservative solution 0.866 0.839 0.642 ~PRED*PG*~SCT*~PK + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC*~PK + 
~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK + (~PRED*SE*PG*SC*PK) 
(*MA)  
4-year period 
0.878, 0.855, 0.674 
~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*~SC + 
~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SC*PK 
6-year period 
0.888, 0.864, 0.638 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
Using crisp instead of 
fuzzy-sets 
0.93, 0.925, 0.774 ~PRED*PG_CS*~SCT_CS + ~PRED*~SE_CS*~PG_CS*SC_CS + 
~PRED*SE_CS*~SCT_CS*~SC_CS*PK_CS + 
SE_CS*PG_CS*SCT_CS*SC_CS*PK_CS 
Without PRED 0.827, 0.773, 0.682 SE*PG*~SCT + ~SE*~PG*SC*~PK + ~SE*~SCT*SC*~PK + SE*PG*SC*PK 
(*MA) 
Changing calibration thresholds 
Point of indifference (0.5 threshold): Higher & Lower 
PG_PIH 
0.863, 0.833, 0.584 
~PRED*SE*PG_PIH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG_PIH*~SCT*SC + 
~PRED*~PG_PIH*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_PIH*SCT*SC*PK 
PG_PIL 
0.863, 0.835, 0.637 
~PRED*PG_PIL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG_PIL*SCT*SC*PK 
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SE_PIH 
0.878, 0.852, 0.618 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_PIH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SE_PIH*~SCT*PK 
+ SE_PIH*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SE_PIL 
0.863, 0.835, 0.64 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_PIL*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE_PIL*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SCT_PIH 
0.861, 0.835, 0.69 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_PIH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_PIH*SC + 
~PRED*~SCT_PIH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SC*PK 
SCT_PIL 
0.87, 0.844, 0.641 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_PIL + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_PIL*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT_PIL*SC*PK 
SC_PIH 
0.863, 0.836, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC_PIH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_PIH*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC_PIH*PK 
SC_PIL 
0.862, 0.834, 0.63 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_PIL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_PIL*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC_PIL*PK 
PK_PIH 
0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_PIH + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_PIH 
PK_PIL 
0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_PIL + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_PIL 
Full inclusion threshold: Inclusion Higher & Lower 
PG_IL 0.863, 0.835, 0.635 
~PRED*PG_IL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG_IL*SCT*SC*PK 
PG_IH 0.867, 0.84, 0.638 
~PRED*PG_IH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG_IH*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG_IH*SCT*SC*PK 
SE_IL 0.864, 0.837, 0.641 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_IL*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE_IL*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SE_IH 0.863, 0.835, 0.632 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_IH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE_IH*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SCT_IH 0.858, 0.829, 0.633 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_IH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_IH*SC + 
~PRED*~SCT_IH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_IH*SC*PK 
SCT_IL 0.871, 0.845, 0.642 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_IL + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_IL*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT_IL*SC*PK 
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SC_IH 0.862, 0.834, 0.63 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_IH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_IH*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC_IH*PK 
SC_IL 0.863, 0.836, 0.635 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_IL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_IL*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC_IL*PK 
PK_IH 0.864, 0.837, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_IH + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_IH 
PK_IL 0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_IL + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_IL 
Full exclusion threshold: Exclusion Higher & Lower 
PG_EH 
0.865, 0.837, 0.633 
~PRED*PG_EH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG_EH*SCT*SC*PK 
PG_EL 
0.86, 0.831, 0.634 
~PRED*PG_EL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG_EL*SCT*SC*PK 
SE_EL 
0.866, 0.839, 0.631 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_EL*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE_EL*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SE_EH 
0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_EH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE_EH*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
SCT_EH 
0.864, 0.836, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_EH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_EH*SC + 
~PRED*~SCT_EH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_EH*SC*PK 
SCT_EL 
0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT_EL + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_EL*SC + 
~PRED*~SCT_EL*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_EL*SC*PK 
SC_EH 
0.865, 0.838, 0.638 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC_EH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_EH*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC_EH*PK 
SC_EL 
0.862, 0.834, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_EL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_EL*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC_EL*PK 
PK_EH 
0.866, 0.841, 0.629 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_EH + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_EH 
Dropping cases 
dropped: Angola 
0.856, 0.828, 0.631 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
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dropped: Azerbaijan 
0.863, 0.835, 0.658 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.856, 0.826, 0.635 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Burundi 
0.863, 0.835, 0.647 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Cambodia 
0.855, 0.822, 0.583 
~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC + 
~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Chad I 
0.863, 0.835, 0.633 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Chad II 
0.865, 0.838, 0.633 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Chad III 
0.863, 0.835, 0.645 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Congo 
0.863, 0.835, 0.648 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: DRC I 
0.863, 0.836, 0.631 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: DRC II 
0.873, 0.847, 0.633 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: El Salvador 
0.852, 0.82, 0.613 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Ethiopia 
0.863, 0.835, 0.635 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Georgia 
0.863, 0.835, 0.637 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Guatemala 
0.856, 0.822, 0.583 
~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Indonesia 
0.862, 0.832, 0.616 
~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
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dropped: Iraq 
0.868, 0.841, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Lebanon 
0.863, 0.835, 0.649 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Liberia I 
0.866, 0.839, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Liberia II 
0.852, 0.82, 0.613 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Libya 
0.858, 0.824, 0.683 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
~SE*PG*SCT*SC + PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Mozambique 0.883, 0.863, 0.598 ~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Nepal 
0.858, 0.829, 0.643 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Nicaragua 
0.853, 0.819, 0.573 
~PRED*~SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*SC + 
~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Peru 
0.854, 0.823, 0.573 
~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Rwanda I 
0.867, 0.84, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Rwanda II 
0.89, 0.867, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Serbia + 
Kosovo 0.857, 0.827, 0.637 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Serbia 
0.863, 0.835, 0.633 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Sierra Leone 
0.856, 0.826, 0.633 
~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Sri Lanka I 
0.887, 0.864, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
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dropped: Sri Lanka II 
0.857, 0.827, 0.638 
~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
+ SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Tajikistan 
0.888, 0.87, 0.615 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Uganda I 
0.868, 0.841, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Uganda II 
0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
dropped: Yemen 
0.869, 0.843, 0.639 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
Changing the outcome condition (peace) 
PEACE 0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACEUP 0.862, 0.834, 0.654 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEC2 0.865, 0.842, 0.611 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACE_FIL 0.853, 0.826, 0.641 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACE_FIH 0.863, 0.835, 0.634 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACE_PIL 0.856, 0.824, 0.641 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACE_PIH 0.856, 0.824, 0.641 
~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + 
SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK 
PEACE_HIIK 0.827, 0.682, 0.691 
~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*SC + 
~PRED*SE*PG*SC*PK + PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*~PK + 
~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC*~PK + ~PRED*SE*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK 
Using coincidence analysis 
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Using cna (con 0.85, cov 
0.65) 0.866  0.649 ~PRED*SC + ~PRED*PG*~SCT + PG*SC*PK <-> PEACE (*MA) 
Using cna (con 0.8, cov 
0.7) 
0.809  0.723 
 
~PRED *PG + ~PRED *SC + PG*SC <-> PEACE (*MA) 
 
Legend: incl = consistency, PRI = Proportional Reduction Inconsistency, cov = coverage, (*MA) = model ambiguity occurred: two models that 
differ in one path can explain the data 
 
 
List of interviewees 
 
Table 22: List of interviewees 
Country of analysis Origin of interviewee Organizational affiliation Date Location 
Indonesia International INGO 13.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia International Bilateral cooperation 14.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Academic/Think tank 15.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Academic/Think tank 15.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic NGO 15.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia International INGO 16.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia International Bilateral cooperation 20.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Academic/Think tank 20.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Academic/Think tank 22.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Bilateral cooperation 22.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic INGO 22.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic INGO 22.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic INGO 23.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia International Bilateral cooperation 23.11.2017 Jakarta 
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Indonesia International INGO 24.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Bilateral cooperation 24.11.2017 Jakarta 
Indonesia Domestic Policy expert 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic NGO 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Former rebel movement 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic NGO 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Former rebel movement 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Multilateral agency 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic NGO 27.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Policy expert 28.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Academic/Think tank 28.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Journalist 28.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic Politician 28.11.2017 Banda Aceh 
Indonesia Domestic NGO 29.11.2017 Jakarta 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 31.10.2017 Telephone 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 08.11.2017 Telephone 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 09.11.2017 Bonn 
Cambodia International INGO 10.11.2017 Telephone 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 13.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 13.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic Bilateral cooperation 14.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International INGO 16.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic INGO 18.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International NGO 20.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 20.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
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Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 20.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Multilateral agency 21.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic NGO 21.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Other local institution 21.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic Government 22.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International NGO 22.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International NGO 22.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic NGO 23.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Academic/Think tank 23.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Policy expert 23.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Academic/Think tank 23.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Domestic Academic/Think tank 24.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Bilateral cooperation 24.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Cambodia International Policy expert 24.11.2017 Phnom Penh 
Liberia Domestic NGO 16.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 17.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International NGO 17.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Government 20.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 20.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 20.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International INGO 20.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 21.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 21.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Government 22.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic INGO 22.11.2017 Monrovia 
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Liberia Domestic Government 23.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 23.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 23.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 24.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International INGO 25.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Journalist 27.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Government 27.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 28.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic INGO 28.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 28.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 28.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 29.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 29.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 30.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 30.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 30.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Multilateral agency 30.11.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 01.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 01.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Multilateral agency 01.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 01.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 04.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 04.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic NGO 04.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 04.12.2017 Monrovia 
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Liberia Domestic NGO 04.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Bilateral cooperation 05.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia Domestic Government 05.12.2017 Monrovia 
Liberia International Multilateral agency 26.01.2018 Telephone 
All interviews were based on a semi-structured guide (see next page). Most interviews were held in person and usually lasted between 45 
and 60 minutes. First interviews at the German Embassy were used to get a good overview over the donor landscape and provided contacts 
to the relevant bi- and multilateral donors as well as first suggestions on interesting NGOs, think tanks, universities, media outlets etc. 
Further interviewees were identified through snow-balling. Many interviews were recorded, but this depended highly on the country 
context. In Indonesia only one interview asked for hand-written notes instead of recording, in the more difficult, Cambodian context, 
mostly hand-written notes were used. Further information regarding the content of the interviews can be made available by the authors 
upon request.  
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Questionnaire for case studies (Indonesia as example)  
1. On the situation more generally 
- Do you consider Indonesia to be peaceful? 
- What were the major challenges Indonesia was facing to sustain peace in 2005? 
- Why do you think Indonesia has remained relatively peaceful? Which factors contributed to sustaining peace? 
o Were there important developments at the national level, that can explain peace at the regional level? 
o Why did Aceh remain stable? 
o Why has no other, large scale conflict erupted or a low-scale conflict like Papua escalated? 
- Were there any specific, critical moments, where a return to large-scale violence would have been possible?  
o What prevented recurrence in these moments? 
 
2. The different peacebuilding areas 
- What role has governance and democratization played for peacebuilding in Indonesia? 
- So far there have not been any serious attempts at transitional justice at the national or local level. But Indonesia is nevertheless relatively 
peaceful. Was it maybe important for peace not to engage in this area, or does it rather threaten sustainable peace? 
- Have there been efforts in the area of Security Sector Reform, or would this be necessary? 
- How is the situation economically? Was there a peace dividend felt (especially in the conflict-affected regions)? 
 
3. Donor engagement 
- What were donor priorities in the first five to eight post-conflict years? 
- Was there any shift or sequencing of aid in those first years? 
- Were donors able to contribute to Indonesia more generally and Aceh more specifically remaining peaceful?  
- Who and how? (through support they provided or support that could have been problematic, but they decided not to provide) 
 
4. The identified path 
- Do you think this (explain path) describes the pattern of aid to Indonesia well (compared to other post-conflict countries)? 
o Was there indeed substantial support in only one area? 
- Do you think the absence of support to transitional justice was important for peace? 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis unpacked the relationship between political institutions and conflict 
recurrence. Chapter 2 took a closer look at local elections as an important channel of 
political participation in post-conflict countries, Chapter 2 at constitution-writing 
processes after conflict and Chapter 3 at peacebuilding strategies of international 
actors. Each chapter generated interesting insights, thereby adding to the previous 
literature. 
 
Chapter 2 argued and showed that specific political institutions, namely certain 
channels of political participation, can have a pacifying effect. In order to do so, they 
have to provide access to the political system to all segments of society. At the same 
time, they must offer the post-conflict elite the chance to influence policy-making. 
Local elections satisfy the access and the influence condition and are significantly 
associated with less conflict recurrence. Chapter 3 then turned to a specific type of 
institutional change, namely post-conflict constitution making. It shows that countries, 
which manage to write a new constitution after conflict are significantly more likely to 
remain peaceful. The fact that especially longer constitution-writing processes are 
associated with peace underlines the theoretical argument that these processes can 
contribute to peace if they enable extensive bargaining and thereby trust-building 
between the different political actors of the post-conflict state. Chapter 4 looked at 
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international efforts to promote peace after civil war. The results show that international 
engagement can make a difference and that supporting political institutions and 
governance can be just as efficient as security-focused international peacebuilding 
interventions.  
 
 
Contribution to the academic literature 
 
The dissertation contributes to the current literature in several ways. Firstly, Chapters 
2 and 3 assess claims of the literature that have so far remained untested. Proponents 
of the democratic civil peace theory have long argued that one mechanism via which 
democracy contributes to peace is by providing non-violent channels to participate. The 
first chapter scrutinizes this claim and develops it further by proposing a theoretical 
argument as to why some channels of political participation should be able to reduce 
conflict recurrence, specifically local elections. Second, many expect that constitution-
writing can contribute to peace, but this claim has to date not been assessed empirically. 
The third chapter of this dissertation both puts forward empirical evidence that there is 
indeed a positive relationship between post-conflict constitution making and peace as 
well as a theoretical argument why this is the case.  
 
Secondly, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that it is possible to identify specific types of 
political institutions – or institutional change – that contribute to peace. Given that the 
172 
 
 
 
existing literature does not show a clear link between either regime type or political 
power-sharing and less conflict recurrence, one could conclude that political factors are 
not decisive in explaining conflict recurrence. Moreover, the literature clearly shows 
that premature post-conflict elections at the national level can destabilize post-conflict 
countries, which could lead to the conclusion that political participation is not only 
irrelevant, but in fact dangerous. This dissertation strongly calls such conclusions into 
question. Instead it demonstrates that it is possible to identify specific political 
institutions and types of institutional change that in fact increase a country’s chances 
of remaining peaceful. These results are further underlined by one of the main findings 
of Chapter 4. The path “Institutionalizing peace” in which international support to 
politics and governance contributes to peace is the path that explains most of the cases. 
 
Thirdly, the dissertation generates new insights by unpacking broad categories the 
literature has so far been working with. Chapter 2 disaggregates regime type and 
instead looks at local elections as one very specific channel of political participation. 
Chapter 4 departs from the broad category of peacebuilding in order to be able to 
analyse international engagement in post-conflict contexts more concretely than 
current approaches that focus on peacekeeping or aid more generally. Both chapters 
are able to show that specific aspects of the broader categories are consistently 
associated with sustainable peace.  
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Policy implications 
 
The findings of this dissertation have clear policy implications. Firstly, they provide 
policy makers with concrete insights on which domestic political institutions can 
reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. This is particularly important because many 
others only warn of democratization, more specifically post-conflict elections, but are 
not able to present alternative strategies. The literature warning of post-conflict 
elections, for example recommends international actors to focus on institution-building 
before supporting elections. However, it remains entirely opaque what this is supposed 
to mean as “it is not clear (…) precisely what the exact institutional developments or 
preconditions are—only that they take time to develop” (Joshi, et al., 2017). The results 
in this thesis instead provide policy makers with very concrete suggestions on 
potentially promising areas of engagement. Regarding political participation, the 
results of the dissertation suggest that local elections can contribute to sustained peace 
and should therefore receive international attention. Importantly, these institutions can 
also be supported in autocratic contexts, without necessarily pushing for 
democratization, which is known to have potentially destabilizing effects in these types 
of contexts. 
 
Writing a new constitution, the topic of the third chapter, is often promoted by 
international actors in post-conflict situations. For example, Security Council 
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Resolution No. 2254, which was passed in 2015 and lays out the basis for a road map 
for peace talks in Syria, explicitly identifies the need to draft a new constitution. The 
findings of this dissertation show that writing a new constitution can indeed contribute 
to peace, hence lending support to international efforts in this area. At the same time 
the third chapter also demonstrates that it is vital to allow enough time for these often 
very complicated processes. International actors frequently pressure post-conflict 
countries to go through these processes very quickly, which according to the results of 
this dissertation could run counter to building sustainable peace. Finally, the fourth 
chapter demonstrates more generally that international engagement can contribute to 
peace and shows which specific types of international support can be helpful in 
different contexts. The results at hand show that support to politics and governance 
constitutes an effective strategy for international actors seeking to support peace.  
 
 
Limitations  
 
This dissertation has two main limitations. Firstly, although several steps were taken to 
reduce the risk of endogeneity biasing the results, it still poses a challenge in each of 
the chapters. One additional way to address endogeneity would be to better understand 
the origins of the institutions and processes analysed. Independent analyses that look 
at and explain aid allocation to post-conflict states or the question of which post-
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conflict states adopt new constitutions would be promising avenues for further 
investigations in this regard.  
 
Secondly, the fourth chapter shows that it can be beneficial to complement quantitative 
findings with qualitative insights. Both the second and third chapter rely almost purely 
on quantitative analyses. Systematic, comparative analyses of post-conflict 
constitution-making could help better understand under which conditions constitution-
writing contributes to peace. Further analysing the causal mechanisms put forward in 
the third chapter would also mean taking a closer look at determinants of trust – both 
between citizens and citizens and the state – in post-conflict societies. Process tracing 
based on qualitative data could also be interesting to take a closer look at the 
mechanism behind the pacifying effect of local elections identified in the second 
chapter. Questions here would be how they are used by the different political actors in 
the post-conflict period – the population, former rebels or potential new rebels – to 
further their political aims and interests.  
 
 
Avenues for future research 
 
The dissertation also opens up several avenues for future research. A first one would 
be to even further disaggregate several of the categories used in this dissertation. In 
order to keep each chapter as parsimonious as possible, very specific and narrow 
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subjects were focused on, leaving other interesting aspects out of the analysis. For 
example, the first chapter only looks at local elections as one very specific channel for 
participation. Analyses of other types of participation, such as through political parties 
or civil society, could also generate further insights into the connection between 
political institutions and conflict recurrence. Another prominent argument in the 
democratic civil peace theory is that institutional constraints are key in explaining why 
democracies should be able to avoid conflict (recurrence). It would be possible to also 
take a closer look into this argument, differentiate between different types of 
institutional constraints and whether they reduce a country’s risk of experiencing 
conflict recurrence. Similarly, although already presenting a more disaggregated 
approach, the fourth chapter still deals with quite broad categories of international 
peacebuilding. Several of the five identified areas of peacebuilding, such as politics 
and governance, still encompass many different types of international support and 
could be looked at in a more detailed manner. Also the current analysis combines aid 
commitments across all different types of international actors. Taking a closer look at 
how the results vary depending on the type of aid donor (multi- vs. bilateral for 
example) could uncover interesting variation.  
 
One central question the second chapter leaves unanswered, is how the local elections 
that are important to prevent conflict recurrence come about. Further research could 
analyse whether these institutions developed before, during or after the conflict and 
how this affects their effect on post-conflict peace. Such endeavours would also 
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connect well to the literature on sequencing democratization, which calls for allowing 
a period of institution-building in post-conflict contexts. What institutions can be and 
are built in post-conflict societies hence represents one promising avenue for future 
research with potentially strong policy implications. 
 
Generating new data based on the insights provided by this dissertation would be 
another avenue for further research, as data availability for post-conflict countries 
remains highly limited. Regarding international engagement, complete disbursement 
data on ODA would be a valuable addition, as well as geocoded data that allows 
analysing where exactly aid is going. Gaining more information on local elections, 
when exactly they take place and the extent of voter turnout, for example, could also 
help study in more detail how political participation at the local level affects conflict 
recurrence.  
 
Finally, the results of two control variables consistently contradict some assumptions 
of the current literature on conflict recurrence. Several of the analyses show that less 
intense civil wars are more likely to recur, as are conflicts that ended in a rebel victory. 
Since theoretical arguments can be made for both, it would be worthwhile to look into 
these differences more systematically. Explanations could be that the results differ 
between analyses of systematic and dyadic peace, specific measurement approaches or 
time spans analysed. More generally, such an approach would also imply a more careful 
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discussion of the concept of “conflict recurrence”, its different empirical definitions 
and the different kinds of scenarios it entails.  
 
To summarize, this thesis expands the current literature by disaggregating the political-
set up of post-conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) certain types of political 
participation have a pacifying effect 2) institutional change, in the form of constitution-
writing, can be good for peace and 3) international support to political processes and 
governance is an important strategy in building sustainable peace. The dissertation 
opens up several avenues for further research while also generating valuable 
implications for policy-makers, most importantly that support to political participation 
in post-conflict countries can contribute to sustainable peace. 
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